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Welcome, 
 
Thank you for reading this latest Sports, Inc. is-
sue.  As former editor-in-chiefs Jeffrey Lebow ‘11, Joshua 
Erenstein ‘11, and I graduate this spring, we take this 
space to briefly give thanks and share a vision for the mag-
azine‘s future. 
Each current and former writer and editor has 
contributed with great effort and dedication.  Working 
through first and second (and sometimes third and fourth) 
drafts, the time our student editors have dedicated, while 
balancing many other responsibilities, to this issue and the 
previous four is greatly appreciated.  Additional thanks are 
due to our printer, Bloomberg LP, as well as the club‘s 
faculty advisor, Kevin Harris, for his advice and enthusi-
asm. 
This magazine itself is in a broader sense a ―thank 
you‖ to our professors and advisors.  The goal for each 
issue is to present intelligent, educational, and accessible 
articles.  Whether the subject is MLS labor negotiations, 
NCAA football attendance, or advanced NFL player met-
rics, the analytical tools used—which could be statistical, 
financial, legal, mathematical, historical, or cultural—are 
essential to our mission.  Subject matter we learn in ILR 
and our time at Cornell influences and inspires all that we 
do. 
Current ILRSMC seniors started the first issue 
two years ago and grew with each subsequent installment, 
yet we have great faith in our next editor-in-chief, Jake 
Makar ‘13, and the still-expanding editorial team.  We 
trust that the magazine will continue to strive for higher 
editorial standards and develop stronger relationships with 
writers and readers.  Previous issues and articles have been 
mailed to alumni, handed to an NBA and MLB General 
Manager, shared with high school students considering 
applying to ILR, emailed to league commissioners and 
presidents, discussed by professional journalists, presented 
in Cornell courses and lectures, linked to by blogs, cited by 
national media and research papers alike, and even read 
cover-to-cover by Fortune 500 executives, but there is 
more the magazine can and will do.  Our writers and edi-
tors aren‘t content to simply observe and comment on the 
sports industry; we truly wish to advance it. 
We hope you find this current issue interesting 
and insightful and come back for the next one. 
 
Happy reading, 
 
Gabe 
Gabe Gershenfeld, ILR ‘11 
Jake Makar, A&S ‘13 
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Introduction 
 
The battle has lasted for 60 
minutes. The score is tied. The coaches 
prepare their players. The fans cross their 
fingers. The most important play of the 
game is underway. A flick of the ref‘s 
fingers and it is… heads. 
The NFL coin flip to determine 
possession in overtime is one of the most 
crucial plays in all of sports, and the play-
ers are not even on the field. Fans, play-
ers, and coaches have all had their gripes 
about this act of chance that determines a 
game of skill and determination. This is 
not only because the teams have no con-
trol over the outcome, but also because 
statistically the team that wins the coin 
flip has a better chance of winning the 
game. Only 7 teams in the 36-year history 
of the NFL overtime system, encompass-
ing 445 overtime regular-season games, 
have chosen to kick off rather than re-
ceive. In the past decade, there have been 
158 overtime games. 96 times or 61% of 
the time, the winner of the coin flip won 
the game. 58 times or 37% of the time, 
the losing team‘s offense never touched 
the ball (Burke). Essentially the team that 
wins the coin flip has 3:2 odds of winning 
the game, which has caused years of de-
bate and recently resulted in a rule 
change. 
On March 23rd, 2010, NFL own-
ers voted by a margin of 28-4 to establish 
new overtime rules in the playoffs. In 
many ways the new system is similar to 
the old one; there is a coin flip, a kickoff, 
and in many scenarios the game will re-
vert back to sudden death. However, the 
new rules increase the likelihood of the 
kicking team getting a possession and the 
game does not necessarily end with the 
first score. 
Imagine this hypothetical situa-
tion - Team A has won the coin toss and 
elected to receive the ball, while Team B 
must kick off.  If Team A scores a touch-
down, it wins; if it scores a field goal, 
Team B must answer with a score of its 
own, a touchdown winning the game or a 
field goal resulting in a sudden death situ-
ation. If Team A fails to score on its first 
possession, the next team to score wins. 
These changes decrease the 
competitive advantage gained by a ran-
dom coin toss, yet after a thorough analy-
sis, it is evident that further improve-
ments and changes are still needed. 
 
Analysis of the Problem 
 
The root of the NFL overtime 
dilemma is the increased skill of field 
goal kickers. In 1974, the league field 
goal percentage was 60.6%; in 2008, this 
number increased to 84.5%. In 1974, 36% 
of field goal attempts were from 40+ 
yards; in 2008, this number increased to 
41%. These statistics prove that, ―in dec-
ades past, when teams kicked off from the 
35 or 40 yard line and when field goal 
kickers were not as accurate as they are 
today, starting overtime with the ball did 
not offer much, if any, edge‖ (Leonhardt). 
In today‘s game, the 
kickoff is at the 30-yard 
line and the current field 
goal kickers make field 
goals of well over 50 
yards meaning that the 
receiving team does not 
even have to drive half of 
the field to get into scor-
ing position. 
It is no secret 
that teams play for the 
field goal in overtime. 
Since 1994, 73% of over-
time games have been 
won by a field goal. The 
significance of 1994 is 
that this is the year that 
the NFL made a rule 
change, moving the kick-
off from the 35 to the 30-
yard line. NFL rule 
changes in conjunction 
with the increased skill of field goal kick-
ers have made the NFL overtime format 
unacceptable. 
This fact was evident in the 2010 
NFC Championship game, when the New 
Orleans Saints beat the Minnesota Vi-
kings in overtime by kicking a field goal 
on their first possession. Brett Favre 
threw an interception to end regulation; 
his offense would never see the ball 
again. The Saints won the coin flip in 
overtime and returned the ball to the 39-
yard line. Thirty-nine yards later – com-
posed of two questionable penalties total-
ing 17 yards and a measly 22 yard offen-
sive gain - Garrett Hartley converted a 40
-yard field goal, which eliminated the 
Vikings and sent the Saints to their first 
super bowl in franchise history. It took an 
event of this magnitude to make the NFL 
realize that the current overtime system 
was compromising the integrity of the 
game. After much controversy and de-
bate, league officials and the owners de-
cided to enact the new postseason over-
time rules this past offseason. 
Dissecting the New NFL Overtime Rules 
Why new rule changes extend the game and the debate 
 
Ross Berger, CALS ‗14 & Joey Shampain, A&S ‗13 
rlb283@cornell.edu & jrs433@cornell.edu 
A Brett Favre interception, two questionable penalties, and 
unfair OT rules sent Drew Brees and the Saints to the 
2010 Super Bowl. 
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Overtime Changes 
 
Overtime games are seemingly a 
rarity in the NFL, but according to Peter 
King of Sports Illustrated, the NFL plays 
12 overtime games per season. Assuming 
these games are randomly distributed, the 
probability of any one game going into 
overtime is 4.7%; conversely, the chance 
that a game will not go into overtime is 
95.3%. Raising this number to the 16th 
power gives us 46.3% - the odds of a 
team playing 16 consecutive games with-
out playing in overtime. However, this 
means that the odds of a team playing in 
at least one overtime game in the regular 
season, are 53.7%, and this number in-
creases with teams that make the 
playoffs. Overtime games are likely to 
affect every team in the league at least 
once every other season, substantiating 
the importance placed on this aspect of 
the game in a 16 game season when every 
game is critical. 
The main goal of the new system 
is to reduce the advantage of the team 
who wins the coin toss. At a recent meet-
ing of the NFL‘s Competition Committee, 
Eric Winston, tackle for the Houston Tex-
ans, stated the need for a change in a few 
words: ―They're trying to prevent the 45-
yard kick return, then a pass-interference 
call, then kneeling on the ball on third 
down, then kicking an easy field 
goal‖ (King). According to Brian Burke 
of Advanced NFL Statistics, the new 
rules somewhat succeed; he calculates 
that the winning percentages in favor of 
the winner of the coin toss will move 
from 60/40 to 56/44. Burke uses calculat-
ed drive outcome rates and a visual model 
to calculate the probability of certain sce-
narios. When multiplying through the 
percentages on the chart below, the re-
ceiving team is predicted to win only 
56% of the time. 
This percentage is possibly an 
overestimate when considering that the 
kicking team will have use of all four 
downs when they receive the ball after a 
converted field goal. The chances of scor-
ing improve drastically as this team has 
33% more downs available to them. This 
added down will increase the probability 
of a score by the kicking team, which 
further increases their odds to win. 
Although it is clear that the new 
overtime rules are an improvement over 
the old rules, they are far from a perma-
nent solution. The most pressing issue is 
that the rules are only in place for playoff 
games. The restriction of the rules to the 
postseason limits the sample size and 
hinders the league‘s ability to analyze 
how the winning percentages will change. 
On average, there are 1.2 playoff games 
that are decided in overtime each year, so 
within the next ten years we may see a 
total of 12 overtime games governed by 
the new rules. This is clearly not a large 
enough sample size for any noticeable 
trend to emerge. 
Additionally, the rules create 
new scenarios that coaches have never 
encountered, forcing them to make deci-
sions without any true experience. For 
example, on fourth down, a team within 
field goal range will have to debate 
whether to kick the field goal or go for 
the game-ending touchdown. Making 
these decisions for the first time should 
not be during the postseason, when the 
outcomes of the games are most im-
portant. If the NFL feels their new rules 
are the answer to the overtime dilemma, 
why not extend them to the regular sea-
son? Teams could then practice working 
with the new rules and scenarios during 
the regular season. 
 
Alternative Solutions 
 
The new rules were not the only 
proposed solution to the overtime debate. 
One option was moving the kickoff up 
from the 30-yard line to the 35 or 40-yard 
line. This would decrease average starting 
field position, lowering the likelihood of 
the receiving team scoring on its first 
possession. Due to more touchbacks, 
teams would start more often at their own 
20-yard line, where, according to the fol-
lowing Brian Burke graph, there is an 
equal likelihood of both teams scoring 
next. However, under this proposal, a 
team can still drive down the field on its 
first possession and kick a field goal to 
win the game without the other team 
touching the ball. 
Based on Burke‘s subsequent  
graph of Expected Point Value by Field 
Position, we created another proposal in 
which the receiving team must start with 
the ball on their 15-yard line. At this 
point on the field where a team has a ex-
pected point value of 0, there is essential-
ly no advantage of having the ball. There-
fore, it would be wise for teams with rela-
tively stronger defenses to play defense 
first, trying to ultimately win the field 
position battle. Unfortunately, this pro-
posal eliminates aspects of special teams 
and kickoff coverage, both of which are 
critical factors in football. 
Another solution that has gained 
some widespread support is an overtime 
in which the first team to score six points 
wins the game. This proposal is similar to 
the new rules implemented by the league, 
but differs in some critical ways. The 
second team to touch the ball would not 
necessarily have to match a converted 
field goal to stay alive in the game. This 
would increase their odds of winning the 
game. However, if the receiving team 
fails to score and the kicking team scores 
a field goal, the game does not end which 
could damage the kicking team‘s chances 
of winning. Other point totals have been 
suggested, such as the first team to 4 
points, but the common flaw among all of 
NFL 
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these proposals is that football is not a 
game controlled by a scoring require-
ment; rather it is a game controlled by a 
limited amount of time, which is the basis 
of the argument for the final possible so-
lution. 
Imposing a restriction on the 
length of field goal is another poplar idea. 
As previously stated, the root of the NFL 
overtime dilemma is the increased accu-
racy of field goal kickers. Their ability to 
now kick field goals of well over 50 yards 
has decreased the length of the field a 
team must travel to score points. This 
proposal would force teams to make it to 
the opponent‘s 13-yard line or further to 
attempt a field goal, which would there-
fore be 30 yards or less. The odds that a 
team would not see the ball would greatly 
diminish, and if the receiving team were 
to score on the first possession it would 
most likely be the result of a long drive. 
The negatives of this solution include the 
fact that it takes out an aspect of special 
teams as it restricts field goal kickers and 
takes away the value of a kicker with 
superior leg strength in overtime. 
One more proposal is a ten-
minute overtime in which the team with 
the most points after the ten-minute peri-
od wins. This proposal has garnered 
much support because it keeps the integri-
ty of the game intact. Overtime should 
not change the way the game is played. In 
the NBA, there is a five-minute overtime 
period, not a race to score ten points. In 
the MLB, there are full innings played, 
not a home-run derby to decide the win-
ner. This NFL overtime scheme proposes 
that the game continues as an extension 
of regulation and the 10-minute limit 
should allow for more than one posses-
sion as drives rarely last over 10 minutes. 
At most, the average time per drive is 
about 3 minutes, so both teams should see 
the ball in the overtime period. The only 
drawback to this proposal is that games 
would be considerably longer, increasing 
the chances of an injury and causing a stir 
among television networks. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 It is the greatest folly in all of 
the sports. From the second we step foot 
on the Pee-Wee football field, we are 
taught that practice and determination are 
the foundations of success in sports. An 
overtime scheme based on a random coin 
toss contradicts these values as players 
lose control over the outcome of the 
game.  This must be changed. Enough of 
the political influence on the overtime 
format; enough of the crying over injuries 
that may result from extended play. A 
system must be implemented for the good 
of the game. Yes, it is impossible to make 
the perfect rule, but there are several 
changes that could be made right now to 
make the game fairer. Every fan, every 
player, every coach, and every owner has 
a different perspective, which is why it is 
tough to make changes in the system, but 
everyone agrees that modifications must 
be enforced. The proposals in this article 
are only a few of the countless possibili-
ties for different overtime systems and it 
is imperative that pressure be put on 
league officials and owners to make the 
necessary changes. 
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 From Reggie Harding (Detroit 
Pistons) in 1962 to Andrew Bynum (Los 
Angeles Lakers) in 2005, a basketball 
player who is drafted immediately out of 
high school makes news. Opponents ar-
gued against this eligibility from two dif-
ferent angles: 1) that an eighteen year old 
player‘s physical development is not yet 
complete and the constant pressure to 
train and perform would have detrimental 
effects on his future health; and 2) that 
drafting an eighteen year old would set a 
precedent of crowding out the older play-
ers in the league by replacing them with 
younger players. These opponents push 
for professional sports leagues to set min-
imum age restrictions for all athletes in 
the league. 
This route to oppose the employ-
ment of younger athletes is made by peo-
ple who do not understand the extent of 
case law surrounding this very topic in 
the United States legal system. The fact 
of the matter is that, subject to a ―rule of 
reason‖ analysis, the antitrust laws of the 
United States prohibit leagues from set-
ting such a restriction. 
 What makes an agreement bar-
ring players of a certain age illegal? How 
did this come to be? How does it still 
exist today? This article aims to answer 
these questions by offering a concise his-
tory of the antitrust laws in general and 
how these laws are applied to profession-
al sports leagues through a case study of 
Clarett v. NFL. 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 
(2004). Additionally, a brief analysis of 
the law‘s potential implications on the 
decision for a players‘ union to decertify 
is included. 
 But first, here is some back-
ground information on the general body 
of antitrust legislation. 
 
What the Trust?! Some General Back-
ground on American Antitrust Law  
 
The field of United States anti-
trust law as it applies to professional 
sports leagues stems from almost beauti-
fully simple language from Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act of 1890, which reads: 
 
―Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be 
illegal." (15 U.S.C. § 1) 
 
If one were to stop and think about the 
language used above, one would say to 
themselves: ―Whoa! That is some sweep-
ing language right there!‖ And that per-
son would be correct. Simply reading the 
language above makes any contract 
where money changes hands illegal. For 
example, any labor contract would be 
illegal, as it restrains a firm from hiring 
an employee under specific terms and 
restrains an employee from seeking em-
ployment under those terms – the terms 
themselves would, in theory, restrict 
trade. Obviously the U.S. Congress did 
not intend to stop the formation of all 
contracts and had more practical applica-
tions in mind. Using this language as a 
guide, the U.S. courts have defined anti-
trust law through cases, specifically aim-
ing, above all, to preserve competition 
and to protect American consumers while 
maintaining a logistically feasible frame-
work within which to decide cases. 
However, professional sports 
leagues must define their employment 
practices even more narrowly than within 
this framework. Because the players in 
the big four sports leagues are unionized, 
the leagues must tailor their practices to 
be legal with regard to the aforemen-
tioned antitrust laws and American labor 
law which allows for concerted economic 
behavior as long as it is in the context of a 
collective bargaining agent (e.g. a union). 
The case of Clarett v. NFL (Id.) provides 
an example of the ambiguous territory 
posed to professional sports leagues re-
garding minimum age restrictions on 
players by these two canons of diametri-
cally opposed law. 
 
A “Clar-ifying” Example 
  
 The case of Clarett v. NFL not 
only shows how the agreement between 
teams within leagues to only recruit play-
ers of a certain age is illegal, but also 
explains the only type of agreement a 
league is actually allowed to make re-
garding, well, anything. 
 The facts of the case are pretty 
simple. Prior to this case, all of the pro-
fessional football teams in the National 
Football League (hereafter, the NFL), 
made an agreement that they would not 
hire players for their teams that were less 
than three years out of high school. Mau-
rice Clarett was a star running back for 
Ohio State who led the Buckeyes to a 
national championship his freshman year.  
After several incidents led to his dismis-
sal from school, he attempted to enter the 
2004 NFL draft a year before he was eli-
Minimum Age Restrictions in Professional 
Sports 
A tantalizing tango of antitrust and labor law 
 
George Yorgakaros, ILR ‗11 
gy43@cornell.edu 
When Senator John Sherman  wrote the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, he probably 
did not expect it to so profoundly affect the 
business of professional sports.  Dr. James 
Naismith would invent basketball one year 
later. 
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gible, as he felt he would have been re-
cruited to play professionally without the 
minimum age restriction.  
 Now you might be thinking: 
―but wait, the antitrust laws have to do 
with trade. How does this whole situation 
qualify as trade?‖ Consider each football 
team as a company buying raw materials 
to create a product. The product, in this 
case, is a football game. Continuing this 
line of thought, imagine that each player 
is a company selling their labor as one of 
the raw materials that go into creating the 
product. Thus, the ―sellers‖ in the market 
are the players themselves and the 
―buyers‖ are 
the teams. 
The facts of 
the case 
then boil 
down to the 
teams com-
ing together 
and forming 
an agree-
ment to boy-
cott the pur-
chase of a 
good, which violates the language in the 
Sherman Act almost perfectly. This is 
clearly an agreement in restraint of trade 
and thus in crystal clear violation of the 
antitrust laws. 
 So why is this case in court? Is it 
not plainly obvious that this is a direct 
violation of the Sherman Act? 
 Think about the nature of the 
―product‖ described above: a football 
game. In order for this product to exist at 
all, some agreements must exist between 
the ―companies‖ that make it. Teams 
must agree on rules for how the game is 
to be played and to determine who wins. 
Even more fundamental than the rules of 
any sports game, the teams must agree to 
meet in order to compete; in other words, 
you cannot have a game with only one 
team. There must be agreements in order 
to create the product. Such was the logic 
that the Supreme Court followed in its 
opinion in NCAA v. Board of Regents. 
468 U.S. 85 (1984), the opinion that set 
the precedent that all agreements within a 
league that have some sort of impact on 
trade must be examined for a ―pro-
competitive justification.‖ 
According to case law to date, 
this is the only defense that will hold up 
in court. Leagues must prove that whatev-
er agreements they make actually encour-
age competition, not hinder it; the agree-
ments must be ―pro-competitive.‖ All 
agreements necessary for the existence of 
the product itself fall within this category. 
In the same opinion, the Supreme Court 
determined that all cases involving agree-
ments within leagues would have to un-
dergo a deeper analysis to decide whether 
or not the agreement was pro-
competitive. 
 This was only one of the argu-
ments presented to the court in the case of 
Clarett v. NFL. One other argument is the 
one that most people wrongfully believe 
is the justification for a minimum age 
hiring restriction within a sports league – 
the fact that the demands of the sport, be 
it in the game itself or due to the strenu-
ous training regiment, could have adverse 
effects on the future health and well-
being of the player. Hypothetically, imag-
ine a coach seeing a 300 pound fifteen 
year old and thinking he could use that 
person on his defensive line. If that player 
were to be hit incorrectly during practice 
or in a game, his future health would be 
compromised. Under the United States 
antitrust laws, a coach could technically 
hire that player. Why does this potentially 
Minimum Age Restrictions in Professional Sports 
After  his dismissal from Ohio state following his freshman season, Maurice Clarette challenged the NFL‘s Draft eligibility rule under 
antitrust law. The court ruled in favor of Clarett, but the decision was overturned. He was later drafted, but never played a down. Un-
fortunately, Clarett may be best known for his legal troubles since the end of his football career. 
Because the players in the big four sports 
leagues are unionized, the leagues must tai-
lor their practices to be legal with regard to 
antitrust laws and American labor law 
which allows for concerted economic be-
havior as long as it is in the context of a col-
lective bargaining agent (e.g. a union).  
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moving argument have no bearing in the 
court?  Prior case decisions, while not 
dealing directly with sports, address this 
question. 
 In National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679 (1978) the ―for the public good 
argument‖ was raised. In that case, the 
attorney on behalf of a group of profes-
sional engineers argued that ―… bidding 
on engineering services is inherently im-
precise, would lead to deceptively low 
bids, and would thereby tempt individual 
engineers to do inferior work with subse-
quent risk to public safety and 
health‖ (id.). Translated, the argument is 
that competition is bad in the industry and 
goes against the public interest by follow-
ing the logic that by having engineers bid 
against each other and creating a race to 
the lowest price, competition would actu-
ally encourage engineers to cut corners 
during design and production and thus 
inherently harm the public. Justice Ste-
vens refutes this argument in his opinion 
saying that it misinterprets the very point 
of the Sherman Act, which forbids agree-
ments in restraint of trade. Stevens says 
that nowhere within the law is there any 
discussion about protecting the public 
interest, only about protecting trade from 
restriction. He writes: 
 
… [The Sherman Act] 
prohibits unreasonable 
restraints on competition. 
[The Society of Profes-
sional Engineers‘] ban on 
competitive bidding pre-
vents all customers from 
making price comparisons 
in the initial selection of 
an engineer and imposes 
the Society‘s views of the 
costs and benefits of com-
petition on the entire mar-
ketplace…it is this re-
straint that must be justi-
fied…and [the Society‘s] 
attempt to do so on the 
basis of the potential threat 
that competition poses to 
the public safety and the 
ethics of its profession is 
nothing less than a frontal 
assault on the basic policy 
of the Sherman Act. (id.) 
 
This case set the precedent that arguing 
that a restraint of trade is justified be-
cause it is in the public interest will not 
hold up in court and, in fact, is ―a frontal 
assault on the basic policy of the Sherman 
Act.‖ (id.) Applying this rule to profes-
sional sports leagues means that these 
leagues cannot justify agreements barring 
certain players from being employed on 
the grounds that it is in the players‘ best 
interest. 
 At this point, allow me to re-
mind you that the district court decided in 
favor of Clar-
ett in Clarett 
v. NFL. The 
NFL argued 
that their 
agreement to 
bar players of 
a certain age 
p r o m o t e d 
competition in that it was an agreement 
necessary for the ―product‖ to exist. The 
court disagreed and thus banned such 
agreements (the case was appealed and 
eventually reversed by the Court of Ap-
peals of the Second Circuit on separate 
grounds). 
 Now, having just read that sen-
tence, you may be saying to yourself and 
wanting to say to me: ―but wait! The 
NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB still have 
minimum age restrictions. What‘s the 
story, George?‖ 
 The story varies from league to 
league, reader.  
 
How Minimum Age Restrictions Can 
Exist Today Despite What You Just 
Read 
 
 It is true the NFL is not allowed 
to make such exclusionary agreements (as 
mentioned earlier, all such agreements are 
subject to ―rule of reason‖ analysis). 
However, this league did something very 
clever to maintain the minimum age 
standard by taking advantage of a loop-
hole in the antitrust laws. Earlier I men-
tioned that collective bargaining agents 
(unions) have a statutory exemption from 
antitrust restrictions under the National 
Labor Relations Act and are allowed to 
conduct concerted economic behavior 
such as strikes. The minimum age re-
striction is now a clause in the collective 
bargaining agents‘ constitution and by-
laws between the NFL and the players‘ 
union. Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, organized labor has a blanket 
antitrust exemption; any agreement or 
term made within the players‘ union con-
tract is immune from antitrust prosecu-
tion. The league bargains for the right to 
maintain the minimum age restriction and 
union membership agrees to keep young-
er players from crowding out the older 
players. 
 This legal strategy also carries 
through to other North American profes-
sional sports leagues.  The NBA took 
advantage of this same loophole as the 
NFL when they established the college 
―one-and-done‖ minimum age restriction 
with the 
N B A 
P l a y e r s 
Associa-
tion in 
t h e i r 
2 0 0 5 
collective 
bargain-
ing agreement.  Under this agreement, 
NBA players have to wait a full year after 
the date of graduation from high school to 
be drafted.  Likewise, the NHL has bar-
gained for player minimum age eligibil-
ity, and amateurs must be 18 years old 
before September 15th of the year of the 
entry draft to be eligible.  MLB is slightly 
more complicated, because the courts 
have excluded MLB from antitrust legis-
lation from 1922 in Federal Baseball 
Club of Baltimore, Inc v. National League 
of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 to 1998 when congress passed the 
Curt Flood Act.  Now that baseball has 
the same antitrust vulnerability as the 
other sports, MLB agrees with their play-
ers‘ association to only draft high school 
players and college players who have 
either completed their junior year or are 
twenty-one (with some exceptions).  
Teams are eligible to sign international 
players at sixteen years old, but this might 
change in the upcoming CBA negotia-
tions (see interview with MLB VP Labor, 
Daniel Halem ‘88, on page 58). 
 What does this mean for leagues 
and players today? Because of the mod-
ern policies outlined above, the NFL and 
NBA face a large risk under the antitrust 
laws with respect to the restriction of 
players within the league. The risk arises 
only if membership were to decertify 
their union, which is a legitimate weapon 
when current collective bargaining agree-
ments‘ term comes to a close. This deci-
sion is a major one, as both management 
and union membership lose the ability to 
maintain the minimum age agreement 
protection from the antitrust laws.  
NFL 
The NFL and NBA face a large risk 
under antitrust laws if membership 
were to decertify their union 
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Baseball general managers may 
not like to hear this, but they are essen-
tially glorified human resource managers.  
If they paid more attention to this reality, 
they may be able to do their job better. 
Work performed in the Baseball 
Operations department of an MLB 
team—player evaluation, coaching play-
ers, administrative filings, arbitration 
strategy, and contract negotiation—are 
transferable to those performed in corpo-
rate human resources departments.  Re-
place ―player‖ with ―employee‖ and 
―coaching‖ with ―managing‖ and drop a 
couple zeroes off the salaries.  A player 
trade can even be compared to mergers 
and acquisitions (for which HR depart-
ments play crucial roles), as the due dili-
gence that went into the Proctor & Gam-
ble and Gillette fusion was similar in 
scope for the Reds and Rangers in the 
Josh Hamilton / Edinson Volquez trade.  
The core issues in both business and 
baseball are similar, and the same funda-
mental theories apply, but the practices 
between a Baseball Operations and Hu-
man Resources office often vary greatly.   
This article explores these con-
cepts through a common Human Re-
sources tool, the nine-box.  What could 
Human Resources professionals learn 
from applying the nine-box to baseball 
players?   And what can the baseball in-
dustry take away from corporate HR 
practices? 
 
The Nine-Box 
 
The nine-box is a tool that HR 
professionals use to evaluate the talents of 
their current workforce and plan for suc-
cession.  This three-by-three matrix labels 
workers into nine boxes, or four simpli-
fied and condensed color categories.  The 
horizontal rows denote a particular em-
ployee‘s performance trend as ―high‖, 
―medium‖, or ―low‖, and vertical col-
umns denote his or her growth potential 
in the same three ratings:  
The terms for each box may vary across 
companies, but are used to describe the 
current status of the worker according to 
his or her past performance and future 
potential.  Here is an example nine-box 
count of 580 managers and executives 
that could be typical of a Fortune 500 
consumer goods company: 
Note that this nine-box designated the 
lowest performing workers as ―reds‖ and 
the remaining medium- and high-
performing workers as ―yellows‖, 
―blues‖, and ―greens‖ according to their 
growth potentials.  Greens may be con-
sidered the most desirable employees, but 
a successful organization requires the 
proper mix of all colors to achieve their 
group‘s objective.  This company catego-
rizes much of its workforce as steady 
yellows (69%) and blues (25.9%) to pass 
along the institutional knowledge in-
volved in producing and selling their 
mainstay products.  In contrast, a compa-
ny in the technology industry may be 
more likely to be made up of high-
potential greens to innovate new prod-
ucts. 
 Besides providing a current 
snapshot of a company‘s talent, the nine-
box is a key tool for succession planning.  
By categorizing employees according to 
these four simple colors, an employer has 
a quick tool to see which employees are 
most prepared to replace current leaders.  
If a company has a discrepancy in yel-
lows and greens across different depart-
ments, then management may choose to 
rotate high-potential leaders throughout 
or re-evaluate their recruiting or training 
strategy across departments.  Brad Pat-
rick, an EVP and Chief Human Resources 
Officer at Tempur-Pedic International, 
writes that the nine-box helps to ―create a 
useful inventory of an organization‘s tal-
ent and how the talent will move through 
the organization‖ and ―provides a nice 
linkage to both individual development 
opportunities and identifying what needs 
to be managed to satisfy organization 
capability needs.‖ 
 The nine-box is clearly an im-
portant personnel tool, but what are some 
of its flaws?  Patrick says its static, point-
in-time inventory is limiting—the tool 
needs to be maintained regularly and ac-
curately in order to be effective.  A green 
who is promoted only to be reclassified as 
a yellow or blue the next year is not un-
common.  Did this employee‘s ―true‖ 
growth potential really change with their 
new job?  An employee‘s nine-box label 
is sometimes determined through his or 
her supervisors and co-workers sitting 
around a table, calibrating their opinions, 
and coming to a consensus.  Hard records 
of performance criteria are sometimes 
brought into the discussion, but determin-
ing growth potential is often subjective 
and can be self-fulfilling.  If a boss 
doesn‘t think you will succeed, then you 
probably won‘t—at least not at that com-
pany under that boss.   
Furthermore, the evaluation cat-
egories are limiting.  What is the exact 
difference between a ―high‖ and 
―medium‖ performance?  These catego-
ries are equivalent to categorizing all 
baseball players as ―subs‖, ―average play-
ers‖, or ―all-stars,‖ for example.  St. Lou-
Quantifying Succession Planning and  
Player Development 
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is first basemen Albert Pujols and Oak-
land pitcher Trevor Cahill were both vot-
ed onto the 2010 All Star Team, but any 
serious baseball fan would not say that 
their value was equal.  The nine-box is 
meant to be a quick assessment, not a 
thorough performance evaluation, yet the 
strategic implications for the nine-box 
mean that the input data must be carefully 
selected. 
M o s t  i mp o r t a n t l y ,  t h e 
―performance trend‖ and ―growth poten-
tial‖ variables are not independent.  The 
word ―trend‖ implies recent actions af-
fecting the future, and thus would seem to 
overlap with that same employees‘ future 
potential.  Indeed, during nine-box meet-
ings at certain companies, evaluators gen-
erally select the single color or nine-box 
they think seems correct, choosing perfor-
mance trend and growth potential togeth-
er at once instead of separately. Inde-
pendence, and an accurate portrayal, can 
only be found when past performance is 
separated from future potential. 
 
A Baseball Perspective 
 
Major League Baseball analysis 
provides another framework for formulat-
ing a more objective nine-box.  Fans and 
professional analysts scrutinize player 
performance daily, and the segmented, 
individualistic nature of the game allows 
for attempts at all-encompassing value 
statistics that can be more objective than 
qualitative performance reviews – meas-
uring past performance and future poten-
tial in separate and more precise ways. 
Baseball Prospectus‘ Value Over 
Replacement Player (VORP) statistic is a 
quick tool to quantify past performance.  
VORP measures ―the number of runs 
contributed beyond what a replacement-
level player at the same position would 
contribute if given the same percentage of 
team plate appearances,‖ ignoring de-
fense.  The following is the distribution of 
all 1,200 Major League players‘ VORP 
who were on a 40-man roster at the end 
of the 2008 season: 
This histogram spread is centered on zero 
and skewed to the right, with a mean 8.4 
runs, median 2.9 runs, and standard devi-
ation of 16.5 runs.  Pujols led the majors 
with 99.1 runs produced over what a ge-
neric ―replacement‖ AAA third-baseman 
could have been expected to produce, 
while Rangers pitcher Luis Mendoza was 
the worst at allowing 31.9 runs more than 
what a ―replacement‖ AAA pitcher would 
have (he had a 3-8 record and 8.67 ERA 
in 63.1 innings).  The 64% of players 
with a positive VORP are highlighted in 
black. 
 ―Upside‖ is another relevant 
Baseball Prospectus statistic; this one can 
be equated to future potential.  This num-
ber is calculated through the past perfor-
mances of players most similar and com-
parable to the player in question at the 
same age.  Above-average performances 
are double-counted while below-average 
performances are counted as zero, thus 
rewarding those with the highest poten-
tial.  An upside score will thus always be 
positive, and can be interpreted as pro-
jected VORP over approximately the next 
five years.  In a February 1, 2007, article 
explaining the concept, former Prospectus 
author (and current Five Thirty Eight 
blogger) Nate Silver shared the following 
key: 
This statistic is most relevant for minor 
league prospects and young major 
leaguers, but VORP and Upside data is 
only available for the same set of 1,200 
Major Leaguers on a 40-man roster enter-
ing the 2009 season.  The following is 
their distribution: 
Upside is strongly skewed right: mean of 
40.2, median of 19.2, and standard devia-
tion of 60.  Numerous role-players and 
older players had scores close to zero, 
while Hanley Ramirez had the highest 
2009 upside of 677.1.  Only ten other 
players had upside scores greater than 
Upside 
Score 
Definition 
100+ Excellent Prospect—―strong 
chance of long major league 
career, perhaps with several 
All-Star appearances‖ 
50-100 Very Good Prospect—
―strong chance of meaningful 
major league career‖ 
25-50 Good Prospect—―reasonable 
chance of a meaningful major 
league career‖ 
10-25 Average Prospect—―some 
chance of a meaningful major 
league career, but more likely 
to end up on fringe.‖ 
0-10 Marginal Prospect—―very 
little chance of becoming a 
major league regular‖ 
Can Red Sox GM Theo Epstein (left) really learn anything from fictional Dunder Mifflin 
HR Representative Toby Flenderson (right)?  Their job functions in fact have many simi-
larities, and tools from one field reveal valuable insights when applied to the other. 
MLB 
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300: Chase Utley (306.4), Tim Lincecum 
(316.0), Evan Longoria (317.6), Dustin 
Pedroia (319.0), Brian McCann (321.4), 
Joe Mauer (344.9), Grady Sizemore 
(349.9), David Wright (433.6), Jose 
Reyes (517.4), and Albert Pujols (528.7).  
Any baseball fan would agree that these 
young players would expect to have many 
more productive future years at that point 
in time. 
 With data on past performance 
for the 2008 season (VORP) and projec-
tions of future potential entering the 2009 
season (Upside), one can combine these 
variables in one scatter plot: 
The majority of players are clustered 
around the replacement level of zero and 
minimal upside, with a spread upwards 
and to the right.  To fully compare this 
spread to a corporate nine-box, the same 
color codes are added according to sub-
jective benchmarks: red for all players 
below replacement level (35.6% of all 
players), yellow for those remaining with 
upside scores below 50 (43.9%), blue for 
those very good prospects with upside 
scores between 50 and 100 (10.8%), and 
green for those excellent prospects with 
upside scores greater than 100 (9.8%).  
Player labels are also added for select 
data points in the scatter plot below. 
 In a corporate HR setting, this 
data would suggest that Aubrey Huff is a 
―pro in place‖, Kevin Youkilis is a ―high 
promotable‖, Jose Reyes is a ―high poten-
tial‖, Cameron Maybin is a ―solid poten-
tial‖, and Luis Mendoza is need of an 
―organizational exit.‖  Manny and Hanley 
Ramirez both had very comparable 2008 
performances in terms of total value, but 
Hanley (age 25) is in the fair right corner 
because he is expected to provide much 
more value over the next five years than 
Manny (age 37).  What about all the 
blank space on the bottom right triangle 
of the plot?  This is where the minor 
leaguers would be—those with high up-
side but low actual performance.  Matt 
Wieters‘ 623.4 2009 Upside score is phe-
nomenal, but his minor league numbers 
translated to only a 7.1 VORP.  He and 
many other top and solid prospects are 
not included because they were not 
placed on the 40-man roster at the end of 
the 2008 season with these other data 
points.  These minor leaguers are the 
players most in need of ―performance 
coaching‖ and time to mature. 
 What value does this exercise 
provide for HR professionals?  The key 
takeaway should be the difference be-
tween discrete and continuous perfor-
mance measurement variables.  In the 
traditional nine-box, an employee is 
bounded into one of nine boxes, whereas 
baseball measures past and future perfor-
mance quantitatively on a continuous 
spectrum.  According to the artificial col-
or boundaries, Carlos Gomez is a red and 
Jay Bruce is a green.  The implications 
for these labels in succession planning 
can drastically affect organizational strat-
egy, and so if the exact statistical differ-
ence between Gomez and Bruce (5.9 
VORP and 35.5 Upside differential) is 
not the same as between Mendoza and 
Pujols (131 VORP and 496.6 Upside dif-
ferential), for example, why should 
Gomez / Mendoza and Bruce / Pujols be 
put in the same boxes?  The challenge is 
for HR departments to develop and im-
plement similar performance and poten-
tial measurements to quantify their talent 
so that evaluations can as precise and 
accurate.   
 Additionally, the upwards-
skewed talent distribution in baseball 
represents one of many ways true talent 
can be distributed across any given popu-
lation.  When HR professionals force 
employees into nine-box categories, they 
are making implicit assumptions about 
talent distribution across their workforce 
that may or may not be valid. 
 From a labor economics per-
spective, another important concept is the 
replacement-level.  In baseball, this is the 
performance level of a AAA minor 
leaguer who would presumably make the 
major league minimum salary (currently 
$400,000 / year).  In the corporate world, 
this could be the talent of a worker a 
company could hire at the state or federal 
(currently $7.25 / hour) minimum wage.  
The decision of whether to hire at this 
level will affect the make-up of reds, yel-
lows, blues, and greens in any organiza-
tion.  A baseball team made up of re-
placement-level players will not win.  
Each company must determine whether 
replacement-level workers and managers 
can perform their work and provide the 
desired succession potential. 
 
Next Steps 
 
 This practice of plotting past 
performance against future potential has 
key implications for comparing organiza-
tions and quantifying player develop-
ment.  The plot on the upper left corner of 
the opposite page displays the same 2008-
9 data for the Chicago White Sox (in 
white) and the Cubs (in blue). 
 The White Sox‘s Jim Thome is 
the yellow ―pro in place‖ and the Cubs‘ 
Rich Harden is the green player with the 
second-highest ‘08 VORP and ‘09 Up-
side.  All data points are generally dis-
persed in the same upwards trend as the 
Quantifying Succession Planning and Player Development 
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plot for all major league players, but the 
White Sox seem to have more players on 
the upper left side (veterans) while the 
Cubs may have more players on the far 
right side (prospects). Such plots can be a 
quick tool for comparing the spread of 
prospects and veterans across organiza-
tions.  What is the optimal distribution of 
talent for an organization?  In 2008, the 
Cubs finished with 97 wins and White 
Sox with 89, while in 2009 the Cubs won 
83 and the White Sox won 79.  Further 
longitudinal research on the distribution 
of talent across more teams can explore 
organizational optimality questions. 
 What is the typical career pro-
gression for an individual player?  These 
2008-9 data are snapshots of past perfor-
mance and predicted performance at one 
point in time, but historical VORP and 
Upside data can show the progression of 
one player over time.  Then-37-year-old 
DH Jim Thome hasn‘t always owned 33.3 
VORP and 19.0 Upside; one can imagine 
him as high blue first-basemen when he 
hit 47 home runs for Philadelphia in 
2003, as a green third-basemen when he 
hit .311/.450/.612 for Cleveland in 1996, 
and as a far-right red when he dominated 
A-ball as 19-year old in the Appalachian 
and Carolina leagues.  And just as Matt 
Wieters and Hanley Ramirez have ad-
vanced from the negative VORPs (red 
zone) they started their careers at, they 
can be expected in future years to contin-
ue providing strong value as they get old-
er and their potential decreases.  The ca-
reer ―path‖ of each player will of course 
be unique, but similar routes for similar 
players can be expected.  The plot on the 
upper-right superimposes potential career 
paths for greens, blues, yellows, and reds 
on the previous Chicago White Sox / 
Cubs plot. 
 Again, these lines and arrows are 
arbitrary designations, but further analy-
sis of historical data can suggest typical 
career paths for groups of players across 
this Cartesian plane.  A player‘s color at 
any one point in time from this last plot 
can suggest previous performance and  
future career progression, from their 
rookie growth (high upside, low value) to 
career peak (high upside and value) to 
veteran decline (low upside and declining 
value).  However, unlike the nine-box, in 
this model their color reflects their ―true‖ 
ability throughout their career, and does 
not change depending on what career 
stage they are currently in.  It may also be 
worth noting that the geometric length of 
the blue line is longer than yellow and 
red, as a blue or green player is expected 
to enjoy a longer career than a yellow or 
red.  The Baseball Prospectus PECOTA 
model is an empirical system to predict 
future performance based on comparable 
players, and such performance vs. poten-
tial historical / predictive plots can pro-
vide original and complementary career 
progressions visuals. 
 This approach can also be ex-
tended to player analysis in other sports.  
What is the career progression for an 
NFL running back drafted out of college?  
Or a European soccer played signed by a 
professional team at age 12?  In both of 
these sports, there may not already be 
VORP- or Upside-equivalent statistics.  
However, these sports must be challenged 
to ―quantify the qualitative‖—in the same 
manner as HR professionals—so that a 
more thorough story can be shared. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The concept of plotting quantita-
tive measures of past performance against 
future potential on two-dimensions is a 
practice that has not been previously uti-
lized in either Baseball Operations or 
Human Resources.  The cross-sectional 
data used are limited, but such a frame-
work can give a more accurate succession 
picture as well open up new visual meth-
ods for baseball player development anal-
ysis.  Previous Sports, Inc. issues have 
documented the increasingly intercon-
nected world of sport and business: Vol-
ume 2, Issue 2 analyzed how MLB GMs 
are increasingly younger, better educated, 
less likely to have played professionally, 
and rising up with more analytical back-
grounds (pp. 11-18), while Volume 2, 
Issue 3 covered the value sports analysis 
holds to outside businesses at the 2010 
MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference 
(pp. 26-35).  In a competitive climate, 
true analytical innovation in both worlds 
must draw off each other to ―think out-
side the box.‖ 
 
The author presented portions of this 
article in an Evolution of Sports Address 
at the 2011 MIT Sloan Sports Analytics 
Conference. 
 
Sources: 
 
Email interview with Brad Patrick, 
11/11/10 
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/
glossary/index.php?search=vorp 
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/
article.php?articleid=5836 
A player‟s color at any 
one point in time from 
this last plot can suggest 
previous performance 
and future career pro-
gression, from rookie 
growth to career peak to 
veteran decline. 
MLB 
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 Trying to follow top-level soccer 
while living in the U.S. isn‘t always so 
easy. Sure, with MLS we now have a 
viable and high quality professional soc-
cer league in the U.S., and it‘s lots of fun 
to go to MLS matches, especially in the 
new built-for-soccer stadiums. But the 
truth is that the very best soccer is still 
played in Europe and will be for some 
time to come. So one of the perennial 
questions soccer fans have debated over 
the years is which leagues are the very 
best, and how you may be able to tell. To 
answer that question, UEFA, Europe‘s 
soccer governing body, has been in the 
business of measuring the quality of 
leagues. This is meant to take some of the 
subjective judgments out of the debate, 
but more importantly, it helps UEFA de-
termine how many teams from each 
league get a chance to participate in the 
crown jewel of international soccer com-
petition, the UEFA Champions League. 
 UEFA does this by calculating a 
so-called league ―coefficient,‖ which is 
determined by the results of the clubs of 
the leagues in UEFA Champions League 
and UEFA Europa League games over 
the past five seasons. UEFA‘s most re-
cent (2010) coefficients of the European 
leagues reveal the following hierarchy of 
leagues: the English Premier League 
(EPL), Spain‘s La Liga, Italy‘s Serie A, 
and the German Bundesliga are currently 
the top 4 leagues with some distance to 
spare (with the leagues in France, Russia, 
Ukraine, Romania, Portual, and the Neth-
erlands rounding out the top 10 leagues). 
A closer look at the coefficients reveals 
rough parity between the English and 
Spanish leagues (with coefficients around 
80) followed by Serie A and the Bun-
desliga (with coefficients around 65). 
And this sounds about right; if you asked 
soccer professionals – coaches and play-
ers – where they want to work, these are 
the leagues that would likely rank highest 
in their minds.  
 An important and interesting 
follow-up question for soccer analysts is 
whether the style and quality of play dif-
fer across these four in important ways. 
At the level of players, the question 
would be whether moving from one 
league to another is akin to moving from, 
say, the AFC East to the NFC West in 
American football. At the level of teams 
and managers, the question is whether 
performance measured in one environ-
ment (speak: league) is comparable to 
performance in another – no manager 
wants to overpay for performance in a 
league that‘s nothing like the one the 
player is hired into. 
 One indicator of a league‘s qual-
ity may be how its teams do in head to 
head competition with teams from other 
leagues in Champions League or Europa 
League play. But there is surprising little 
else we know about how leagues com-
pare, and it is difficult to develop very 
strong prior expectations about what the 
data might tell us about league differ-
ences in style and quality. On one hand, 
one might expect that leagues‘ results 
reflect different, perhaps national, styles 
of play and tactics. So, off the bat, one 
might expect to see fewer shots on goal in 
countries like Italy and Germany that are 
traditionally known for a more defensive 
style of play than in countries like Eng-
land, where teams have traditionally 
played a more physical game or Spain 
where a more open offensive possession-
dominated game has predominated. On 
the other hand, one might argue that these 
leagues have become so thoroughly inter-
nationalized from the youth academies 
up, with player and manager movement 
and the diffusion of soccer knowledge 
across Europe and the globe, that one 
wouldn‘t expect too many differences 
across the top leagues that could be at-
tributed to ―national‖ styles and soccer 
cultures. 
 In what follows, I report some 
data on league performance on offensive 
production and fouls and punishment to 
show that, while soccer at the very high-
est level follows similar basic patterns, 
there also are some real differences across 
the Big Four leagues of soccer.  To make 
things comparable and recent, I examine 
Comparing the Best Soccer Leagues in the 
World 
A „style of play‟ statistical breakdown  
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Statically, Bundesliga players shoot more than the other players in the Big Four; how-
ever, this does not correlate to a  higher goal percentage. 
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data for the last five seasons – that is, 
from 2005/06 to 2009-10. 
 
Offensive Production 
 
 First, above is a look at offen-
sive production across the leagues, meas-
ured by the number of goals and shots 
taken by teams per match. An obvious 
place to start is to look at the number of 
goals scored per match. 
 There is relatively little variation 
across years and leagues. Statistically 
speaking, these leagues are extremely 
―well behaved‖ and it is difficult to detect 
over time trends or cross-league differ-
ences. Each of the leagues, on average, 
sees slightly fewer than 3 goals each 
match each season. We observe the most 
stability in Serie A, which has only mi-
nute variation over time, and in the Bun-
desliga. The EPL and La Liga have seen 
slight upward trends in goals, but data for 
five seasons are probably not sufficient to 
say if these are long-term trends (the high 
point came in La Liga‘s 2008/09 season 
at 2.9 goals per match). Overall, virtually 
without fail, the four big leagues see 
slightly below 3 goals per average match. 
 But teams can‘t score if they do 
not shoot, so what do the data reveal 
about shots taken on goal (SOG) and 
shots on target (SOT)? One thing to note 
up front is that, in each of the four 
leagues, shots on target (SOT) and shots 
on goal (SOG) are (unsurprisingly) posi-
tively correlated with goals and wins. 
This means that the more teams shoot and 
the more accurately they shoot, the more 
they score and the more matches they 
win. Importantly, shots on target (SOT) 
are more highly correlated with outcomes 
than shots on goal (SOG). 
 Here, again, we see that the 
leagues are remarkably similar to one 
another. On average, teams take about 25 
shots per match. Over the last five years, 
the Bundesliga has been the most trigger-
happy league with 27.6 SOG, and the 
EPL the least trigger-happy with 23.2. 
Serie A and La Liga were in between at 
24.4 and 25.2, respectively. And the one 
notable anomaly 
seems to be Serie 
A in the 2005-06 
and 2006-07 sea-
sons with only 
about 20 SOG. 
Overall, these are 
small differences 
around a similar 
central tendency. 
 And fi-
nally, teams can‘t 
score unless they 
actually hit the 
target, so below to 
the left are the 
numbers for shots 
on target (SOT) 
rather than just shots on goal (the data for 
the 2005-06 Bundesliga season are miss-
ing). To the left, we finally see some 
more distinct differentiation among the 
leagues, mostly with regard to the English 
Premier League. 
 Aside from the one notable out-
lier - Bundesliga clubs were particularly 
accurate in 2006-07 - the numbers of 
SOT are quite similar, with one excep-
tion: accuracy has gradually and notably 
gone up in the EPL where it is by now 
highest among the four leagues. That is, 
there has been an increase in accuracy in 
the Premier League, along with the in-
crease in shots taken. 
 Another way to see this is to 
calculate the shots on goal by shots on 
target ratios - how many shots did teams 
have to take to yield shots on target? Here 
are the ratios, averaged over the past five 
years: 
 These numbers show that the 
EPL clearly stands out: the league is more 
efficient than the other leagues when it 
comes to shot accuracy and the difference 
to the other leagues is distinct. 
While shooters in the EPL are slightly 
less trigger-happy than shooters else-
where, especially in recent years, they 
need fewer shots to create shots on target. 
And when we combine the shots on target 
trend with the accuracy ratio, it is clear 
that the EPL has outpaced the other 
leagues in recent years. Enough to say 
that it is different from the other leagues? 
EPL:  1.87 
Bundesliga: 2.46 
Serie A: 2.58 
La Liga: 2.79 
Soccer 
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Comparing the Best Soccer Leagues in the World 
 
By and large, the EPL is quite similar to 
the other leagues - so far as goals and 
overall shots are concerned - but hitting 
the target is one of the things that make it 
distinct. 
 When we put all these things 
together in the one graph above to show 
the various ratios of goals and shots 
(overall and on target), the distinctions 
among the leagues become more obvious 
(using data from the 2009-10 season).  
 Across the Big 4, the goal/shot 
ratios are virtually identical and reminis-
cent of Charles Reep‘s ratio of 1 goal in 
nine shots on goal (.111) (Reep and Ben-
jamin 1968). Despite this essential simi-
larity, there are sizable differences in shot 
accuracy and conversion efficiency across 
them. In fact, the EPL and La Liga could-
n‘t be more different despite their virtual-
ly identical goal/shot ratios. In the EPL, 
we see lots of high value shots (the high-
est SOT/Shots ratios), but low conversion 
(the lowest goals/SOT ratios). In La Liga, 
we see the lowest proportion of accurate 
shots, but the highest conversion rates. 
Finally, the Bundesliga and Serie 
A are similar to one another in that they 
have more accurate shooting than in La 
Liga, but lower conversion rates than the 
Spanish league. 
 These findings suggest that the 
quality of forward play in the EPL is 
higher in that teams manage to take more 
accurate shots (though EPL strikers, on 
average, take fewer shots overall). At the 
same time, La Liga play stands out offen-
sively because of the high conversion rate 
we see in the league. Whether this is due 
to better goalkeeping in EPL or weaker 
(though accurate in the sense of hitting 
the goal) shooting in the EPL cannot be 
answered with these data. 
Fouls and Cards 
 
 Another way to evaluate the 
style of play is to consider how many 
fouls teams commit or how much punish-
ment referees have to mete out. These can 
be taken as indicators of style of defen-
sive play in the case of tactical fouls in-
tended to interrupt the flow of the game, 
but also of how physically tough and dan-
gerous a league is. When counting up 
fouls, however, there‘s a thorny defini-
tional issue. The official statistics we 
have from box scores and various other 
published sources include only fouls that 
are called by the referee, not necessarily 
those that were committed. Counting how 
many times referees blow the whistle for 
a foul and a card is not the same as count-
ing actual fouls or correct punish-
ment. Assuming that too many fouls 
called on any one team we would ran-
domly draw from a hat cancel out too few 
called on another drawn from a hat, above 
to the right is the total number of fouls 
called over the past 
five seasons. 
 As the 
data show, there is 
quite a range in 
how busy referees 
are. The totals 
range from fewer 
than 9,000 fouls 
called in the 
2008/09 EPL sea-
son to almost 
15,000 in the 
2005/06 La Liga 
season and the 
2007/08 Serie A 
season. Among 
other things, this 
suggests fewer interruptions to the game 
in Germany and England than Italy and 
Spain or conversely, a more fluid, contin-
uous style of play. Over the 2005/06-
2009/10 seasons as a whole, the average 
numbers of fouls per match were: 
 Again, the EPL looks distinctly 
different from the rest of the pack (the 
low foul totals for the Bundesliga shown 
in the graph are virtually entirely due to 
the fact that there are fewer teams [18] 
and therefore matches played in that 
league). Clearly, fewer fouls are called in 
the Premiership. The data show that play 
is interrupted just for a foul (aside from 
all the other interruptions that happen in a 
EPL:  24.63 
Bundesliga: 36.46 
Serie A: 35.09 
La Liga: 37.41 
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Soccer 
match) every 3.5 minutes in the Premier 
League and every 2.5 minutes in the other 
leagues. At the level of individual teams, 
this means that teams in the Premiership 
are called for fouls an average 12 times 
per match, while teams in the other three 
big leagues foul a whopping 50% more at 
an average of about 18 times per match. 
This statistic is particularly interesting in 
light of the fact that commentators com-
monly talk about the alleged physical 
play in the EPL. Perhaps by that they 
mean that fouls are committed as often 
there as elsewhere but simply not called 
as much. This could be the case, of 
course, or there may simply be fewer 
fouls in the Premiership than anywhere 
else. 
 Along with fouls, does football 
punishment get meted out equally across 
leagues?  One easy way to see if there are 
patterns and to quantify their size is to 
look at yellow cards - a common enough 
occurrence in a match to yield some inter-
esting and sufficient data. So below are 
trends in yellow cards since the 2005-06 
season per team/match. 
 Overall, teams see about two 
yellows per match played. But clearly, 
referees in some leagues more easily pull 
out the card than in others. In particular, 
refs in La Liga give significantly more 
yellows than refs in the Premier League, 
but also than in Serie A, a league with 
similar foul totals. La Liga‘s 2.5 yellows 
per team/match easily dwarf the Premier-
ship‘s roughly 1.5 cards. Whether this 
reflects differences in playing style, in-
structions from the league, training of 
refs, or more skillful diving in Spain‘s top 
league is unclear, but punishment is clear-
ly not meted out equally. We see consist-
ently more yellows over the years in 
Spain and Italy than in England and Ger-
many. We also see the fewest yellow 
cards in the EPL, consistent with the pat-
tern of fouls called. 
 
 
They’re the Same, Except When 
They’re Not, and the English Premier 
League Really Is Different 
 
 The data reviewed above pro-
vide some descriptive evidence for two 
basic conclusions. First, the highest quali-
ty soccer leagues in the world are remark-
able similar in important ways. On com-
mon metrics of 
offensive pro-
duction like 
goals scored, 
shots on goal, 
or the goal to 
shot ratio, the 
leagues are 
very similar. 
But lurking 
u n d e r n e a t h 
these basic 
metrics we see 
that the English 
Premier League 
is different 
from the rest in 
key ways: play 
is interrupted 
less frequently 
because of 
fouls, there are 
fewer delays on the field because of yel-
low cards awarded, and shots on goal are 
significantly more likely to be accurate, 
though less likely to find their target 
when they are accurate, than in the other 
three leagues. Taken together, this sug-
gests a faster, more continuous, and more 
exciting pace of play that viewers value. 
For players coming into the league, this 
suggests that players cannot count on refs 
to stop play, and the ability to keep going 
despite a tackle or challenge from the 
opposition is a key ingredient for EPL 
success. As well, EPL managers will be 
on the lookout for accurate shooters more 
than managers in other league as well as 
defenders and goalkeepers who know 
how to play together to turn away accu-
rate shots after they‘ve been taken (for 
example, after set play like a corner or 
free kick). 
 Next time you have a chance to 
watch a Premier League and Serie A 
match side by side, see if your own eyes 
confirm what these data just told you. But 
the beauty of the game and whether this is 
better soccer, lies in the eyes of the be-
holder. 
 
For more information on soccer analytics 
and more detailed comparisons across 
leagues and teams, check out the author‟s 
blog at www.soccerquantified.com. 
 
Source: 
 
Reep, C. and Benjamin, B. (1968). Skill 
and chance in association foot-
ball. J. Royal Statistical Society 
A 131: 581-585. 
Chelsea FC celebrates their 2009-2010 Premier League Championship. 
David Beckham and AC Milan argue the issuance of yellow card in 
Serie A play. 
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Introduction 
 
Soccer (football, futbol, whatev-
er you call it) has for many years been 
referred to as ―The Beautiful Game‖. 
Though the laws of the game apply eve-
rywhere, different styles of play seem to 
spring up in different parts of the globe. 
The various different styles from around 
the world have battled each other for 
years, literally. From the likes of Pele, 
Garincha and free form Brazil, to Johan 
Cruyff and the Dutch Total football sys-
tem different areas of the world have 
been known for their own styles of play. 
One system, bred in Italy, the infamous, 
―bend but don‘t break‖, defensive-minded 
catenaccio formation (in which a sweeper 
or ―libero‖ plays directly in front of the 
keeper), though in many ways extinct has 
made a comeback and a new, modern day 
catenaccio mindset has come about.  
While some people can appreci-
ate a hard fought, defensive battle, the 
majority of fans like goals, and lots of 
them. Though soccer has been growing in 
popularity in the United States as the 
MLS grows and the national team suc-
ceeds on the international stage, many 
pundits still claim it bores them due to a 
lack of goals. Unfortunately these offen-
sive purists will probably not be swayed 
any time soon as this modern day caten-
accio becomes more popular among the 
highest levels of soccer thanks in part to 
its success in high levels of international 
competitions. This shift would be seen in 
statistics such as goals scored and cards 
given in competitions like the World Cup. 
In general, a defensive game will have 
fewer goals and more cards given, thus a 
trend showing a decreasing number of 
goals and an increasing number of cards 
wo u l d  s u p p o r t  t h i s  t h e o r y .  
 
History 
 
 There have been many different 
versions of Catenaccio used throughout 
history. The one unifying quality that 
they all have is the sweeper; a final de-
fender behind the actual defensive line. 
 One version, a 1-3-3-3 can be 
seen above. However this is far from the 
only formation; some played 1-4-3-2, the 
real key is the 1 starting the formation 
description with the sweeper.  
 Compare these with the 1958 
World Cup winning Brazilian team seen 
below-left. Brazil‘s 4-2-4, is clearly a 
more attacking minded formation; the 
fact that they frequently pushed their out-
side backs forward giving them 8 attack-
ing players just emphasizes Brazil‘s at-
tacking ideals. 
The famous Dutch ―Total Foot-
ball‖ system employed throughout the 
70s, which led the Netherlands to the 
1974 World Cup Final is also seen below. 
While only diagramed in their defensive 
half, the ―Total Football‖ 4-3-3 was built 
on players switching positions for spurts 
throughout the game; full backs were 
almost equally creative and offensive, 
going forward as the wingers and striker 
and were encouraged to do so.  
Though very few teams still use 
the sweeper in their everyday formation; 
the mindset associated with having one 
extra defensive line is being seen more 
and more. The mindset, and correspond-
ing styles of play, rather than the specific 
formation are what I am considering 
―modern day catenaccio‖.  
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Statistical Analysis 
 
The World Cup is arguably the 
most famous competition in sport, and 
thus makes a great place to start looking 
for developments of modern day catenac-
cio. A defensive game generally consists 
of low scoring, a lot of fouls and thus 
cards, and concentrated possession 
(specifically meaning low possession 
numbers in the attacking third). Starting 
with number of goals, looking only at 
World Cups since the end of World War 
II (there has been one World Cup every 
four years since 1950), this figure has 
been erratic. The highest value came in 
1954 when the average was over 5 goals 
per game, the highest tally since has been 
just short of 3 goals per game in 1970. 
More recently, since there was an average 
of 2.711 goals per game at the American 
World Cup in 1994, the figure has been 
on a steady decline, reaching a low of 
2.265 at the World Cup this past summer 
in South Africa. A fitting trendline with 
this data of y = -0.1224x + 3.964 shows 
that since the 1950 World Cup, the num-
ber of goals per match has decreased by 
0.1224 goals every World Cup 
Another statistic that shows the 
overall style of soccer being played is 
cards per game. However, when looking 
at cards given, World Cups before 1970 
cannot be looked at because although 
cautions (yellow cards) and expulsions 
(red cards) were given, the colored cards 
had not yet been introduced. While the 
2010 World Cup did have a lower num-
ber of cards given than the 2006 World 
Cup, the overall trend has been a steady 
increase peaking with the 2006 World 
Cup in which over five cards per game 
were given. The fitting trendline with this 
statistic shows an even greater increase 
than goals per game. The trendline is y = 
0.3972x + 0.8771, meaning that since the 
1970 World Cup and the first time that 
cards were used, the number given per 
game has been increasing by 0.3972 per 
World Cup.  
 Most likely the best indicator of 
a defensive minded game is possession; 
where each team had most of their pos-
session and how much of the overall that 
is. For instance, just because a team had 
60% of possession does not mean that 
they dominated. A team with only 40% of 
the overall possession, but that had 50% 
of their possession in the attacking third 
shows a much more offensive minded 
team. Unfortunately this data has not 
been kept beyond a few years ago and 
t h u s  c a n n o t  a s s i s t  h e r e . 
 
Clinical Analysis 
 
While an increase in defensive 
minded play in the World Cup can be 
seen statistically with these numbers, a 
clinical, less numerical approach can also 
show such development. Looking at the 
successful teams in world soccer‘s most 
high profile tournaments can show this; 
the UEFA Champions‘ League, the Euro-
pean Championship and the World Cup.  
First looking at the 2004 European Cham-
pionship, which Greece won scoring only 
seven goals in six games. In the knockout 
rounds (quarterfinals through to the final) 
the Greeks won each game 1-0, defending 
furiously, seemingly only worried about 
keeping a clean sheet.  
In the recent past, even teams 
known for their offense have been resort-
ing to this modern catenaccio. One exam-
ple would be Chelsea in the Champions 
League Semi Final in 2009 against FC 
Barcelona; two world-class clubs, mainly 
heralded for their offense. In the first leg 
at Barcelona‘s Camp Nou, Chelsea elect-
ed to leave top striker Nicolas Anelka on 
the bench, leaving Didier Drogba up front 
as a lone striker. The first leg ended a 
success for Chelsea, as Barcelona was 
kept scoreless at home for the first time in 
any competition that season. 
Even more recently, the 2010 
World Cup showed modern day catenac-
cio. In the final were the Spanish, who 
like the Greeks from 2004 won each of 
their games in the elimination round 1-0. 
On this run they managed to keep Cris-
tiano Ronaldo (viewed by many as the 
best player in the world) and Portugal, 
Paraguay and Germany (the highest scor-
ing team in the tournament) scoreless. 
Opposite the Spanish in the final were the 
Dutch, the second highest scoring nation 
in the World Cup with the likes of Robin 
van Persie, Arjen Robben, Wesley 
Sneijder, Rafael van der Vaart and Dirk 
Kuyt in attack. However, in the final they 
played a defensive 4-5-1 (with both Mark 
van Bommel and Nigel de Jong playing 
defensive midfield) allowing the Spanish 
to attack relentlessly. The tactic seemed 
to be working until in the last four 
minutes of the second period of extra 
time Spain finally found a break through. 
The tactics employed in the final show 
the Dutch adapting to defend against a 
perceived stronger Spanish side, and the 
Soccer 
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Spanish adapting to attack a defensive 
minded Dutch team.  
The saying, ―defense wins 
championships‖ has been around for 
years, so why in soccer‘s past did more 
offensive teams win more trophies? Since 
expanding to 16 teams in 1996, only the 
Greeks in 2004 managed to win the Euro-
pean Championship without reaching 
double digits in goals. Since the World 
Cup reached 32 teams in 1998, Spain 
were the only winners not to score at least 
twelve goals in the seven matches each 
winner must play. Simply put, what is it 
that has changed relatively recently in 
soccer to warrant these results 
 
Conclusion 
 
The catenaccio system was 
adapted from the Swiss‘ favored verrou 
system by Nereo Rocco in the 1950s, 
only to be taken and made famous by 
Helenio Herrera, the manager of Interna-
zionale in the 1960s. Since that time, 
many teams have employed the defensive 
minded approach successfully. However, 
the biggest change from the Herrera ca-
tenaccio to the modern catenaccio, or 
modern football in general is the shift of 
the sweeper/libero and bringing that de-
fensive assistant from behind the defend-
ers to in front of them-the central defen-
sive midfielder (CDM) or 
―Makalele role‖(Named 
for Claude Makalele who 
seemingly perfected it). 
The philosophy of old 
time catenaccio was that 
the sweeper would be 
able to keep anything that 
beat the defenders from 
getting to the keeper. The 
new CDM ideally keeps 
anything from getting to 
the defenders at all. It 
seems that this change; 
bringing the isolated cen-
tral defender from behind 
the defensive line to in 
front of it and its corre-
sponding success has 
caused the mindset 
changes discussed above. 
This transition means 
that more of the game is 
played in the middle third 
of the field as opposed to 
end-to-end soccer, which 
generally produces more 
goals. While this cannot 
apply to soccer universal-
ly it seems that the CDM 
is all over soccer. Cham-
pions League 2009-10 
winners Interazionale 
relied on Esteban Cambiasso, as 2008 
European Championship winners Spain 
relied on Marco Senna, as Chelsea now 
use Michael Essien, Barcelona use Javier 
Mascherano, Arsenal use Alex Song, and 
countless other teams from the top 
leagues down to the youth teams use a 
central defensive midfielder as cover for 
their defensive line. This positional shift 
is one explanation for the trends showing 
decreasing numbers of goals scored and 
increased numbers of cards given in the 
World Cup and the overall increase in 
defensive minded soccer being played at 
all levels.  
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Claude Makelele has played the  central defensive mid-
fielder position so well, that it is sometimes called the 
―Makalele role‖ 
In the 2010 World Cup Final, the Spanish used the catenaccio style with success. 
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As the New York Jets wrapped 
up a victory over the Oakland Raiders last 
October, Jets quarterback Mark Sanchez 
sat on the sideline holding the future of 
American sports in his hands. With every 
secretive bite the quarterback took of a 
precious hotdog, baseball disappeared 
from its long-held post as ―America‘s 
pastime.‖ Nearly a century earlier, fellow 
New York superstar Babe Ruth had set 
the foundation for a century-long sports 
culture dominated by baseball. In addition 
to his extraordinary talent, Ruth‘s love of 
hotdogs, soda pop, and beer gave his 
sport a personable appeal, bringing huge 
crowds to enormous stadiums and large 
revenues to top executives. Mark 
Sanchez‘s hotdog changed everything. 
The sport of our fathers, and of their fa-
thers, was about to take the back seat. 
Sanchez had personally grabbed the 
torch, claiming football as America‘s new 
glory sport. Let‘s hope he didn‘t get any 
mustard on his hands along the way. 
Sanchez‘s actions can be seen as 
a symbolic icing on the cake of a transi-
tion from baseball to football as Ameri-
ca‘s national pastime that was decades in 
the making. I propose that this transition 
can be simplified into five basic events, 
which symbolically represent the nation‘s 
growing admiration for football: Monday 
Night Football, championship ratings, 
culture, expansion, and public opinion.  
By the end of the 20th century, baseball 
had lost its post, due in large part to exec-
utive decisions that failed to adjust to the 
times. 
With the combination of the 
National Football League (NFL) and the 
American Football League (AFL) in 
1970, football was officially on the map. 
The emerging NFL instantly doubled fan 
support, and executives were faced with 
precedent-setting decisions. Commission-
er Pete Rozelle was revolutionary in his 
influence in increasing the popularity of 
the league and the sport.  
The first event that unofficially 
triggered the transition also came in 1970, 
when Rozelle led football‘s move to 
primetime television with the launch of 
Monday Night Football. This weekly 
broadcast brought the gridiron into the 
homes of the growing television market. 
By moving to primetime, football was 
made available to more American fami-
lies. As Rozelle put it himself, ―There are 
a lot more TV sets in use on Monday 
night than on Sunday afternoon.‖1 In his 
biography Commissioner: The Legacy of 
Pete Rozelle, John Fortunato praises the 
commissioner‘s understanding of the tele-
vision market. ―Rozelle knew that the 
frontier often began with television. 
Knowing that it is the league‘s greatest 
source of revenue and exposure, Rozelle 
was always conscious of how the game 
was presented through the medium.‖2 
Monday Night Football is currently the 
second longest running show on prime-
time, behind 60 Minutes.3 
Major League Baseball, mean-
while, had started airing its Game of the 
Week, in the 1950s. This program, how-
ever, was traditionally aired on Saturday 
afternoons. A national move to primetime 
wouldn‘t come until 1990 with the launch 
of Sunday Night Baseball. By that point, 
the NFL had expanded its primetime cov-
erage to Sunday nights as well. 
While baseball had increased 
popularity in the early 1900s by entering 
directly into American homes via radios 
and newspapers, the evidence above sug-
gests that television would lead the 
charge in connecting Americans to their 
sports in the latter part of the century. 
With regard to national coverage, football 
appeared to have grabbed the advantage 
and maintained it. By 2009, national tele-
vision network giants – CBS, FOX, NBC, 
ESPN, and the NFL Network –combined 
to pay $3.085 billion for the rights to air 
the year‘s football games.4 In the baseball 
market, only FOX, ESPN, and TBS pur-
sued broadcasting games on a national 
scale in 2009. 
The transition would progress to 
its second symbolic stage in 1992, when 
television ratings for the Super Bowl dou-
bled those of baseball‘s World Series for 
the first time and would continually do so 
for the next 18 years. 
Since its origin in 1967, the Su-
per Bowl has dominated baseball‘s World 
Series in television ratings, as the graph 
on the following page suggests. Ratings 
for the World Series, meanwhile, have 
been puttering in the modern era, after its 
peak in 1980. With regard to the Super 
Bowl, the thrill that comes with knowing 
that this one game decides the world 
champions can‘t be overlooked. The com-
mercial culture established by television 
marketing came together to create the 
largest sports day of the American year. 
With about one hundred million Ameri-
cans guaranteed to be watching televi-
sion, large corporations have taken a 
stake in the game. Commercial giants like 
PepsiCo, Frito Lay, and Budweiser would 
soon compete for air-time and by 2009, a 
30 second commercial sold for an average 
of $3 million.5 
Seeing the enormous revenues of 
the football television market, rival enter-
tainment industries got the idea and start-
ed putting their investments toward foot-
ball in dreams of big profits. The movie 
Football as America‟s New Pastime 
Storylines as the gridiron stole the crown 
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industry is one example. As the second 
graph on the right suggests, sports movies 
throughout the 20th century have reflected 
the ideology of most Americans – pre-
dominately baseball movies in the early 
part of the century, marked by a steady 
increase in football films until the latter 
finally became the top-revenue maker at 
the turn of the century. By 2009, The 
Blind Side would be the highest-grossing 
sports film of all time. Football fans had 
found their feel-good film, like baseball 
fans found in classics like Field of 
Dreams and A League of Their Own a 
generation earlier. 
This tendency can mark the third 
event of the transition, where, at the turn 
of the century, American families put 
more of their hard earned dollars and pre-
cious time toward football than baseball. 
In this way, football‘s influence was firm-
ly expanding beyond the playing field and 
into American culture. 
Football‘s influence has spanned 
into other areas of interest as well. Ac-
cording to Google‘s Ngram tool, which 
charts a word‘s relative frequency in all 
books published between 1500 and 2008, 
the word ―football‖ has been published 
more than the word ―baseball‖ in every 
year since the 1800s. It is important to 
note that some of these references are 
likely with regard to the football as the 
rest of the world know it – ―soccer‖ to 
Americans. Nevertheless, the graph to the 
right comparing the frequency of ―MLB‖ 
verse ―NFL‖ shows the latter‘s domi-
nance in the world of literature in the 
second half of the 20th century.6 
This idea is reflected in attend-
ances at regular season football games in 
comparison to those of baseball. Enor-
mous stadiums, seating up to 70,000 fans 
(20,000 more than any of their baseball 
counterparts) helped football become a 
large spectator sport. The nation respond-
ed, filling stadiums to their capacity year 
in and year out. In 2008, for example, 
while the Tampa Bay Rays were en route 
to their first World Series appearance in 
franchise history, their stadium averaged 
52.8% capacity. Meanwhile football‘s 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers were en route to 
a 9-7 season where they missed the 
playoffs. Nevertheless, in the same mar-
ket, the Buccaneers averaged 98.3% ca-
pacity. More Tampa residents were de-
voted football fans. 
Granted, football could never 
surpass baseball in sheer attendance over 
the course of the year, given the differ-
ences in schedule length. Then again, 
perhaps it is this lengthiness of the base-
ball season that has deterred fans from 
spending the money to go to the stadium 
on a weekly basis. 
In cities and states across the 
country, the story was similar. More 
Americans expressed interest in watching 
football than baseball. In Tennessee, the 
Titans have sold out every home game 
since opening LP Field in 1999 in the 
same market that has never housed a Ma-
jor League Baseball (MLB) team. 
The transition is brought to its 
fourth event in 1999, when Americans 
Football as America’s New Pastime 
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were given more markets to enjoy watch-
ing football over baseball.  With the 
reestablishment of the Cleveland Browns 
franchise in 1999, the National Football 
League had its 31st team, thus surpassing 
the MLB‘s 30 affiliated organizations. As 
a greater number of regions craved a foot-
ball team to root for, the NFL responded, 
giving northern Ohio its football team 
back. In a state where baseball can trace 
its roots to the 1880s, football moved one 
step closer to surpassing its rival sport. 
What else was missing in foot-
ball‘s quest to become America‘s new 
pastime? 
Thus far, the events suggested 
here have been the byproduct of NFL 
executives wanting to bring their sport to 
more fans across the country, while se-
curing football‘s influence in other as-
pects of American culture. What seems to 
be missing – the fifth and final stage of 
the transition – is how the average Ameri-
can could feel personally connected to the 
sport. Throughout the 20th century, it had 
been baseball that allowed for this per-
sonal appeal. Somewhere between bridg-
ing generation gaps as a father and son 
played catch to promoting confidence as 
every boy dreamed of being a profession-
al ball player, baseball summed up the 
American dream. 
In the 21st Century, football best 
represented American culture, and that‘s 
where the timeline returns to Mark 
Sanchez‘s hot dog. By eating that hot dog 
as his teammates were on the field, 
Sanchez symbolically demonstrated that 
football was ready to take this leap. The 
NFL was more than the profit-driven, 
billion dollar business that the MLB had 
become. 
A more concrete example of 
football replacing baseball as the sport 
that personally appealed to the average 
American came in 2007, with the release 
of the ―Mitchell Report.‖ Under current 
MLB commissioner Bud Selig, baseball 
(like most sports of the modern era) 
watched the increased use of steroids and 
other performance-enhancing drugs. Selig 
was slow to act and by 2007 the effects of 
the ―Steroid Era‖ were felt, fostering an 
environment where it was acceptable to 
cheat in order to get ahead. Young ath-
letes across the nation lost role models 
and thought that they couldn‘t succeed 
unless they cheated. With the release of 
the ―Mitchell Report,‖ the MLB admitted 
that it had a problem, but it came a dec-
ade too late. 
The steroid policy for the NFL 
has been far from perfect. In fact, one 
could argue that it is more of a problem in 
football than in baseball, as evident in the 
famed death of Lyle Alzado, who directly 
blamed his brain tumor at age 43 to his 
steroid abuse beginning in 1969.6 Enter-
ing the 21st century, however, the unspo-
ken mantra of the current administration 
under commissioner Roger Goodell has 
been clear: violate our conduct policies 
and you will be punished. Besides crack-
ing the whip on drug use, Goodell has 
increased penalties for players who vio-
late other policies, particularly behavioral 
issues off the field and dangerous actions 
on the field. In the process, he has main-
tained an equal playing field and empha-
sized the need for players to be role mod-
els. 
Admittedly, the NFL is far from 
perfect, and with the looming possibility 
of a lock out next season, many of the 
league‘s problems will be exposed. Nev-
ertheless, football has come to represent 
the new America – capitalistic bosses, 
equal playing fields, feel good stories, 
and poor eating habits – everything base-
ball had been years earlier but gradually 
lost. 
For around a century, baseball 
has stood in this post as the official sport 
of America, crossing boundaries imposed 
by class and ethnicity, uniting fathers and 
sons in a way unparalleled in any other 
sport. Football has progressively estab-
lished itself as the destined glory sport of 
America. While one cannot discount the 
influence of baseball during its prime, the 
only films akin to Field of Dreams that 
one can expect in the upcoming decades 
will be shot not on the baseball field, but 
on the gridiron. 
Mark Sanchez later apologized 
to his fans and teammates for eating the 
hotdog. He should have apologized to the 
baseball legends for officially dethroning 
their sport. 
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 In the world of skateboarding, 
there is perhaps no figure more prominent 
than Rob Dyrdek. As an entrepreneur and 
reality TV star, he has extended his influ-
ence beyond skateboarding, the sport that 
served as a launching point for his career. 
Dyrdek is an ambassador for the sport, 
and his efforts to create safe skating ven-
ues for kids through his charity ―Safe 
Spot Skate Spot‖ are well documented. 
However, now Dyrdek is attempting to 
take skateboarding one step further, and 
revolutionize it as a sporting competition. 
 Dyrdek‘s latest venture, Street 
League Skateboarding, is an attempt to 
broaden skateboarding‘s appeal to all 
sports fans. The league makes major de-
partures from traditional skateboarding 
competition, whose attempts to compro-
mise ―true skateboarding‖ with contest 
skateboarding have been, as described by 
Dyrdek himself, ―fragmented and mis-
guided‖ (―Street League Skateboarding 
On Tour‖). The most noticeable change 
in the format is that rather than skaters 
performing for one-minute heats, they 
perform tricks one after the other and are 
instantly scored according to difficulty, 
innovation and circumstance (Street 
League). Each trick is comparable to a 
possession in sports like basketball or 
football. The viewer can easily under-
stand the significance of a single trick 
because every attempt has a potential to 
change the standings instantly. The for-
mat allows the competition to develop 
more evenly and therefore form a plot. 
 In its current form, skateboard-
ing is a sport that is lumped with other 
―extreme‖ or ―alternative‖ sports, rather 
than billed as an attraction unto itself. 
Such major competitions as 
the X-Games and the Dew 
Tour also feature BMX and 
divide skating into ―Vert‖, in 
which skaters perform tricks 
on a half-pipe ramp, and 
―Street‖, in which a course is 
made to simulate an urban 
environment. In addition to 
this lack of focus on street 
skating, skaters perform heats 
simultaneously, so that multi-
ple skaters are all performing 
tricks on the same course, at 
the same time. Dydek finds 
this arrangement to be fan-
unfriendly and believes Street 
League Skateboarding can 
remedy the shortcomings of its predeces-
sors. 
  Every one of the innovative for-
mat changes Dyrdek has implemented are 
aimed at primarily towards adding drama 
and suspense to the competition in order 
to enhance the spectator experience. Ex-
tensive research has found a relationship 
between sports enjoyment and drama and 
Dyrdek‘s changes are well in-line with 
these findings (although it would not be 
surprising if he came up with his ideas 
intuitively through years of 
experience as a sports fan and 
skateboarder). More specifical-
ly, research clearly shows a 
relationship between factors 
such as ―expectations of a 
win… and potential for a loss‖ 
as a source of enjoyment 
(Raney 442). For example, if a competitor 
isn‘t expected to win, a win elicits more 
enjoyment for the fan. Similarly, research 
has demonstrated that ―the cumulative 
time (in seconds) that a NCAA men's 
basketball tournament game score was 
extremely close is a powerful measure of 
perceived suspense and predictor of over-
all enjoyment‖ (Raney 443). Previously, 
these elements were absent from profes-
sional skateboarding competition. 
Dyrdek‘s new scoring system and compe-
tition format allows the score to stay clos-
er for longer, creating situations in which 
a single trick can sway the outcome of the 
competition. In close contests, the last 
round of tricks can be compared to the 
last two minutes of a football game, or a 
buzzer beating shot. Dyrdek‘s format 
allows for this suspense in a way that is 
simply impossible in a traditional format. 
Additionally, Dyrdek‘s new system cre-
ates ―all this immense data that starts to 
develop, like average landed trick score, 
consistency ratings, most accumulated 
points in the history of the league,‖ which 
naturally creates favorites and underdogs 
(Polk). The Street League format is much 
friendlier to the possibility of upsets and 
presents the contest in an exciting way. 
Before Street League Skateboarding, a 
contest comparable to the Butler-Duke 
National Championship game in the 2010 
NCAA basketball tournament – a game 
that came down to the final possession – 
would never have been possible in skate-
boarding competition. 
 Dyrdek‘s ability to make his 
brainchild immediately legitimate and 
viable is nothing short of remarkable. The 
Street League has signed no less than 24 
of the world‘s top skaters to multi-year 
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Rob Dyrdek has seen his influence as a skater grow 
over the past few years and is now trying to use that 
influence to change professional skateboarding.  
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contracts including 2009's Dew Tour 
Champion and Thrasher's Skater of the 
Year, Chris Cole (―Street League Skate-
boarding On Tour‖), 2009‘s Dew Tour 
Runners-Up, Chaz Ortiz and Paul Rodri-
guez (―Dew Tour Standings‖), and Pro-
fessional Skaters-turned-
entrepreneurs-turned-reality 
TV stars Terry Kennedy and 
Ryan Sheckler  (Street 
League). As Chris Cole de-
clared in an interview, ―Every 
single dude out here is the best 
at something‖ (Street League 
Highlights). The attraction for 
many of the stars of the sport is likely 
both the huge purse offered by the Street 
League – 1.2 million dollars and the larg-
est in the history of professional skate-
boarding – and a revenue-share program 
that entitles each skater to a percentage of 
merchandise and media rights sales 
(Mickle). In exchange, each skater has 
agreed to an ―exclusivity clause‖ which 
stipulates that skaters participate only in 
Street League and Street League-
sanctioned events (Mickle). The exclusiv-
ity clause, coupled with Dyrdek‘s ability 
to convince many top skaters to partici-
pate in the league, strengthens the Street 
League and threatens to drastically 
change the landscape of the skate tourna-
ment scene. Obviously, the League poses 
a major challenge to other competitions 
such as the Mountain Dew Tour and the 
X-Games. But for the skaters, the league 
is a win-win. If it succeeds, they are in on 
the ground floor of the first professional 
skate league and have the opportunity to 
compete for the skateboarding world‘s 
largest cash prizes. If it fails, they can 
simply return to the tournaments they 
frequented before; the other major tourna-
ments are in no position to refuse some of 
the most talented skaters in the world. 
 In the Street League, one can 
witness the intersection of two distinct 
aspects of the sporting world – the sport 
itself and the marketing of the sport. 
Skateboarding‘s status as an ―alternative‖ 
sport enables the marketing to have a 
profound impact on the sport itself; 
Dyrdek‘s attempts to reach a broader au-
dience are changing the way the sport is 
played. Surely this intersection is present 
in other sports as well, albeit to a much 
lesser degree. A prominent example 
would be the NFL‘s reaction to new evi-
dence regarding concussions. Rules are 
now being changed to, at least in part, 
make the violent game more palatable for 
fans. It will be interesting to see how 
Dyrdek‘s tinkering will ultimately play 
out in the market. The changes run the 
risk of alienating the ―hard-core‖ portion 
of the fan-base who will likely complain 
that many of the top skaters ―sold out‖, 
though it seems unlikely. Dyrdek has put 
together a seemingly strong marketing 
campaign that included a series of com-
mercials that highlighted the absurdity of 
the current skateboarding competition 
format by portraying other sports as if 
they were played under a similar arrange-
ment. For example, one commercial won-
dered if people would watch if the shoot-
around in the warm-ups before a basket-
ball game replaced the actual game. This, 
along with Dyrdek‘s tremendous popular-
ity and the warm reception from the skat-
ers themselves makes it easy to see how 
the Street League could maintain rabid 
fans even as it gains more casual ones. 
Still, it is a legitimate concern. It‘s well-
known that fans of niche entertainment 
can become resentful of the new fans and 
the form of entertainment itself when it 
goes main stream. These are perhaps the 
most intriguing and important questions 
regarding this undertaking: Exactly how 
will the marketing of skateboarding and 
the sport of skateboarding interact? And 
how will old fans react to the change? 
 While the Street League is in its 
nascent stages, it is an intriguing business 
venture and growing quickly. The princi-
ples behind the new format are sound and 
based on compelling evidence supporting 
its potential to generate more enjoyment 
than previous incarnations of tournament 
skating. Whether the league has the abil-
ity to attract a significant TV viewership 
remains to be seen. Yet it appears that 
Dyrdek has well-positioned the first pro 
skateboarding league to succeed. The 
magnitude of the creation of the league is 
tremendous, as its success or failure may 
be indicative of the future marketability 
of action sports as a whole, an industry 
that 46% of senior-level sports industry 
executives think still has room for growth 
according a poll taken in June of 2010. 
Chris Stiepock, X-Games general manag-
er, sees the league as ―a real test of street 
skateboarding and a true test for the fu-
ture of action sports‖ especially consider-
ing ―the marketing pull of Rob 
Dyrdek‖ (Mickle). Stiepock seems to be 
suggesting that if Dyrdek, for all his mar-
keting and business acumen, is unable to 
make this league work, there is little hope 
for any professional 
skateboarding league. 
None of this seems to 
bother Dyrdek who has 
declared that ―It‘s virtual-
ly impossible for [Street 
League Skateboarding] 
not to succeed‖ (Mickle). 
Whether it does or not, 
Dyrdek has done an impressive job put-
ting it in the best possible position to real-
ize its potential. 
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— Chris Stiepock, X-Games General Manager 
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 Prior to the start of the 2004-05 
National Hockey League (NHL) season, 
professional teams were able to buy and 
sell players as they saw it fit through the 
process of free agency.  This system sig-
nificantly advantaged teams with greater 
revenue streams and prompted frivolous 
spending.  The result was a high level of 
payroll disparity across the league and its 
players.  For instance, while the Detroit 
Red Wings franchise consistently loaded 
up its roster with highly paid players, the 
Buffalo Sabres couldn‘t hold on to their 
best players, and the team filed for bank-
ruptcy in 2003.  Focusing on this issue, 
the owners voted to lockout the NHL 
Players Association (NHLPA), prompting 
the cancellation of the entire 2004-2005 
season – a first for any sports league in 
North America due to a labor dispute.     
For hockey fans, this meant 
missing out on the blistering shots, bone-
crushing checks and miraculous saves of 
the 2004-05 season – no playoffs and no 
one to hoist Lord Stanley‘s Cup.  Howev-
er, after 301 days of ―lockout,‖ on July 
13th, 2005, both parties agreed upon a 
new collective bargaining agreement 
meant to diminish economic inequalities 
across the league.  From the NHL‘s finan-
cial perspective, was it worth it? 
One cannot fairly or definitively 
measure the psychological effects of this 
lost season on fans and players.  Howev-
er, this article compares changes in NHL 
salaries paid and revenues received from 
before (2003-04 season) and after (2005-
06) the lockout to provide a preliminary 
financial answer to this critical question.  
 
Lockout Changes 
 
The NHL and the NHLPA‘s new 
collective bargaining agreement com-
pletely overhauled the NHL‘s salary 
structure, in addition to establishing some 
new rules for the game itself.  This agree-
ment included the institution of a maxi-
mum salary cap beginning at $39 million 
per team for the 2005-06 season – to be 
adjusted on a yearly basis to guarantee 
players 54 percent of total NHL revenues.  
Additionally, the implemented minimum 
salary cap requires teams to pay at least 
$21.5 million for its players.  Under this 
new structure, teams are not permitted to 
go above or pay below these benchmarks 
except to replace a player who has sus-
tained a long-term 
injury.  These 
minimum and 
maximum salary 
caps aimed to 
compress the dif-
ferences between 
both salaries paid 
and revenues 
earned by each 
team across the 
league.  
Many of the rule 
changes that were 
brought about by 
the lockout re-
volve around 
opening up the 
flow of play and 
making the game 
more entertaining to watch.  The most 
obvious rule change was the institution of 
the shootout.  No one likes when a game 
ends in a tie and the new shootout format 
ensures that in the NHL there will be no 
more ties.  As the penalty shot is widely 
regarded as one of the most exciting 
events in hockey, this new format makes 
the NHL more appealing to fans.  Also, 
the league decreased the size of goalie 
pads, eliminated the two-line pass and 
reinstated the ―tag-up‖ offside rule to 
increase the amount of scoring in the av-
erage game.      
 
Economic Theory  
 
 In a free market, economic theo-
ry tells us that a company would operate 
in a way that would most maximize their 
level of profit.  Before the institution of 
the maximum salary cap, the owners of 
the teams in the NHL were operating in a 
free market.   
During this time, NHL owners, 
as profit maximizers, would only sign a 
player if they believed that that specific 
player‘s added benefit would exceed his 
added cost. There was always the risk, 
however, of overpaying (resulting in what 
is termed the ―winner‘s curse‖). A man-
ager would conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis and sign a player if that player‘s mar-
ginal revenue product of labor was great-
er than his associated marginal revenue 
cost of labor – or so traditional economic 
theory predicts.  Indeed, while the costs 
of signing a specific player are concrete, 
the benefits of signing him are more chal-
lenging to quantify, as this process in-
volves assessing their level of production 
in the future, which is subject to a large 
number of variables.    
The implementation of the new 
salary cap significantly altered the ability 
of NHL team owners to fully act in the 
interest of profit maximization.  While 
previously, owners were free to sign a 
player if they believed the added benefits 
The 2004-05 NHL Lockout 
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Bruins goaltender Tim Thomas makes a save against Sharks 
center, Patrick Marleau, during a shootout—one of the most 
prominent changes made to the NHL as a result of the lockout. 
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of that player exceed the added costs, the 
cap affected their ability to openly do so.  
For example, if the owner of the Pittsburg 
Penguins, Mario Lemieux, believes that 
the benefit of acquiring Roberto Luongo 
exceeds the cost of doing so, if the money 
was available, would sign him.  However, 
under the new cap, Lemieux must be con-
scious of the salary cap restrictions when 
acquiring any new players and may not 
be able to sign Roberto Luongo, if he so 
desires.  In this way, under the new cap, 
NHL owners are significantly restricted 
from acting as true profit maximizers.  
However, with the new cap max-
imum, some owners are also now forced 
to reduce the contract expenses or release 
some of their higher paid players.  In this 
way, the new cap is also, to some extent, 
pushing owners to act more like profit 
maximizers.          
 In addition, the newly instituted 
cap restricts NHL owners from falling 
victim to the ―winner‘s curse‖ and sub-
stantially overpaying a player.  With only 
a limited amount of money to spend on 
players, owners will be much more con-
servative in their estimates of a player‘s 
future value, causing a reduction in the 
effect of the ―winner‘s curse.‖  
After initially looking at the ef-
fects of the institution of a maximum sal-
ary cap on NHL team owners in accord-
ance with economic theory, this article 
analyzes the effects of this cap on team 
revenues.   If NHL team owners were, 
indeed, profit maximizers before the lock-
out period, the institution of a cap maxi-
mum should result in decreased revenues 
of greater than $1 for every dollar change 
in salary across the teams for which the 
cap was binding.     
Analysis 
 
The first step in identifying the general 
effects of the cap is to compare average 
team payroll and revenue from the 2003-
04 season to 2005-06, according to 
Forbes data: 
While average 
team payroll sig-
nificantly de-
creased (as was 
forced by the cap) 
by close to $10 
million, there was 
a surprising in-
crease in average 
revenue of $1 
million (as shown 
in the table in the 
bottom left).  This 
increase in reve-
nue, despite the 
sharp decrease in 
salary expenses, 
is evidence that, 
overall, the insti-
tution of the cap 
has been benefi-
cial for the finan-
cial position of 
the NHL owners.  The inverse relation-
ship that seems to exist between the de-
crease in salary expenditure and the in-
crease in revenues suggests that NHL 
team owners may not have been acting as 
profit maximizers, and were instead vic-
tims of the ―winner‘s curse.‖     
 Additionally, among the thirty 
teams, the correlation between salary and 
revenue decreased from .72 to .51 after 
the lockout.  This suggests that under 
these rules, salary is now a weaker pre-
dictor of revenue (or vice versa)—the 
salary cap creates more equality for all 
teams. 
 Breaking down the data further, 
to the upper-left is a scatterplot of salary 
against revenue for each team both before 
the lockout (blue) and after (red), with 
linear regression lines drawn for each 
case. 
The positive trend suggests that 
teams required to reduce their payroll 
experience a reduction in revenues.  The 
fact that the red line is above and to the 
left of the blue line re-confirms the con-
clusion that teams made more money 
with smaller salaries.  However, teams 
such as Anaheim and Buffalo saw the 
opposite effect; reduced salary expenses 
were associated with revenue increases.  
These increases in revenue suggest that 
the owners of teams such as Anaheim and 
Buffalo were overpaying for their players.  
The cap forced these teams to be more 
cautious in their estimates of a player‘s 
future benefit, which, in turn, led to in-
creased revenues.   
NHL 
 Season 03/04  05/06  
Payroll $44,400,490 $34,309,972 
Revenue $74,600,000 $75,566,667 
Correlation 0.72 0.51 
Roberto Luongo, one of the most sought-after—and highly paid— 
players in the league, makes a save on a shot from the top of the 
circle 
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 For statistical summation of the 
data, the following regression is used: 
 
 Δ Revenue = a0 + a1 (Cap) + a2 (Cap) x 
(Required Δ Salary) 
 
 This regression makes use of 
three variables: Δ Revenue, Cap, and Re-
quired Δ Salary.  Change in revenue is the 
difference in revenues of a team between 
the pre- and post-lockout periods.  The 
cap variable is a dummy variable includ-
ed to distinguish between those teams that 
were forced to reduce their payroll to 
meet the cap from the teams that were 
unaffected.  If the cap was binding for a 
team – meaning a team was forced to 
reduce its payroll value to the level of the 
cap – the cap variable is equal to 1.  If the 
cap was not binding for a team – meaning 
a team‘s payroll was unaffected by the 
cap – the cap variable is equal to 0.  The 
required change in salary variable is the 
amount a team was forced to reduce its 
payroll in accordance with the new maxi-
mum cap.  Therefore, if the cap is binding 
for a team, this value will be the amount 
of reduction in its payroll, whereas if the 
cap is not binding for a team, this value 
will be 0.      
 This regression will also produce 
three coefficients – a0, a1 and a2.  The 
coefficient constant a0 will tell us the val-
ue for the change in revenue of the teams 
for whom the cap is not binding.  The 
coefficient a1 will show the expected ad-
ditional change in revenue for those 
teams above the cap.  The coefficient a2 
indicates the change in revenue for every 
dollar reduction in payroll.  If this value 
is greater than -1, this means that for eve-
ry dollar reduction in payroll, the team 
experiences a greater loss in revenue.  If 
this value is between 0 and -1, then for 
each dollar reduction in payroll, the team 
is only losing a fraction of its revenue.  If 
this number is positive, then every dollar 
reduction in payroll is associated with an 
increase in revenue.  
Running this regression pro-
duced the following equation values: 
 
Δ Revenue = 4,571,428.60 + 256,670.40 
(Cap) + -.34 (Cap)(Required Δ Salary) 
  
 With an r-squared value of .18, 
this regression implies that the required 
change in salary enforced by the cap  
maximum accounts for 18 percent of the 
variation in the change in revenue.  This 
equation shows a0 to be 4,571,428.60, 
representing that teams not bound by the 
cap will experience an increase in reve-
nue of $4,571,428.60, on average.  
 With a t-value of 1.24, this is a fairly 
imprecise estimate and leaves room for 
much variation, which can be seen in the 
large differences between teams across 
the league.  Also the cap variable is 
shown to have a t-value of .05, indicating 
that its influence on the model is pretty 
insignificant.  Most importantly, this 
equation depicts that for every dollar the 
maximum cap requires a team to change 
its payroll, there is a $0.34 decrease in 
revenue, the value of a2. At this value, 
teams are only losing a fraction of their 
revenue ($0.34) for reductions in payroll 
costs.  With a t-value of -2.13, for the null 
hypothesis of 0, and 4.13, for the null 
hypothesis of -1, this change is a statisti-
cally significant finding.  
As expenses are decreasing less 
significantly than revenues, this indicates 
that profits would be increasing after the 
institution of the cap.  While this may be 
true for some teams, the low t-value for a0 
indicates that there is variation in this 
data and that the model cannot be applied 
accurately as a general trend for the entire 
league.  The data, as a whole, suggests 
that the owners of teams who were re-
quired to change their payroll to meet the 
cap were both overpaying their players 
and, at least to some extent, acting as 
profit maximizers during the pre-lockout 
period.         
 While this initial data gives an 
indication of the overall effects of the 
maximum cap, in order to analyze these 
effects more accurately, it is important to 
separate the data of the teams for whom 
the maximum cap was binding (16) – 
above the maximum cap – from the teams 
that were unaffected by the cap (14) – 
below the maximum cap.  In separating 
data into these two groups, it is evident 
that the teams who were unaffected by 
the cap saw average revenue increases of 
$4,785,714, while the teams that were 
forced to reduce their salaries as a result 
of the instituted cap experienced revenue 
decreases of $2,375,000, as seen in the 
table below.   
 This data suggests that the im-
plementation of the salary cap was bene-
ficial for teams that were not restricted by 
the cap, but was detrimental to teams that 
were.  More importantly, this data sug-
gests that the owners of teams above the 
maximum cap were, to some extent, oper-
ating previously as profit maximizers, and 
the cap is now restricting their ability to 
act as profit maximizers – a fact that is 
reflected in the reduced profit levels.   
In addition, the graph in the top 
left of the previous page depicts the re-
quired change in salary and the change in 
The 2004-05 NHL Lockout 
-$40,000,000
-$30,000,000
-$20,000,000
-$10,000,000
$0
$10,000,000
$20,000,000
Change in Salary and Revenue for NHL Teams
Change in Salary Change in Revenue
Coefficient T-ratio 
a0 1.24 
a1 .05 
a2 -2.13 / 4.13 
 Team Averages Revenue Change 
Below Max Cap +$4,785,714 
Above Max Cap -$2,375,000 
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revenue between the pre- and post-
lockout periods for each team in the 
NHL.  Teams that were required to re-
duce their payrolls in accordance with the 
maximum salary cap have a value equal 
to the change, while the teams that were 
unaffected by the cap have a value for 
salary change of zero.   
 
Conclusion  
 
The teams that were required to 
reduce their payroll as a result of the new 
cap maximum experienced an even great-
er reduction in revenue between the pre-
lockout and post-lockout seasons than 
teams for whom the cap was not binding.  
I hypothesized that if owners were, in-
deed, acting as profit maximizers before 
the lockout period, the institution of a cap 
maximum would result in decreased reve-
nues of greater than $1 for every dollar 
change in salary across the teams for 
which the cap was binding.  The results 
obtained from the regression suggested 
that teams above the cap saw decreases in 
revenue of $0.34 for every dollar change 
in salary, indicating that the owners were 
not acting as profit maximizers before the 
lockout.  However, the regression, in con-
junction with the other data, also showed 
that this was not consistent across all 
teams.  From these results it can be con-
cluded that each individual team and 
owner operated to a different extent as a 
profit maximizer during the pre-lockout 
period.  
 While this data depicts that 
teams that were forced to reduce their 
payroll experienced a loss in revenue, it 
also shows that some of these teams ex-
perienced an increase in revenue and 
many others saw an increase in profits.  
This suggests that those teams that expe-
rienced a loss in revenue after the cap 
were acting previously as profit maximiz-
ers and that those teams that experienced 
an increase in revenues or profits were 
previously falling victim to the ―winner‘s 
curse‖ and overpaying for their players.  
 In assessing the effectiveness of 
the maximum cap instituted by the new 
collective bargaining agreement between 
the NHL and the NHLPA, it is evident 
that it has sufficiently reduced the eco-
nomic disparity that exists across the 
league, based on the data I have.  There 
could also be other uncontrolled variables 
that help to explain this effect.  While 
some teams may have previously been 
operating as profit maximizers, the new 
cap has prompted those that were not, to 
make progress towards doing so.  As evi-
dent by the increased levels of total 
league revenue and profit, the new maxi-
mum salary cap has been effective in di-
minishing payroll and revenue disparities 
across the NHL and has certainly benefit-
ed the league as a whole.  In this way, the 
‘04 – ‘05 lockout was beneficial for the 
fans, the owners and the NHL, as a 
whole.  
 
The author adapted this article from a 
paper he submitted for academic credit in 
ILRLE 2400: Economics of Wages and 
Employment in spring 2010. 
NHL 
The Anaheim Ducks (left) and Carolina Hurricanes (right)—the two teams that saw the greatest  increase in revenue as a result of the 
new salary cap—hoist Lord Stanley‘s Cup in the two seasons following the lockout period 
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  My favorite 30 for 30 was the 
―Two Escobars‖, directed by Jeff and Mi-
chael Zimbalist. The story is horrific yet 
captivating. Fueled by the rise of Colombi-
an drug lord Pablo Escobar, the Colombian 
National Soccer became one of the premier 
international team entering the 1994 World 
Cup. However, an own goal against the 
United States in the opening round by the 
other Escobar, Andres Escobar, eliminated 
Colombia from competition. After returning 
home, Andres Escobar was shot and killed. By including specific 
details and candid interviews, the Zimbalists do more than retell the 
story. Fascinating intricacies are elaborated on, including the col-
lapse of order after the death of Pablo Escobar and his unique love 
for soccer. This brings more passion and sympathy into the story. 
In the end, I even found myself rooting for Colombia against the 
United States.  
 -Joey Shampain, A&S „13 
 
 Personally, my favorite 30 for 30 was ―Without 
Bias,‖ directed by Kirk Fraser.  Having been born after the 
actual phenomenon that was Len Bias, I did not have the op-
portunity to experience this intense, fierce, competitive, and 
most importantly talented individual.  With this installation of 
the series, viewers were placed in the middle of the action, 
right at the school, and in the offices of the Celtics organiza-
tion.  I was shown how the events transpired, and it let me 
formulate my own opinions of what actually happened that 
fateful day when the sports world was shocked.  Without Bi-
as made viewers feel compassion.  It almost felt like it all 
happened again. 
 -Daniel Lowenthal, CALS „14 
 
 
 I thought it was the Len Bias one, ―Without Bias.‖ I just 
appreciated the honesty that Len's friends showed throughout the 
documentary. They just came forward and said that Len had done 
cocaine several times and didn't try to glamorize the situation, just 
told it how it was. I also think it was an interesting microcosm of 
the general coke problem that the NBA had 
back in the 80s. (David Stern may have fixed 
that problem, but he's created several more 
and I think he needs to go!) Anyways, it was 
also great to see just how scary of an athlete 
Len was and how good the Celtics would 
have been with him and Bird in their front 
court. I just thought the whole documentary 
was really well done and got right to the heart 
of matters. 
 -Morgan Zimmerglass, ILR „10 
  My favorite 30 for 30 was 
"Run Ricky Run.‖ This documen-
tary showed the real story of one of 
the most misunderstood talents in 
pro sports history. Most fans look 
down upon Ricky Williams for 
missing out on his prime due to drug 
problems. However, this story went 
inside Ricky's life and showed a 
whole perspective that most people had previously failed to 
recognize. This story gave me greater appreciation for Ricky 
Williams, and a greater understanding of the problems he's 
had to deal with. 
 -Robbie Cohen, ILR „13 
 
 As an economist, my favorite 30 for 30 film was 
"Small Potatoes: Who Killed the USFL?". It is a reminder 
of an era that has now seemingly forever passed; an era when 
established leagues faced ongoing threats from upstart rival 
leagues. Since the demise of the USFL, none of the estab-
lished leagues have faced credible competition, and all have 
been able to further solidify their strong monopoly positions. 
 -Professor Neil Longley, UMass Sports Management 
 With its plethora of highlights and analyses, everyday ESPN  “wows” our eyes and intrigues our brains. 
However, with its 30 for 30 series, which premiered last October, ESPN successfully affects another part of our 
body, our hearts. In celebration of its 30th anniversary, ESPN has been airing 30 documentaries directed by pro-
fessional athletes, celebrities, and filmmakers. By covering the issues, people, trends, teams and events that 
changed the sports world over the past 30 years, ESPN has once again shown us why we love sports. Bill Simmons, 
who came up with the idea, explained the series' goals in a few sentences. “We wanted people to say, 'Wow, I for-
got how (fill in a word: great, amazing, poignant, crazy, depressing, unbelievable) that was' or 'I can‟t believe I 
never knew that whole story.' We didn‟t want to check off a laundry list of the 30 biggest stories from 1979 to 2009. 
That‟s what our viewers would expect from us. We wanted to surprise them."  ESPN did just that. So, we asked our 
club, “"What is your favorite 30 for 30 documentary and why?" 
  
 -Compiled by Joey Shampain. A&S „13        
ESPN 30 for 30 Reviews 
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 My favorite 30 for 30 was ―The 
Best That Never Was.‖ This documen-
tary centered on Marcus Dupree, a star 
running back out of Philadelphia, Missis-
sippi that attended the University of Ok-
lahoma. Sports writers at the time called 
him the most skilled running back that 
ever lived on our planet. In addition to 
top-level speed, break tackle ability, pa-
tience, vision, and strength, I could see 
from footage that he had an innate ability 
to find space when there was very little at 
hand. In the 1983 Fiesta Bowl, played 
following the 1982 season, Dupree‘s 
freshman year, Oklahoma played Arizona 
State, who had the top rush defense in the 
country. Dupree came back from vacation 
out of shape, which negatively affected 
his hamstrings. Playing at about half of 
his optimal ability, Dupree often slid and 
fell deliberately following runs before he 
was touched by defenders because of leg 
pain. He went to the locker room several 
times throughout the contest. Despite 
playing less than half of the offensive 
snaps and playing at a severely dimin-
ished level, Dupree still managed to run 
for 239 yards on only 17 carries! 
  That game was a fitting repre-
sentation for Dupree‘s football career as a 
whole. Mentally, Dupree could not han-
dle the pressure of the cameras and atten-
tion being given to him. Beyond that, he 
simply wanted to be left alone. His rocky 
relationship with Sooner head coach Bar-
ry Switzer did not make things any easier 
for Dupree‘s mental state, and Switzer 
says his handling of Dupree is the biggest 
regret of his football coaching career, 
which include three national champion-
ships and a Super Bowl victory. Dupree 
was granted special permission to join the 
professional ranks via the USFL after 
dropping out of Southern Mississippi. His 
five year, $5 million contract with the 
New Orleans Breakers was the richest in 
league history. A vicious knee injury 
knocked him out of the league, and 
Dupree gained a ton of weight. Eventual-
ly, Dupree made a comeback with the 
Los Angeles Rams in 1990 but was cut 
following the 1992 preseason. 
  Today, Dupree is a truck driver 
and is content with his life. He did not 
want what others wanted for him, which 
was to be the best running back of all 
time. Football-wise, he was pure potential 
that never materialized. This movie in-
spired me to be the best that I possibly 
can be in a certain field, whatever that job 
may be. 
 -Joshua Erenstein, CALS „11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   In the Summer of 2009, I 
worked for Shoot the Moon Productions 
on the 30 for 30 documentary, ―Winning 
Time: Reggie Miller vs. The New York 
Knicks.‖ The documentary is a dark 
comedy about the bitter, physical, enter-
taining rivalry between Reggie Miller‘s 
Indiana Pacers and the New York Knicks 
during the mid-90‘s. There isn‘t a main 
narrator of the film. The people inter-
viewed for the documentary (Knick and 
Pacer players, coaches, executives, re-
porters, and fans) tell the story.  
      I spent most of my time at work 
watching and re-watching 17 Knicks-
Pacers  playoff games. I created gamelogs 
that gave descriptions and times of every 
clip that could potentially be put into the 
documentary. One of my most tedious 
responsibilities was to transcribe all of 
the playoff games. For instance, if Marv 
Albert said ten minutes into the tape, 
―John Starks, for three . . . YES!‖ I would 
pause the game and type, ―10:00—MA: 
John Starks, for three . . . YES!‖  
      Spending a summer breaking down 
old Knicks-Pacers playoff games was a 
perfect summer job for me. I applied my 
experiences of transcribing episodes of 
Sports, Inc. Radio, directly to my job 
with Shoot the Moon Productions. I start-
ed following basketball during this time 
period. I idolized Patrick Ewing and 
played basketball in my Charles Oakley 
jersey. But I couldn‘t fully appreciate the 
Knicks, the rivalry, Reggie‘s greatness, or 
the NBA at the time.  Dissecting and re-
watching every minute of those playoff 
battles was a dream-job. Contributing to 
the documentary which was shown at the 
Sundance Film Festival was a rewarding 
feeling as well. But the best part of the 
job was that it confirmed that I could 
watch and analyze sports all day. 
 -Jeffery  Lebow, ILR „11 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 ―Kings Ransom” covers Wayne 
Gretzky‘s 1988 trade from the Edmonton 
Oilers to the Los Angeles Kings and pow-
erfully explores issues of loyalty, fandom, 
and management in professional sports 
and the economy.  Through highlights, 
interviews, and a chilling six-minute cold 
introduction from the great one himself, 
this film attempts to explain how the best 
hockey player who ever lived was traded 
in the prime of his career—at twenty-
seven years old, he already held 49 NHL 
records and four Stanley Cup titles—from 
the devoted, blue-collar Edmonton fan-
base to Hollywood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Although technically a trade (the 
Oilers received in return players, draft 
picks, and $15 million), this was not 
about two general managers constructing 
their respective teams.  Indeed, the view-
er never hears from front office staff be-
sides Edmonton head coach Glen Sather 
(who‘s opposition to the trade is ignored 
by owner Peter Pocklington).  This is an 
issue for the owners, Gretzky, and the 
game of hockey itself.  Trade ramifica-
tions even touched on national allegianc-
es, as the Canadian government attempt-
ed to block it. 
 Ownership considerations al-
lowed the deal to materialize, but ulti-
mately Gretzky‘s personal deliberations 
and hockey ambassadorship made it hap-
pen.  He brought the very best talent to 
the entertainment capital of the world in a 
move that coincided with NHL expansion 
from 21 to 30 teams in less than a decade.  
Was this worth the personal relationships 
he built in Edmonton and the ―maybe 
four more championship‖ he says he 
thinks he could have won had he stayed 
in Edmonton (he won none in LA)?  
 -Gabe Gershenfeld, ILR „11 
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 Flashback to week 1 of the 2009 
football season-  The Denver Broncos 
trailed the Cincinnati Bengals 7-6 with 
only 28 seconds left in the game and the 
ball on their own 13-yard line.  With 
mere seconds left and the length of the 
field to go, the situation looked bleak for 
Broncos fans.  But as Kyle Orton took a 
shot into traffic, aiming for a triple cov-
ered Brandon Marshall, the ball was bat-
ted up into the air and Gus Johnson‘s 
voice echoed out of televisions around the 
country: ―Ohhh CAUGHT! STOKLEY! ‖   
 Now dubbed ―The Immaculate 
Deflection,‖ the ball dropped right into 
the hands of Wide Receiver Brandon 
Stokley who had 
a clear lane to the 
end zone.  He 
spr inted the 
length of the 
field, poised to 
put his team up 
by a touchdown, 
but as he ap-
proached the one-yard line, he unexpect-
edly veered off to the right.  Running 
parallel to the goal line, a move all too 
familiar to Madden NFL players, Stokley 
burned six precious seconds off the clock 
before turning into the endzone, and 
helped prevent any last second drive from 
the Bengals.  After the game, he was 
praised for his quick thinking, and when 
asked if this was a move straight out of a 
video game, Stokley replied, ―It definitely 
is.‖ 
 The Madden NFL Franchise has 
infiltrated every locker room in The 
League.  Eagles Running Back LeSean 
McCoy puts it simply ―Everybody plays 
Madden.‖  According to Jets QB Mark 
Sanchez, everyone claims to be the best 
on their team and they often are forced to 
settle it on the sticks.  Perhaps nothing 
speaks to the mass appeal and popularity 
of the game as the Madden Bowl.  This 
single elimination tournament has been 
held every Super Bowl weekend since 
1995 on the current year‘s version of 
Madden.  It is not played with typical 
gamers though, all eight participants are 
NFL stars.  Maurice Jones-Drew took 
home the title in 2010, knocking off Chris 
Johnson and Patrick Willis to claim brag-
ging rights.  With some players choosing 
to play as themselves in the game, and 
others selecting teams more suited for 
their strategies, the significance of the 
competition to the players was apparent.    
Madden‘s mass appeal to the 
players and fans alike can be seen on the 
television show ―Madden Nation‖, anoth-
er annual competition that aired on 
ESPN2 for four years.  Accomplished 
gamers traveled across the country play-
ing against the nations best for the right to 
play the final showdown on the big 
screen in Times Square, where the winner 
walked away with $100,000.  More im-
portantly, everyone on the show got the 
chance to meet an NFL pro.  It was quite 
the experience for these Average Joes to 
go to a player‘s home and play him in 
Madden, beating him at his own game.  
The participants would then represent 
their NFL pro for the duration of the na-
tionwide Madden tour by wearing his 
official NFL jersey, bridging the gap be-
tween casual gamers and those who are 
actually in the game. 
 Madden has invaded the culture 
of the NFL and, as seen by the Stokley 
play, it‘s making its presence felt on the 
field too.  Even in last year‘s Super Bowl, 
Saint‘s head coach Sean Payton turned 
down a chip shot field goal in the second 
quarter for an unsuc-
cessful fourth and 
goal attempt.  Then, 
at the start of the se-
cond half, the Saints 
surprised the Colts 
with an onside kick.  
These decisions go 
against usual, con-
servative NFL protocol, exemplifying the 
new aggressive ―Maddenized‖ movement 
of playcalling.  This strategy aims toward 
scoring as many points as possible 
through high-risk, pass-happy, spread 
offenses.  The Madden franchise has al-
ways focused on delivering a real football 
experience that in fact mirrors the NFL, 
but now it seems that the NFL is adapting 
to Madden‘s image.   
A screenshot from the original John Madden Football video game in 1988 (left) compared to Madden ‗11 (right). 
“That‟s actually how I learned how to read defenses 
growing up.  I would look at Madden to see what a  
Cover 2 or a Cover 3 was.” -Percy Harvin, Vikings WR 
Madden NFL 
The game‟s influence around the league 
 
Michael Hansen, CALS ‗14 
mch229@cornell.edu 
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 This new image is extending 
more throughout the NFL as the newest 
generation of players that have grown up 
on video games enter the league.  Many 
players even use Madden as simulation 
software to help improve their game on 
the field.  The game utilizes the actual 
formations and plays used by current 
teams.  Tampa Bay Buccaneers Wide 
Receiver Dezmon Briscoe said that 
NCAA Football 2010, EA Sports‘ colle-
giate equivalent of Madden, successfully 
imported ―a majority‖ of his alma mater 
Kansas‘s playbook into the game.  He 
also credits Madden 2009 for teaching 
him how to read when defenses ―roll their 
coverage.‖  Percy Harvin, Wide Receiver 
for the Vikings, agrees: ―That‘s actually 
how I learned how to read defenses grow-
ing up.  I would look at Madden to see 
what a Cover 2 or a Cover 3 was.‖  This 
shows the potential for how Madden can 
be used as a learning tool, similar to a 
driving simulation for NASCAR racers, 
to help players take what they see in the 
game and apply it on the field. 
It is hard to imagine that a video 
game, which by nature is meant to be fun, 
is also a learning tool for football players
– an amazing achievement for the Mad-
den franchise.  The game attains such 
simplicity that the casual fan can pick up 
a controller and easily learn to play, yet it 
still can replicate the kind of depth and 
precision used in an NFL coach‘s game-
plan for the Super Bowl.  Now when 
gamers and athletes alike pick up the 
game, it only takes one call from the new 
in-game play-by-play announcer Gus 
Johnson to remind them of Brandon 
Stokley‘s infamous catch, and the Mad-
den franchise‘s significant impact on the 
NFL. 
 
Sources: 
 
http://ps3.ign.com/
articles/106/1067283p1.html 
http://www.wired.com/
magazine/2010/01/
ff_gamechanger/all/1 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wj5HtJidMZ8 
http://www.gamespy.com/pc/nascar-
racing-2003-
season/712182p1.html 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=_1b_7QMpmbs&feature=cha
nnel 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ryqQpWmO3sg&feature=cha
nnel 
 In an increasingly sabermetric 
baseball world, the use of certain ad-
vanced statistics has redefined our under-
standing of the modern game. For better 
or worse, new, in-depth measurements of 
performance have infiltrated the minds of 
fans and management alike, creating new 
standards of baseball success. But as 
complex terms such as ―runs created‖ 
begin to fill the mainstream baseball ver-
nacular, while the accepted value of sta-
tistics such as ―runs batted in‖ falls by the 
wayside, we run the risk of misinterpret-
ing data and thus drawing erroneous con-
clusions. One sabermetric statistic that 
features high risk for misuse is batting 
average on balls in play, or simply 
BABIP. Its known and perceived useful-
ness are often at odds with one another, 
making it a rather complex gauge of play-
er performance. 
 BABIP is simply a measurement 
of a player‘s batting average on balls he 
puts into the field of play. The formula is 
as follows: (Hits - Homeruns)/(At-bats –
Homeruns –Strikeouts + Sacrifice flies). 
Homeruns, strikeouts and walks are not 
included in this measurement, for the 
simple reason that they are not examples 
of baseballs hit into the field of play. Es-
sentially, the statistic serves as an objec-
tive observation of the frequency with 
which these hit balls are converted into 
actual hits. A higher BABIP suggests a 
higher rate of conversion.  
 In converting this metric into an 
informative piece of data, there exists a 
common assumption that BABIP is simp-
ly a measurement of luck. The inventor of 
BABIP, Voros McCracken, implicitly 
used this statistic in his Baseball Prospec-
tus essay ―Pitching and Defense‖ to sug-
gest this groundbreaking idea: ―Major-
league pitchers don't appear to have the 
ability to prevent hits on balls in play.‖ In 
other words, a high BABIP correlates to a 
―lucky‖ batter while a low BABIP sug-
gests he caught a series of bad breaks. For 
instance, an at-bat entailing a hard, line 
drive out is decisively more impressive 
than an at-bat featuring a weak, ground 
ball, infield hit. However, the statistic 
batting average, or even the sabermetri-
cally-favored on-base percentage cannot 
account for such a discrepancy in ability. 
 Granted, BABIP can indeed be a 
valid measurement of luck and thus pre-
dict future performance. New York Yan-
kees shortstop Derek Jeter, for instance 
had a stellar performance in 2009, bat-
ting .334 and reaching base over 40% of 
the time. His BABIP, however, was an 
exceptionally high .368 (the league aver-
age generally runs around .300). If his 
contacted balls were falling into play 
nearly 37% of the time, perhaps his bat-
ting average was partially a function of 
these balls finding hitter-friendly spots on 
the field. Sure enough, his 2010 campaign 
featured a much more typical .307 
BABIP, a BABIP that coincided with his 
worst Major League season ever, in 
which he hit just .270, a 60 point decline 
from the year before. But needless to say, 
not everyone is Derek Jeter (in more than 
just one regard). Other factors must be 
considered when determining the rele-
vance of a player‘s BABIP.  
 One such overlooked factor is 
speed. This is a fairly simple concept to 
comprehend. Faster batters are more like-
ly to reach base in a variety of ways, in-
cluding bunts and weak ground balls, 
which generally serve to drive down the 
average player‘s BABIP. Seattle Mariners 
The (In)significance of BABIP 
Luck and future performance in baseball 
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Can Ichiro‘s exceptionally high BABIP 
be ascribed to luck alone?  Or does 
his keen ability to run on contact fac-
tor into this statistic? 
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outfielder Ichiro Suzuki serves as a 
prime example of how speed confounds 
the relevance of BABIP, as his .357 
BABIP and coinciding .315 batting av-
erage may have been a function of his 
propensity to leg-out ground balls for 
infield hits. He had a remarkable 53 of 
these in 2010. 
 Another relevant factor that is 
not quantified by BABIP is defense. In 
this framework, it is more useful to as-
sess the BABIP of a pitcher rather than 
a hitter.  Pitchers have BABIPs as well, 
measuring the frequency with which 
opposing batters attain hits on pitched 
balls. Superior fielders may rob solid 
line drives, while infielders with limited 
range may allow ground balls to pass 
them by. UZR, or ultimate zone rating, 
is a sabermetric metric that can be used 
to gauge a team‘s composite defensive 
range. In 2010, the San Francisco Giants 
ranked second in the Major Leagues 
with a 56.4 UZR while the Atlanta 
Braves ranked twenty-seventh with an 
UZR of -35.7. Giants pitcher Matt Cain 
had a very low BABIP of .260, and 
Braves' pitcher Tim Hudson owned a 
seemingly similar .250. But these two 
figures are not as alike as they seem at 
first glance. Since the Giants were sig-
nificantly more effective at reaching 
baseballs in play, it follows that their 
pitcher was indeed much luckier. Cain 
likely benefited from his team‘s ability 
to ―steal‖ hits from the opposition, while 
Hudson reaped no such benefits. Here, 
BABIP alone is not indicative of a 
pitcher‘s luck. 
 Perhaps most importantly, 
BABIP contains inherent shortcomings 
in that it does not account for the differ-
entiation between fly outs (including 
line outs) and groundouts. Houston As-
tros outfielder Michael Bourn and 
Washington Nationals first baseman 
Adam Dunn had identical, slightly high 
BABIPs of .329 in 2010. Can we con-
clude that they encountered the same 
amount of luck in their at-bats? It seems 
unlikely. Bourn ranked third in the en-
tire league with a 1.66 groundball to fly 
ball ratio. Dunn, on the other hand, 
ranked seventh to last in the entire 
league with just a .49 groundball to fly 
ball ratio. Evidently, Dunn hit fly balls 
at an incredibly higher rate than Bourne, 
balls that have a significantly greater 
capacity to amount to a hit. Bourne ap-
pears to have been significantly luckier 
than Dunn in that his BABIP was this 
high while hitting such an immense 
 Last season's AL MVP, Joe 
Mauer, has seen his home run numbers 
drastically decline this season as com-
pared to his 2009 level. Mauer hit a 
career-high 28 homers during his MVP 
campaign, but so far this year he has hit 
only two. Using Bloomberg Sports' sta-
tistical tools, we can see that Mauer's 
home run output both in 2009 and in 
2010 were uncharacteristic, and that his 
power numbers should regulate some-
where in between the two. 
 First, it must be mentioned that 
Mauer's OPS in 2009 was unusually 
high for his career, and a neutral observ-
er might conclude that 2009 was a 
fluke.  Others could argue that this 
surge had to do with natural age pro-
gression, as he reached the age of 26, a 
milestone at which many players begin 
to peak. Thus, despite Mauer's current 
career OPS of .887, it could be argued 
that his 1.031 2009 OPS would have 
some staying power. Mauer's monster 
season prompted the Twins to hand him 
an eight-year, $184 million contract 
extension in March. 
 Mauer's two homers this year-
to-date have thus raised concerns in 
Minnesota. We can point to his fluctuat-
ing home runs per flyball rate as a cause 
of this season's power outage - as well 
as Mauer's 2009 outlier season. From 
2005 to 2008, that rate ranged from 
6.5% to 10.8% -- league average typi-
cally hovers around 10%. However, in 
2009, Mauer's HR/FB rate jumped to a 
stratospheric 20.4%. Thus maybe this 
shift, rather than indicating anything in 
particular about Mauer's game, indicates 
that a lot of Mauer's power in 2009 was 
the result of a statistical variation. If this 
dramatic increase had been accompanied 
by a drastic change in body type it would 
be understandable, but Mauer's body did 
not noticeably change. 
 This season, Mauer's homerun 
per fly ball out rate has regressed to just 
5.7%, a career low, but also closer to the 
pre-2009 range. The numbers clearly point 
to 2009 being an outlier in this respect. 
Granted, a couple of unmentioned varia-
bles might be pulling down Mauer's HR/
FB rate this year. One, the Twins' move to 
Target Field from the Metrodome might 
be affecting his power numbers, especially 
through the early, colder-weather months 
of the season. Second, pitchers might be 
attacking Mauer differently this season, 
following his '09 power outburst. Let us 
explore these two possibilities. 
 Mauer's new home, Target Field, 
has been the third-worst ballpark for home 
runs, in front of only Citi Field and the 
Oakland Coliseum, according to 
ESPN.com's MLB Park Factors. However, 
through just over one-third of the season, 
it is tough to say that this phenomenon is 
reliable or that it will remain constant. 
After all, it typically takes three years 
before you can properly trust a given sta-
dium's park factor. Meanwhile, Mauer's 
previous home, the Metrodome, played as 
roughly home run neutral. The dimensions 
of the two fields are very similar, so ex-
pect Target Field to be less home run-
stubborn than it currently is, especially in 
the warmer summer months. To date, 
Joe Mauer‟s Power  
Home run analysis 
 
Mat Sevin, ILR ‗11 
ms873@cornell.edu 
number of ground balls. It is also worth 
noting that this disparity could also be 
attributed to the ―Ichiro effect,‖ as 
Bourne possesses tremendous speed 
while Dunn runs well below average.  
Regardless, BABIPs as a stand-alone 
statistic is evidently limited in its use-
fulness without a description of the con-
tact made with the ball.  
 Clearly, the sabermetric-crazed 
baseball culture has reasons to love 
BABIP. It is certainly a valuable tool in 
assessing certain happenings in day-to-day 
Major League games, encompassing phe-
nomena not captured by the daily box 
score. Fantasy owners can benefit greatly 
from the application of BABIP, using it to 
analyze past and predict future perfor-
mance of players they consider drafting. 
The ability to contextualize this metric, 
however, is even more important. Realiz-
ing its limitations is essential to its central 
function as a valid quantification of base-
ball. 
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Mauer's OPS is 80 points lower at home 
than away. 
 Maybe pitchers are attacking 
Mauer differently, too. This argument 
could potentially explain some of the 
catcher's power struggles. Pitchers, in 
fact, have been unwilling to throw him 
fastballs in certain counts, and seem to 
have replaced them with changeups, and 
occasionally curveballs. In 2009, on 0-1 
and 2-2 counts, Mauer saw a majority of 
fastballs. However, this season, in the 
same counts, he's seen a fastball only 
about one-third of the time. This change 
by the pitchers seems smart, as Mauer 
had a lethal 1.077 OPS against four-seam 
fastballs from 2006 through 2009. Mean-
while, he now sees almost three times as 
many curveballs on the first pitch and in 2
-2 counts, according to Bloomberg Sports 
tools, when compared to 2009. This ad-
justment by pitchers seems appropriate, 
as Mauer had a .483 OPS against curve-
balls dating back to '06. Lastly, Mauer 
has seen more changeups in 1-2, 2-1, and 
2-2 counts, although he has fared well 
against the changeup in his career, so this 
adjustment should have had no effect. 
 Target Field's low home run rate 
and the new approach by pitchers may be 
hurting Mauer's home run numbers. But 
the statistical variation in his HR/FB rate 
also helps explains the drastic difference 
between 2009 and 2010. That rate sug-
gests that Mauer's MVP-type numbers 
may have been affected by a statistical 
outlier, and that fans and teams may have 
to reassess their expectations for Mauer's 
power numbers. In regards to how pitch-
ers are approaching Mauer, it seems un-
likely that the recent adjustments can 
explain this year's low home run total, as 
he has been a top player in the league 
since 2004, and pitchers have been ad-
justing to his tendencies every year. 
Meanwhile, Target Field has been playing 
like a large shopping mall - but it does 
not explain Mauer's low road home run 
total, or the fact that he has yet to hit any 
homers at home. 
Expect a middle ground to 
emerge between the home run binge 
Mauer showed last season and the 
drought he's experienced in 2010. 
 
This article was published as a Bloom-
berg Sports blog post on 6/16/10.  In the 
following paragraphs written at the end 
of the 2010 season, the author looks back 
on his analysis. 
 
In retrospect, what I find amaz-
ing about these Bloomberg posts is their 
predictive power. As I quantitatively in-
vestigated Joe Mauer‘s lackluster 2010 
power performance, I asserted that his 
power numbers would not return to that 
of the 2009 level. Mauer finished the 
2010 season with only nine homeruns 
after hitting twenty-eight the year before.  
 The implications of these tools 
are also important in helping baseball 
teams more acutely invest in players.  Joe 
Mauer signed an enormous eight-year, 
$184 million contract that begins in 2011. 
Had the Twins identified the trends from 
this article at an earlier point, they may 
have refrained from paying out this large 
sum.  
This article pinpoints the need 
for teams to invest in ―baseball intelli-
gence‖, AKA sabermetric analytics. Cur-
rently, the thirty Major League teams are 
at different stages of utilizing this infor-
mation, some hardly using it at all. Others 
have the statistics but do not know how to 
properly integrate them into their organi-
zational framework. Only a few teams 
have their own sophisticated models of 
baseball analytics. I think it is clear that 
the predictive power teams reap from 
using sabermetric analytics is immense, 
and that all teams can benefit from such. 
 
Blog link: 
 
http://bloombergsports.mlblogs.com/ 
2010/06/16/joe-mauer-and-his-power-
outage/  
MLB 
Can Joe Mauer‘s HR/ flyball out rate (above) or pitch patterns seen (below) help to 
explain the difference in his HR output between 2009 and 2010? 
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For a die-hard sports fan, watch-
ing his or her favorite team in the com-
forts of home can be considered more of a 
ritual than a luxury.  Cable and satellite 
broadcasts of games are viewed by a mul-
titude of Americans, whether it‘s hud-
dling around the television on a Sunday 
with your buddies to catch the NFL 
games or plopping down in bed to watch 
the Monday Night game after a tiring day 
of work.  Although the widespread, high-
quality television broadcasts are enjoya-
ble viewing mediums for many, individu-
als such as team owners and league offi-
cials fear that fans‘ actions are seriously 
hurting ticket sales.  The response to this 
problem has been enforcing television 
―blackouts‖ within local markets, where 
the game will not be shown if a deter-
mined ticket sales quota is not met.  Tak-
ing this action is surely drastic, but is it 
truly an effective way to combat fan at-
tendance that has been deemed insuffi-
cient?   
 The NFL is the league where 
fans are hit the hardest by this phenome-
non.  With only an 8 game regular season 
home schedule for each team, teams 
strive to sell out each game.  Yet accom-
plishing this goal has proven to be far 
more difficult than the NFL imagined, 
especially for teams that haven‘t had 
much success in the near past.   Generally 
defined, a television blackout refers to a 
situation in which a game cannot be tele-
vised in a certain media market.  Broad-
casters within 75 miles of the stadium are 
only permitted to broadcast home games 
if they are sold out 72 hours in advance.  
Commonly, extensions are given on a 24-
hour basis, and multiple extensions are 
not uncommon prior to making the final 
decision whether or not to air the game.1 
The decision on whether or not to give an 
extension lies with the league office, and 
during this period teams are given the 
option to buy back tickets at one-third of 
their face value in order to lift a blackout, 
if desired.2 It is clear that the repercus-
sions of the NFL‘s use of blackouts are 
felt most by the league‘s most dedicated 
fans, as they may have to miss up to half 
a season of televised games if not enough 
tickets are sold.   
 Blackouts have been present in 
the NFL since its earliest stages.  The 
1963 Bears-Giants NFL Championship 
Gane was ―blacked out‖ in the entire city 
of Chicago as a measure to ensure maxi-
mum home ticket sales and stadium reve-
nue.  The only places that were able to air 
the game were small, private theaters 
which were granted rights to do so.  In 
fact, the first seven Super Bowls were not 
widely available on television within 75 
miles of the stadium.  In the 1960‘s, this 
was not surprising at all as regular season 
home games for all teams were common-
ly blacked out.  Hotels just outside the 
blackout area took advantage of this by 
promoting special day rates for those who 
wished to view the game at a comfortable 
location not too far from home.3  Alt-
hough almost unimaginable today, this 
continued until 1973, when the current 
extension policy began and immensely 
helped ticket sales. 
 In the 2009 season, there were a 
total of 22 blackouts throughout the regu-
lar season, with lowly teams Jacksonville 
and Oakland receiving a whopping seven 
local blackouts each.  But do not think 
that the fans of less talented teams are the 
only ones who should be concerned; 2009 
playoff teams including Arizona, Cincin-
nati, and San Diego are worried that low-
er ticket sales for this current season may 
leave their fans devoid of the pleasure of 
watching games from home.  Even 
though the Chargers sold out every home 
game in 2009, there were several close 
calls where extensions were given in hope 
that more tickets would be purchased as a 
game drew closer.4 Although the NFL‘s 
blackout policy is 
designed to even-
tually increase 
revenue, it is dif-
ficult to believe 
that this will be 
the natural occur-
rence.  This is 
mainly due to the 
ease of access to 
games broadcast-
ed over the inter-
net; simply by 
conducting an 
internet search a 
fan will be able to 
find multiple 
internet broad-
casts of his or her 
favorite team 
with little diffi-
culty.  This may 
be hurting the 
cause of disgrun-
tled television watchers more than any-
thing else as the internet is such an acces-
sible avenue for viewing.  Because of 
this, it is clear that the NFL must take a 
different, more effective approach to this 
Television Blackouts in the NFL 
A progressive plan for the future 
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Blackouts in the NFL are hardly a recent phenomena.For example, 
the 1958 NFL Super Bowl between the Baltimore Colts and the 
New York Giants, often referred to as ―The Greatest Game Ever 
Played‖, was blacked out in the New York Area. 
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 problem or else it will continue to wors-
en. 
Although the NFL may be deter-
mined to enforce their harsh blackout 
policy until it causes a change in fan be-
havior, I do not feel this will occur natu-
rally as believed.  The league must act 
accountably and take action if they wish 
to alter the current reality.  So far, nega-
tive trends have been on the rise, 
and an end to this doesn‘t seem 
near.  Previous history has shown 
that fans have not reacted well to 
blackouts; therefore we cannot as-
sume they will do so in the future.  
Not only do blackouts strip dedicat-
ed fans of the privilege of follow-
ing their favorite teams weekly, the 
message being sent is that money 
has completely taken over the game and 
is ultimately the decision factor.  The 
main concept is that fans need an enticing 
reason that will persuade them to choose 
the stadium over their home theater.   
At this point in time, it is fair to 
say that a plethora of fans feel slighted or 
even betrayed by their lifelong squad.  
The remedy to this situation is one that 
must be viewed as one that will realisti-
cally work in the long-term.  Re-imposing 
blackout conditions after lifting them for 
a short while will lead to immensely larg-
er problems than were present before.  
Fans will be even more discouraged, and 
a remedy would be near impossible.  
Therefore, we must make sure that when 
a possible solution is chosen it can be 
effective far into the future.   A large ob-
stacle is the fact that the quality of televi-
sion coverage is increasing each and eve-
ry year.  Whether it is the ever-occurring 
inventions of clearer, sharper televisions, 
or better cameras that are able to offer a 
multitude of viewing angles, there seems 
to be little promise for a rapid solution to 
this problem.  However we may approach 
this problem, the bottom line is that cur-
rently NFL franchises will likely not be 
satisfied unless they achieve the desired 
result of selling out each home game, 
putting sports enthusiasts in a difficult 
position.   
 My proposed solution is to in-
crease efforts to target lower-income fans.  
Ticket prices for the NFL have increased 
in 2010 for 18 out of 32 teams in hopes of 
increasing revenue, compared to only 8 
teams in 2009.5  This is only compound-
ing the current problem as increasing 
prices are further discouraging many fans 
from attending games.  Perhaps, in sec-
tions of stadiums or arenas that are con-
stantly undersold, special promotions 
may be offered to entice those with less to 
spend.  These may include an increased 
amount of group discounts or packaged 
deals where fans receive coupons or 
vouchers that can be used throughout the 
stadium.  Seats that once were barren may 
now be filled, and surely more revenue 
will be produced than if these tickets 
were not sold at all.  It is clear that the 
NFL and its fans must work in conjunc-
tion in order to make progress; if both 
groups are able to make and comply with 
logical changes then I believe the black-
out issue can be solved rather quickly.  If 
the NFL makes the intelligent decision to 
make changes to its current policies, both 
parties will clearly benefit. 
 In addition, teams would have to 
minimize the ―hidden costs‖ of going to a 
live contest which may deter fans such as: 
high concession stand prices, steep park-
ing fees, seat comfort, and congested traf-
fic flow leaving the stadium after the 
game.  For example, a large pizza at the 
new Cowboys stadium costs $60, and 
parking at the new Meadowlands is at 
least $20; hardly affordable for the aver-
age fan.6  Even if a ticket is purchased for 
only $35-40, twice that may be easily 
spent at the end of the day.  If miscellane-
ous fees are lowered to a point where 
their revenue produced is not greatly al-
tered, fans will likely look at stadiums in 
a different light, and will be more likely 
to think of the stadium as a fan-friendly 
environment. These comfort costs may 
not be the critical deciding factor, but 
improving the fan experience may in-
crease fan attendance and mitigate the 
situation.    
This doesn‘t mean that the 
changes must be completely drastic; even 
if they are small in the beginning fans 
will be likely to notice that their favorite 
franchise is making a greater effort to 
please them.  Other approaches may in-
clude increasing the amount of fan inter-
action with the players.  Perhaps, teams 
could do things such as giving away 
memorabilia to random fans or encourag-
ing organized chants throughout the stadi-
um.   A good example of this are the 
―Terrible Towels‖ given out to each Pitts-
burgh Steelers fan upon entering the sta-
dium, which contain the team colors and 
are waved back and forth in unity 
throughout the entire game.   
 Although it only seems fair that 
hometown fans be able to view their fa-
vorite team on basic television each 
week, the reality is that the NFL is a 
huge business that has minimum ex-
pectations.  Ultimately, the fate of the 
situation may just lie with the actions 
of the fans, but the administrative 
figures within each franchise also 
have several critical options to con-
sider.  If things continue to stay the 
way they currently are, I expect a 
period of futility that could last for 
decades.  It is clear that immediate, alt-
hough not necessarily drastic, actions 
must be taken to make an effort to reverse 
current trends.  After all, the fans are 
what enable professional sports to be as 
successful and prominent as they are to-
day. 
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Not only do blackouts strip dedi-
cated fans of the privilege of fol-
lowing their favorite teams week-
ly, they send the message that 
money drives decisions. 
NFL 
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Introduction 
 
 Article VI, Section F, subsection 
1 of the Major League Baseball Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement describes 
salary arbitration as the method to 
through which a third party neutral deter-
mines a player‘s contract. The process is 
considered final offer arbitration, mean-
ing arbitrators will choose either the 
team‘s offer or the player‘s offer as a one 
year contract. As long as the player and 
team do not settle with a long term con-
tract, the player will be eligible for salary 
arbitration every year until he reaches six 
years of Major League Service (MLS) 
and becomes a free agent. The salary ar-
bitration process came about in 1973 as 
part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment between Major League Baseball 
(MLB) and Major League Baseball Play-
er‘s Association (MLBPA). Initially the 
owners voted 22-2 to approve the 1974 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
that was the first MLB agreement to in-
clude salary arbitration. They stated that 
giving up their stance and allowing salary 
arbitration would benefit everyone be-
cause it would help to pass the collective 
bargaining agreement, which was needed 
to end the labor dispute. The owners were 
hoping that allowing salary arbitration to 
be included in the basic agreement would 
allow them to avoid free agency in the 
future.  
 Unfortunately for the owners, 
free agency did come into existence, and 
a new question has arisen: Do arbitration-
eligible players earn as much as free 
agents? If the answer is yes, then the 
MLS requirement for free-agency is es-
sentially shortened to 3 years, shortening 
the amount of time that teams are able to 
employ players at below-market value. 
This paper attempts to answer this ques-
tion through a regression comparing the 
difference between free-agent salaries and 
arbitration salaries, and performance.  
 
Theory 
 
 The significant cost to teams 
during a prospect‘s development is the 
responsibility they have of both paying 
and training the players from the time 
they are signed until they are either traded 
or released. The high cost of training for 
multiple years coupled with the fact that 
the vast majority of players who sign con-
tracts never make the majors, results in 
extremely high quasi-fixed costs, or costs 
associated with the number of players 
rather than the amount of playing time 
per player, for each team.  
 This type of training is consid-
ered general training. Ron Ehrenberg and 
Bob Smith, both Professors at Cornell‘s  
ILR School, state that ―if employee mo-
bility costs are not very great, employers 
will be deterred from investing in general 
training.‖ However, that seems not to be 
the case with Major League Baseball 
teams. The mobility costs of changing 
teams are not very substantial for players 
due to provisions in the collective bar-
gaining agreement that provides for mov-
ing expenses  
 The problem with investing in 
training for Major League Baseball play-
ers is that after six years playing at a Ma-
jor League level, the players can take all 
of the training that helped them to im-
prove their statistics and use it to assist in 
getting a higher salary on the free agent 
market. However, it should be clear that a 
team ―would only do so if it believes that 
it can collect returns on that investment 
after training.‖ Employers get these re-
turns by keeping wages low after the 
training period.   
Very few teams in the modern 
baseball era have players like Joe Mauer, 
who want to attempt to stay with the same 
baseball team throughout their entire ca-
reer and are willing to take a pay cut by 
earning below market value in order to do 
so. In the majority of the cases, the teams 
only have the six years of MLS prior to 
free agency to attempt to recoup training 
costs for both the player who made it to 
the big leagues and for the many other 
players whose productivities never 
reached what the scouting department 
saw as their full potential. The regression 
analysis discussed below will attempt to 
see whether or not salary arbitration eligi-
ble players are paid the same amount of 
money for performance as free agents. 
This analysis will show if salary arbitra-
tion has effectively lowered the major 
league service requirement for free agen-
cy down to three years.  
 
Analysis  
 
 The best way to decide whether 
free agents are paid more than salary arbi-
tration eligible players is to observe the 
effect that performance has on the salary 
of both groups of players. In order to de-
termine this effect, this section will use 
data to see whether teams indeed have the 
full six years to recoup their training 
costs, by paying players with less than six 
years of MLS lower than their marginal 
revenue costs. 
MLB Salary Arbitration 
Has it raised salaries to free agency levels? 
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Joe Mauer‘s eight-year, $184 million con-
tract keeps the star catcher in Minnesota  
through his arbitration –eligible years and 
at a cost that is likely below market value. 
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 The first decision that had to be 
made in conducting this analysis was 
which types of players to analyze. Since 
the reasons teams hire players for differ-
ent positions can vary widely, the regres-
sion in this section focuses on the corner 
positions. The corner positions include 
first base, third base, right field and left 
field. When scouting players for these 
positions, teams tend to focus much more 
on the players hitting ability than their 
fielding ability. All of the corner position 
players are expected to give the majority 
of the run support for the team.  
 Corner positions are the easiest 
positions to statistically evaluate. Most 
baseball data sites, including the MLB- 
owned PIA Plus, are limited in what they 
report for fielding statistics. Using hitting 
ability statistics, I was able to choose my 
variables much more carefully since I had 
a much larger, more in-depth selection of 
variables to pick from. All data is from 
the 2009 season. 
 Another decision that had to be 
made was which salary arbitration eligi-
ble players and free agents  to include in 
the analysis based on whether or not they 
want to arbitration. When it came to sala-
ry arbitration eligible players, the analysis 
could either include the players who actu-
ally had their cases heard at arbitration or 
both the players who went to arbitration 
and the players who settled before the 
hearing. Since historically only a few 
cases ever reach the arbitration room (in 
2009 only 3 cases made it) the data in-
cludes all of the settled arbitration cases 
as well. The teams who settled with their 
players before did so under the threat of 
arbitration, and therefore had to take that 
into account when bargaining with the 
player. The data used includes settled 
arbitration cases that are coded as if they 
went to arbitration. In total,  33 arbitra-
tion cases were used in the sample. 
 The other choice that had to be 
made was which group of free agents to 
include, based on MLS. The data in this 
paper focuses on free agents with six to 
ten years of MLS. The issue with choos-
ing free agents using MLS criteria is that 
some players chose to sign multiyear con-
tracts that spanned their last year(s) of 
salary arbitration into their first year(s) of 
free agency. Since these players had their 
contracts determined on the basis of both 
salary arbitration and free agency, they 
are not included. Therefore the free 
agents discussed in the rest of this paper 
will refer to any free agent with six to ten 
years of MLS who did not sign a multi-
year contract which spanned from their 
last years of salary arbitration up until at 
least 2009, when they were considered a 
free agent. The number of free agents 
who fit this criteria is 52. 
 One variable in the salary equa-
tion was the free agent dummy variable 
(FA). This variable assigns a value of 1 if 
the player is a free agent and a value of 0 
if he is not, and was added to see if free 
agents get paid more, just because of the 
fact they are free agents. When holding 
performance   (which will be quantified 
later) constant the salary of free agents is 
$555,613 lower than the salary of arbitra-
tion eligible players. However, the regres-
sion analysis shows that the probability 
that this decrease in salary could be due 
to random sampling is 74.9%. A probabil-
ity, or p value, under 5% is considered 
statistically significant. Since the p value 
is over this threshold the regression re-
sults  found cannot be concluded to be 
statistically significant.  
Another variable is based on 
performance of all players, on-base plus 
slugging (OPS) times at bats (AB). OPS 
measures both the ability of the player to 
get on base and the ability to hit for pow-
er.  It is a good overall measure of a play-
er‘s offensive ability. This paper uses the 
product of these two commonly used 
baseball statistics because if a player only 
has a few at bats his OPS can appear ei-
ther extremely high or extremely low. 
Multiplying by AB accounts for this and 
reduces the chance of any major outliers. 
While holding all other variables con-
stant, a player‘s salary increases by 
$10,108 for each point of OPS times AB. 
The p-value of this variable was .5 per-
cent making this result statistically signif-
icant. 
The final variable in the salary 
equation was FA*OPS*AB. This varia-
ble shows how much above and beyond 
the $10,108 free agents receive for each 
point of OPS*AB. This is an extremely 
important variable because it shows 
whether salary arbitration eligible players 
and free agents get paid the same amount 
if they perform comparably. The regres-
sion shows that free agents get an addi-
tional $12,115 for each point of OPS*AB, 
with an R-Squared of 41.2%. The p-value 
for this result is 2.6%, which indicates 
that this is statistically significant. 
Under this regression it appears 
that free agents are compensated more 
than double for their performance when 
compared to salary arbitration eligible 
players, but not for just being free agent 
eligible.  One of the possible reasons for 
this is that free agents have proven track 
records of performance, which means 
teams are willing to pay more for perfor-
mance. The other possible reason, the one 
which seems to be likely according to the 
theory section, is that both arbitrators and 
teams realize that teams have a very lim-
ited time to try to make back the quasi-
fixed costs on the few players who actual-
ly make it to the major leagues. Therefore 
salary arbitration eligible players are paid 
significantly less for their performance 
than free agents with the same statistics.   
 
Conclusion   
 
 The implication of this case 
study is that Major League Baseball 
teams follow most of the theory about 
quasi-fixed costs. Although they provide 
general training, despite the fact that the 
players do not have high mobility costs, 
teams choose to provide training because 
they believe they will recoup the costs by 
keeping the salary of players who make 
the team artificially low for the first 6 
years. Teams provide training at a cost to 
them because they know that any players 
with less than 6 MLS, even salary arbitra-
tion eligible players, will allow them to 
make back some of their quasi-fixed 
costs. Major League Baseball teams ap-
pear to act much like other businesses 
when it comes to quasi-fixed costs.  
 
The author adapted this article from a 
paper she submitted for academic credit 
in a credit internship with the MLB Labor 
Relations department in spring 2010. 
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Introduction 
 
 ―I love the Red Sox as if they are 
my third parent... but they are the "fun" 
parent. Sometimes they punish you with a 
loss, sometimes they make you proud 
with a World Series win or two 
(2004&2007), but [regardless] the Red 
Sox are a huge part of my life‖ (Bridson 
2008).  The most loyal of fans will com-
mit to a team through thick and thin, de-
fending their players in losses and cele-
brating wildly when their team brings 
home a win. The question is, why? Why 
do people become fans? How do these 
fans become committed to a specific 
team? Why do some fans remain consist-
ently loyal while others switch teams 
without reason?  These questions pave the 
way towards understanding the motiva-
tions behind the formation and sustain-
ment of sport fan commitment.   
 Individuals become fans for 
many reasons, with eustress (positive 
arousal), group affiliation, and geography 
as key motivators and prerequisites for 
strong fan commitment. Affective fan 
commitment is generated through the 
recurrent action of participating in a 
shared activity, such as attending or 
watching games with fellow fans, which 
unifies fans into a cohesive social unit. 
This social aspect of viewing revolves 
around the fact that the team is a sacred 
object. As the action is repeated over 
time, individuals form both identities and 
social norms that govern their actions and 
interactions with other fans. This leads to 
the creation of strong, person-to-group 
affective ties to their fellow fans as a col-
lective, resulting in a stable social order 
based on fan commitment. 
 Randall Collins has studied ritu-
als and their impact on social orders 
while Lawler et al. have evaluated how 
shared activity and emotional attribution 
exert influence on social commitments. 
These well-developed theories serve as a 
guide for understanding sport fan loyalty 
and provide a step-by-step blueprint that 
allows us to classify fan allegiance as an 
affective commitment. The emotional 
commitment is felt as a person-to-group 
tie between an individual fan and his fel-
low fans as a whole, leading the fans to 
consider themselves a cohesive social 
unit. Classifying sport fan commit-
ment is relevant as knowing the motiva-
tions behind an individual‘s decision to 
join and remain in an organization will 
allow leaders to manipulate these aspects 
in order attract additional members. Spe-
cifically in the sports sector, classification 
of fan loyalty will allow for improved 
marketing schemes for sport promotion.  
 
Theory 
 
 Collins‘s theory of interaction 
ritual chains explains that there is a spe-
cific process containing causal connec-
tions and feedback loops that precedes 
group commitment. A ritual, according to 
Collins, is ―the process in which partici-
pants develop a mutual focus of attention 
and become entrained in each other‘s 
bodily micro-rhythms and emo-
tions‖ (2004). This process has four initi-
ating conditions: physical group assem-
bly, barriers to outsiders, a common focus 
of attention, and a shared mood (Collins 
2004). These four ingredients are crucial 
prerequisites for instigating commitment 
and as the ritual continues these elements 
will reinforce each other.  Collins notes 
that, ―As the persons become more tightly 
focused on their common activity, more 
aware of what each other is doing and 
feeling, and more aware of each other‘s 
awareness, they experience their shared 
emotion more intensely, as it comes to 
dominate their awareness‖ (2004). Mem-
bers unconsciously follow non-verbal 
cues of their contemporaries – clapping, 
participating in established cheers, etc. – 
perpetuating the activity and creating a 
shared group culture.   
 At the conclusion of a ritual, 
group solidarity or a feeling of member-
ship should be evident. An increase in 
emotional energy, denoted by feelings of 
elation, enthusiasm, and initiative in tak-
ing part, signal that the interaction was 
successful. The attention given to a com-
munal ―sacred object‖ is also a sign of 
group commitment, where a ―sacred ob-
ject‖ is any object that members associate 
with themselves collectively. Finally, at 
the conclusion of a successful ritual there 
is a feeling of moral rightness in adhering 
to the group‘s culture and committing to 
fellow members (Collins 2004). Because 
this theory depends on the importance of 
a sacred object and communal focus gen-
erated through bodily presence, it can be 
directly correlated with sport fan commit-
ment where the team is the ―sacred ob-
ject‖ around which the social unit of fans 
communally gathers. 
 Lawler et al.‘s theory of social 
commitment overlaps with Collins‘s theo-
ry in many respects while differing on 
others. Six main assumptions explain the 
motivations behind group commitment 
and rely upon the general observation that 
―people are affective beings who respond 
emotionally to their experiences in rela-
tionships, groups, or organizations‖ espe-
cially if a task is high in jointness (Lawler 
et al. 2008 ):  
 
1. Social activities are interactive, joint 
activities  
2. Interactions generate positive and 
negative feelings 
3. Feelings are individually interpreted 
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as rewards or punishment 
4. People prefer to experience positive 
feelings or rewards. 
5. Individuals strive to understand the 
cause of their emotions. 
6. Emotions are contextually interpret-
ed and attributed to other people or 
the group. 
 
Additionally, when group tasks are indis-
tinguishable from one another and there is 
a perception of shared responsibility, 
group members are more likely to attrib-
ute emotions to the group. (Lawler et al. 
2008). ―Simply put, the common theme 
here is that people become more socially 
and affectively committed to groups… 
within which they repeatedly or regularly 
experience positive emotions… [and] 
attribute these emotions to the social 
unit‖ (Lawler et al. 2008).  
 
Defining Sport Fans and Fanship 
 
 Where a fan is ―an athlete re-
moved, and athlete in spirit, if not in 
fact... [who] can enjoy the pleasures of 
victory, the sorrow of defeat, the tension 
of the climactic moment. … [and] share 
intense feelings with strangers who un-
derstand‖ (Jones, 2003), fanship is, ―an 
affiliation in which a great deal of emo-
tional significance and value are derived 
from group membership‖ developed via 
the joint activity of social viewing 
(Jacobson 2003). Lawler et al‘s theory 
stated that social commitment will occur 
as individuals attribute emotions to the 
organization, thus fans become commit-
ted as they share both the excitement and 
sorrow with their fellow fans.  
 For example, Red Sox fans are 
notoriously passionate about their fan-
ship. They feel each win or loss personal-
ly and are extremely vocal about their 
opinions following the game.  Andrew 
Bridson, a 19- year-old fan from Hano-
ver, Massachusetts, recalls the sorrow 
after the Sox lost in 2003: ―Of course, 
Aaron Boone‘s walk-off homerun in 2003 
was devastating. I can‘t even describe 
how depressing the next day was in 
school. Nobody talked, and everyone just 
went through the motions. My French 
teacher cried‖ (Bridson 2008). However, 
nothing matched their joy when the Red 
Sox clinched a World Series title in 2004. 
Bridson recalls, ―When we won in ‘04, it 
was such a great feeling. We finally did 
it. Finally won, and especially the way we 
did it, when we came back from 0-3 in 
the series to the Yankees, who put up 
twenty-plus runs in game three, and to 
have those miraculous comebacks was 
insane. It was one of the happiest mo-
ments of my life‖ (2008). It is important 
to note that, as a fan, Andrew expresses 
his emotions as a collective ―we.‖ Fan-
ship is not just about individual emotions, 
hopes, and dreams; it is about sharing and 
relating one‘s feelings to the group as a 
whole. 
 An individual cannot be consid-
ered a full-fledged fan without invoking 
and sustaining some form of social com-
mitment. This social commitment to fel-
low fans is molded by participating in a 
common activity, sharing a common fo-
cus, and attributing and expressing a wide 
scope of emotions during the sporting 
event. This recurrent interaction leads to 
the creation of group norms and social 
identities, both of which enable the emer-
gence of a strong social commitment 
(Lawler et al. 2008). 
 
Motivations for Becoming a Fan 
 
 Daniel Wann et al. identifies 
eight motivational typologies:- escape, 
economic, eustress (positive arousal), self
-esteem, group affiliation, entertainment, 
family, and aesthetics wherein eustress 
and group affiliation were found to be 
prevailing factors in the consumption of 
non-stylistic, aggressive team sports such 
as baseball, basketball, and football 
(2008).  Melinda Jones‘s research con-
curred, showing that the most common 
motivator for becoming a fan was family 
affiliation, a type of group affiliation 
(2003). In contrast, other studies noted 
that geographical location, not group af-
filiation, was at the heart of fan devotion 
and that most fans identify with a team 
because they live or have lived in the area 
(Jacobson 2003). Each motivating factor 
juxtaposes with the social commitment 
framework presented by Collins and 
Lawler et al., and we see how intense 
fanship is promoted and sustained by 
repeated interactions with both family 
and friends who share a common love for 
their team. 
 Wann et al‘s research suggests 
that many fans are excited by the nature 
of violent sports, thus experiencing eu-
stress. They gain stimulation from yelling 
at the players and conversing during play, 
increasing their entertainment and emo-
tional happiness (Wann et al. 2008). In 
addition, team sports are associated with 
many social activities such as tailgating 
and sport viewing parties. ―Under such 
conditions, group norms may be estab-
lished and even cherished, leading these 
fans of these sports to view the group-
nature of the event as an important moti-
vational factor‖ (Wann et al. 2008). When 
fans are cheering together, their eustress 
is attributed to the interaction of their 
fellow fans and person-to-person ties 
begin to form between fan members. To 
be clear though, this person-to-person tie 
is made to the fellow fan only inasmuch 
as the fan is a member of the larger entity 
of fans, and as such the tie would be bet-
ter categorized as a person-to-group tie to 
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the collective fan following. Sport view-
ing is seen as a joint activity in which 
fellow fans can relate to one another and 
share their views on the game at the mo-
ment they occur, which highlights the 
necessity of bodily presence. 
 Group affiliation as a byproduct 
of social viewing is an integral aspect of 
sport fan culture as well. Jacobson notes 
in her research that there is a desire to be 
with other people and experience a sense 
of belonging while watching games 
(2003). Although fans are precluded from 
approaching team members after a victo-
ry or defeat, individuals engage their fel-
low viewers by vocally sharing emotions 
and participating in bodily contact such as 
hugging and hand-slapping (Collins 
2004). This bodily presence is important 
for sustaining team commitment. There 
also is a common culture present among 
fans that makes it more appealing to share 
game experiences. Looking back at our 
original example, when asked if it en-
hanced the game to watch with fellow 
fans Bridson replied, ―Personally, I enjoy 
watching the games with other Sox fans. 
Last year when the Red Sox were playing 
Cleveland in the ALCS, I watched the 
first couple games in the Mews Hall 
lounge. There were four Sox fans: me, 
Jordan, Pat, and Julia. There were also 
two Cleveland fans and two anti-Sox 
fans. The Red Sox people were all in Sox 
gear [and] we bought all red food. How-
ever, we hated watching the game with 
those awful Cleveland fans that didn't 
even have anything Indians at all. So, we 
had private, Red Sox-only parties in my 
room and watched it without those pos-
ers. It was much better‖ (2008). Having a 
common respect and understanding for 
one‘s team helps fans connect, strength-
ening their commitment.  
 In addition to sharing one‘s fan-
ship with friends, fans often pass on their 
love for a specific team and fan 
unit  down through generations. Family 
motivation is another type of group affili-
ation that is often the initial socializing 
factor for younger fans. Children are in-
troduced to certain teams when parents or 
grandparents sit down to watch a game. 
In addition, many families take children 
to games in order to share their love of 
the sport or a specific team. There is the 
idea that parents can bond with their chil-
dren through the shared love of a specific 
team. Most researchers noted that female 
children begin watching sports in an ef-
fort to relate to male relatives including 
fathers, uncles, grandfathers, and brothers 
(Jacobson 2003). 
 Fans can also be initially moti-
vated by geographical factors. Many peo-
ple are drawn to local teams because of 
the convenience factor; they have access 
to games and events. Researchers have 
also suggested that ―residents invest 
themselves in favor of their local athletic 
teams, partly because those teams are 
exponents of the community to which 
they feel themselves somehow bound… 
[a local team is] a means by which that 
community becomes conscious of itself 
and achieves concrete representa-
tion‖ (Jones 2003). Becoming a fan of a 
local team helps a fan achieve a sense of 
belonging in the community, or rather 
helps a fan create an identity that projects 
one‘s love of a specific team to one‘s 
fellow fans. This identity signals how that 
fan wants to be interacted with, and as 
community members interact through 
participating at games and other fan 
events their commitment to each other 
and the  team will increase. 
 These motivating factors them-
selves are not responsible for fan commit-
ment; however they provide the initial 
interest that binds together fans of all 
ages. As fans associate with one another 
and share in the experiences of the game 
setting, these initial factors take the 
backseat to strong affective team commit-
ment. Bridson notes that, ―certainly, if I 
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did not grow up in Boston and my parents 
weren't fans, there is nothing else that ties 
me really to the team--but I am not a fan 
simply because I live in Boston and my 
parents are fans‖ (2008). Instead Bridson 
is a fan because of the sheer number of 
fellow fans in the New England area. He 
reveals that, ―Of the very many things 
that set people apart in Massachusetts, the 
Red Sox are something that brings every-
one together. Your friends talk about it, 
your parents talk about it, your teachers 
talk about it, you turn on the radio (and 
not just sports talk, but regular music 
stations too) and they talk about the Sox. 
The Boston news media is enamored with 
the Red Sox‖ (2008). Collins‘s theory 
tells us that it is this common focus and 
the communication regarding this focus 
that helps cement sport fan commitment. 
The fans relay a ―common mood‖ that 
emanates from their emotional reaction to 
the team‘s actions. When all of the fans 
share this ―common mood‖ there is an 
increase feeling of group solidarity. 
 
Formation of Social Identities 
 
 This interaction of shared emo-
tion with family and friends leads to the 
creation of both social identities and 
norms, both of which act as vehicles for 
fan commitment. It is important to under-
stand that individuals may have many 
different identities and people will act in 
accord with whatever identity meets the 
given situation. Often individuals will 
seek out situations in which they can in-
teract with the identity they are most 
committed to. These identities ―enable 
people to reliably anticipate each other‘s 
behavior, thereby underlying or strength-
ening normative and trust expecta-
tions‖ (Lawler et al. 2008). As people 
form behavioral expectations and norms 
based upon their peers‘ identities, they 
will begin to categorize their fellow indi-
viduals into in-groups and out-groups 
based upon similarity. ―An important 
implication is that if two or more people 
perceive themselves as a group, they act 
in a goal-oriented way without interacting 
with each other and without collective 
goals‖ (Lawler et al. 2008). This explains 
why sport fans can act as a unit and have 
strong commitments to their fellow fans 
without actually knowing each and every 
fan personally. 
 Identification is strongly corre-
lated to commitment intensity as well. A 
sport setting breaks down individuality 
which ―increases the salience of one‘s 
social identities resulting in a conformity 
to group norms‖ allowing a person-to-
group tie to form with fellow fans and 
increasing the commitment one feels to 
both the team and fellow fans (End 2002). 
Fans that boast high levels of identifica-
tion will exhibit high intensity and vice 
versa. Each win or loss will be felt per-
sonally. An individual with lower identi-
fication is able to ―cut off reflected fail-
ure‖ by publically distancing oneself 
from one‘s team and fellow fans; howev-
er, high identifying sport fans are unable 
to cut off reflected failure and may be 
forced to use alternate methods for coping 
with social identity threat (End 2002).  
 This high level of identification 
also helps explain why some fans may 
switch teams frequently, while others 
remain loyal even after years of loses. 
Red Sox fans in particular are known for 
their high levels of identification and 
commitment. In our example, Bridson 
demonstrates this intense social identity 
and commitment stating, ―There is always 
this tendency to ‗believe‘… that eventual-
ly the Red Sox would do it. It‘s very dif-
ferent with the Red Sox than the Bruins, 
Celtics, and to a lesser extent the Patriots. 
When those teams lose or have a string of 
bad seasons, they lose some support. The 
Red Sox don‘t. People still watch the 
games and still pay $90 to park in order 
to go see them play‖ (2008). Because Red 
Sox fans have extremely salient social 
identities and high levels of intensity they 
are able to maintain a strong commitment 
between fans even during their team‘s dry 
spells.  
 
Results: Affective Commitment and 
Social Order 
 
 Social identities provide fans 
with a reason and a mode for communi-
cating with their fellow fans, and as fans 
interact with each other they begin to 
develop a relationship.. Their choice to 
remain a fan through both good times and 
bad times is based on affective ties be-
tween these fans, referred to as social 
commitment. Social commitments in-
volve a tie based on sentiment and nor-
mative beliefs about the group as a whole 
(Lawler et al. 2008). Because of the so-
cial aspect of sport viewing, ―sport fans 
from the start are encouraged to display 
emotions, approbation, and partisanship 
in an open and free-playing man-
ner‖ (Kennedy, 2001). This freedom to 
express emotions and negotiate relation-
ships with other unknown fans creates an 
arena in which fans participate ―because 
they want to.‖ The instrumental gains are 
few; unless fans engage in gambling there 
is no other reason to participate other than 
the fun and enjoyment of being present 
with friends and family and sharing a 
favored pastime. As a fan, Bridson sums 
it up by saying that ,  ―The Red Sox are 
the embodiment of fun. You never know 
what to expect; when Pedro will be taped 
to the dugout, when Nomar will stop his 
crazy routine, or what Kevin Millar will 
say next. The best way to describe it... is 
really that it is just a "fun" thing to 
do‖ (2008). There is no transactional ben-
efit for a sport fan; they are committed 
simply because they love being 
with  their fellow fans. 
 Most individuals see sport fan 
commitment as a bond between the fan 
and his or her team; however, this re-
search has shown that the fans alone 
make up the social unit, not the fans and 
the team. Collins‘ and Lawler et al.‘s the-
ories have demonstrated that affective 
commitments form when participants 
engage in a shared activity that revolves 
around a ―sacred object‖ and attribute 
their emotions to the group as a whole. In 
a sport setting, the participants are the 
fans. They go to games together, or at the 
very least watch games via television 
with family and friends, to celebrate the 
team‘s wins and mourn the team‘s losses. 
They treat the players and team simply as 
a sacred object, symbolic of their social 
identity. As they recognize this feeling of 
membership, they begin to share emotion-
al connections; they collectively feel hap-
py when their team wins and unanimous-
ly despair when their team loses. All of 
these elements culminate in the recogni-
tion of an established social order where 
members are individual fans connected 
through affective social ties. At no point 
is there a tie or commitment made to the 
team or individual players. Fans almost 
never have the option of personally inter-
acting with players. Teams are simply 
seen as a vehicle for uniting fans into a 
collective body.   
 
“If life equals fun and fun 
equals the Red Sox, then in 
my book the Red Sox equal 
life.” 
General Sports 
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Business and Marketing Implications 
 
 Though an understanding of 
sport fan commitment is applicable across 
many different sectors, it is most useful in 
allowing ―sport marketers to tailor their 
promotional methods and marketing strat-
egies to the [prevailing] motivations 
[behind sport fan commitment]‖ (Wann et 
al. 2008). Research shows that fans need 
positive, concurrent interaction to form 
identities and strengthen commitment. 
Using the knowledge that group affilia-
tion is a crucial motivator, sport market-
ers can ―look at promoting activities and/
or events that facilitate enhanced opportu-
nities to interact and bond with other fans, 
such as ―tailgating‖ activities, team ral-
lies, or other interaction opportuni-
ties‖ (Wann et al. 2008). In addition, we 
saw that a sacred object was extremely 
important in cementing and communi-
cating fan identities. In our example, we 
saw how important Red Sox gear was to 
Bridson in affirming his identity as a fan 
and his distain of Indians fans that had no 
symbols to represent their affiliation. 
Knowing this will help sport gear manu-
facturers estimate the style and amount of 
sport merchandise to produce and the 
season and location in which to sell it.  
 Last, but not least, Collins com-
municated the importance of bodily pres-
ence in sustaining group commitment. 
This information will allow stadiums to 
create advertisements reminding fans of 
the importance and the excitement of 
participating in games with other fans, 
resulting in increased business and prof-
its. Television stations can also use bodily 
presence to their advantage. Television 
relies on ―fans-in-presence to create the 
necessary environment for TV fans-in 
absence‖ (Kennedy 2001). By filming the 
fans at the games in addition to the play-
ers they authenticate the ―aliveness‖ of 
the game for those fans watching from 
home, allowing them to feel like they are 
there (Kennedy 2001).  
 These marketing schemes are 
able to use elements of fan commitment 
to increase their profitability and, as a 
byproduct, enhance fan commitment as 
well. 
  
Conclusion 
  
 Fan commitment can be hard to 
understand initially; yet, after breaking 
this loyalty down, we can relate it to af-
fective social commitments that occur 
every day and see why fans are so attract-
ed to the world of sports. Fans enter this 
unique culture in which they are free to 
express emotions, negotiate relationships 
with other fans, and create and maintain 
social identities that are completely dif-
ferent than the identities assumed during 
everyday life. Geography, eustress, and 
group affiliation attract people to sporting 
events where fans develop identities and 
norms through repeated interaction in a 
shared activity. They learn how to read 
each other‘s body language and interact 
on a common level. As their lives become 
intertwined they begin attributing emo-
tions, both positive and negative, to their 
collective group of fellow fans. During 
each of these steps, fans become more 
and more committed to their fellow view-
ers and as their commitment grows it be-
comes a way of life. As one final exam-
ple, Bridson sums up his feelings on be-
ing a Red Sox fan saying, ―If life equals 
fun and fun equals the Red Sox, then in 
my book the Red Sox equal life‖ (2008).  
Such is the case with many fans, and un-
derstanding this process will help us un-
derstand more about commitment and 
society in general.  
 
The author adapted this article from a 
paper she submitted for academic credit 
in ILROB 2225: Commitments to Groups 
and Organizations in fall 2008. 
 
 
Sources: 
 
Bridson, Andrew. (2008). Interview. Cor-
nell University. Ithaca, NY. 
Collins, Randall. (2004). ―The Mutual 
Focus/Emotional Entrainment 
Model.‖ Chapter 2 in R.  Col-
lins (ed.), Interaction Ritual 
Chains. Princeton University 
Press. 
End, Christian Michael. (2002). ―The 
influence of ingroup/outgroup 
norms on sport fans'  ag-
gressive responses to social 
identity threat.‖ Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Miami University,  Unit-
ed States -- Ohio. Retrieved Oc-
tober 16, 2008, from Disserta-
tions &amp; Theses:  Full 
Text database. (Publication No. 
AAT 3043064). 
Jacobson, Beth Pamela. (2003). ―Rooting 
for laundry: An examination of 
the creation and  maintenance 
of a sport fan identity.‖Ph.D. 
dissertation, The University of 
Connecticut,  United States -
- Connecticut. Retrieved October 
16, 2008, from Dissertations 
&amp;  Theses: Full Text data-
base. (Publication No. AAT 
3118954). 
Jones, Melinda Jo. (2003). ―The meaning 
of sport-related events in the 
process of becoming and  being 
a fan: A grounded theory study 
of highly committed sport 
fans.‖Ph.D. dissertation,  The 
University of Tennessee, United 
States -- Tennessee. Retrieved 
October 16, 2008,  from 
ABI/INFORM Global database. 
(Publication No. AAT 3119285). 
Kennedy, Dennis. (2001). ―Sports and 
Shows: Spectators in Contempo-
rary Culture.‖ Theatre  Re-
search International. 26(3). 277-
284. 
Lawler, Thye, and Yoon. (2008). Social 
Commitments in A Depersonal-
ized World. Pp. 50-114. 
Wann, Daniel L., Frederick G. Grieve, 
Ryan K. Zapalac, and Dale G. 
Pease. (2008).  ―Motivational 
Profiles of Sport Fans of Different 
Sports.‖ Sport Marketing Quarterly. 
 17(1). 6-19. 
 
 
The Commitment Behind Fan Loyalty 
The NBA store website is one outlet that 
may seek to capitalize on fan‘s desire to 
affirm their team commitments through 
physical merchandise. 
  Fall 2010 45   
Any Cleveland Browns, Montre-
al Expos, Hartford Whalers, or Seattle 
Supersonics fan knows the loss of seeing 
their team relocate.  The Dodgers are a 
particularly interesting story, as they were 
the first MLB organization to move west 
and the last MLB organization to move 
spring training west.  From Brooklyn to 
Los Angeles in 1958 and then Vero 
Beach, Florida to Glendale, Arizona in 
2008, negotiations played a determinant 
role for the Dodgers organization.   This 
article focuses on these two negotiations, 
providing insight into the process by 
which moves happened then and now.  
The first move west to LA was 
marked by personal emotions, while the 
second move west to Glendale was a 
more formal negotiation bounded by 
monetary reasoning. Furthermore, this 
second move took place 50 years later, 
among vastly smaller cities, involving 
different club and city officials, and con-
cerning fundamentally different functions 
(permanent residence versus spring train-
ing).  Still, both relocations required sim-
ultaneous negotiations between two cities 
(the city the organization was leaving and 
the city they were transitioning to), ex-
tending two analytical perspectives: a city
-government perspective and a team per-
spective. These dynamics provide practi-
cal examples of negotiating theory in-
cluding, how parties establish and evalu-
ate a best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement (BATNA), how emotions and 
economics influence the negotiating pow-
er structure, and the intricacies of intra-
organizational processes. 
 
The Brooklyn Dodgers 
 
In the 1950‘s the United States 
was going through a transformation.  
Economic growth occurred throughout 
the nation, especially in the South and the 
West.  These factors placed pressure on 
city officials and the sports industry to 
move major league sports past the Missis-
sippi River (Euchner, 1993).  In this con-
text, the Brooklyn Dodgers found them-
selves at an important crossroads: the 
team had won their first World Series in 
1955, but was witnessing a decline in 
popularity and support.  
Ebbets Field, home of the Dodg-
ers, was relatively small, run-down and 
attendance at home games was dwindling.  
The field had only seven hundred parking 
spots for 32,000 seats (Ardolino, 2008).   
The stadium was also surrounded by de-
velopment, so there was no room to add 
seats or parking spots.  Compounding 
these problems, the Dodgers‘ fan base 
was largely moving out of the city and 
into the suburbs of Long Island; fans in 
the suburbs found themselves unable to 
attend games due to the inaccessibility of 
Ebbets Field (Kahn, 1972).  Ticket sales 
were leveling off, and even in their 1955 
World Series championship season, fans 
filled an average of only half the stadi-
um‘s capacity (Sullivan, 1987).  Further-
more, the team‘s ―Boys of Summer‖ stars 
were nearing retirement and the manage-
ment predicted that revenue would de-
cline as the team lost its top talent and 
had to re-build (Sullivan,1987). 
In hindsight, these issues fore-
shadow the Dodger‘s exit from Brooklyn 
in 1958, as a round of emotional and tedi-
ous negotiations failed to keep the team 
in its native city. The two main actors 
were Dodgers‘ owner Walter O‘Malley 
and New York City planner Robert Mo-
ses. Historians and sports fans argue 
whether it was O‘Malley or Moses who 
ultimately was to blame for the eventual 
departure of the Dodgers, but it is clear 
that neither of them paid much attention 
to the emotional connection of the Dodg-
ers to Brooklyn (Greenburg, 2009).  
 
City Perspective: Moses Takes on 
O’Malley 
 
Team owner Walter O‘Malley 
knew that in order to remain a financially 
viable business, the Dodgers would need 
to build a new stadium. O‘Malley envi-
sioned a geodesic dome stadium to be 
built at Atlantic and Flatbush Avenues in 
Brooklyn, but was met with fierce re-
sistance by city planner Robert Moses.  
Moses served as the head of twelve New 
York City planning agencies and was 
thought to be the most powerful man in 
the city when it came to urban develop-
ment (Ardolino, 2008).  Moses insisted 
that the stadium be built in Flushing 
Meadows, Queens, and refused to enter-
tain O‘Malley‘s plans.  Both men became 
locked into their positions, rather than 
taking a problem-solving approach to 
bargaining. (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 
2010, p. 166).  These negative feelings 
only grew as the two parties continued 
negotiations, communicating through 
written letters: 
 
It is obviously your 
thought that we can 
somehow go out and 
condemn property for a 
new Dodger field just 
where you want…this 
is absolutely out of the 
question…a matter of 
common sense (R. Mo-
ses, personal communi-
cation, October 20, 
1953).  
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As suggested by this letter Mo-
ses wrote directly to O‘Malley, the emo-
tional aspect of the negotiations made 
conflict personal.  Moses was focused on 
his grand plans to re-shape New York.  
He was determined to build a new ball-
park in Queens and did not care if it was 
inaccessible to the Brooklyn Dodgers fan 
base (Greenburg, 2009).  O‘Malley was 
looking for the best possible deal for his 
team.  Moses was assuming O‘Malley 
was dependent on him to get a new stadi-
um, thereby overestimating his own pow-
er in the negotiation process (Bacharach 
& Lawler, 1986).  According to author 
Michael Shapiro, ―had Moses been agree-
able, the world would 
have never been 
turned on its head 
and the Dodgers 
would not have 
left‖ (Shapiro, 2003).  
 O ‘ M a l l e y 
eventually tried to 
circumvent Moses 
and arrange a deal to 
build a ballpark on 
his selected site any-
ways, but Moses was able to use his bu-
reaucratic authority to thwart O‘Malley 
(Greenburg, 2009).   The failed negotia-
tions led to a deep seated hatred between 
O‘Malley and Moses, and O‘Malley 
eventually began to pursue options out-
side of New York City.  Both for finan-
cial reasons and to avoid Moses‘ influ-
ence, O‘Malley would eventually re-
evaluate his alternatives (or BATNA) and 
focus his resources on moving the organi-
zation to a more favorable city (Fisher & 
Ury, 1991).  
 
Team Perspective: O’Malley Looks 
West 
 
 O‘Malley and the Dodgers re-
ceived solicitation from Los Angeles, 
which viewed the recent relocations of 
other MLB teams to developing cities as 
an opportunity to land their own fran-
chise. During the early 1950‘s two failing 
baseball franchises, the Boston Braves 
and the Philadelphia Athletics, moved 
further into the center of the country to 
Milwaukee and Kansas City, respectively 
(Euchner, 1993).  With similar aspira-
tions, other West Coast cities were vying 
to be the first city to attract an MLB fran-
chise. Some officials had hoped that they 
would be able to convert a Triple-A team 
into a Major League team. The National 
and American league officials, however, 
did not feel that any of the Triple-A teams 
were strong enough to carry a Major 
League title (Sullivan, 1987).   
By 1956, most West Coast offi-
cials had given up on the idea of convert-
ing a Triple-A team—so their alternatives 
were limited.  Los Angeles Councilman 
Kenneth Hahn and Mayor Norris Poulson 
were intent on beating out West Coast 
competitors for the first franchise.  Initial-
ly, Hahn approached the owner of the 
Washington Senators, Calvin Griffith. 
The Senators were experiencing dwin-
dling public support and were searching 
for a new home. However, when Hahn 
heard the Dodgers 
were considering a 
move, he changed his 
mind and approached 
Walter O‘Malley 
(Johnson & Stout, 
2004). 
Originally, O‘Malley 
resisted meeting with 
Hahn, but following 
Hahn‘s unexpected 
attendance at the 
1956 World Series, O‘Malley agreed to 
meet with him. According to Hahn, 
O‘Malley showed great enthusiasm to-
wards a move to LA during their meeting. 
Over the next few months, O‘Malley con-
vinced LA officials that they would not 
need to financially support him as they 
would with other teams. All O‘Malley 
wanted was for the city to provide the 
land and he would finance and construct 
the stadium (Johnson & Stout, 2004). 
While LA wanted to be the first 
West Coast city to host a Major League 
Baseball team for political and develop-
ment reasons, there were economic re-
straints. During the city‘s initial discus-
sion with O‘Malley, Poulson commis-
sioned a review of a plot of land, known 
as the Chavez Ravine (Sullivan, 1987). 
The Chavez Ravine was owned by the 
city and, for years, officials had been en-
trenched in a political debate regarding its 
future (Euchner, 1993).  
When the city found that the plot 
of land was physically sound for a sports 
arena, many saw it as a perfect spot for a 
Major League Baseball stadium 
(Sullivan, 1987). To build a stadium, 
however, it was estimated that Mayor 
Poulson would need to set aside at least 
$2 million from his budget in the next 
year. In addition, extra funds would need 
to be taken out in bonds, which would 
need to be approved by the electorate. 
Thus, when O‘Malley announced he was 
willing to fund his own stadium, the offi-
cials involved were ecstatic—a compli-
cated negotiation was avoided (Sullivan, 
1987).  
While O‘Malley appeared enthu-
siastic to the LA officials, he still publi-
cally stated he would not move the Dodg-
ers out of Brooklyn. He was afraid that if 
the team or fans were to find out about 
the pending move, it would harm the 
1957 season (Johnson & Stout, 2004). 
O'Malley‘s reluctance to publicize his 
negations signaled to LA officials that he 
was not as committed to the move as he 
appeared to be. Ironically, this gave 
O‘Malley more power and LA became 
more and more accommodating as negoti-
ations continued (Johnson & Stout, 
2004). In New York City, however, 
O‘Malley‘s negotiating power was dwin-
dling.   
In New York, O‘Malley was not 
receiving favorable responses from city 
officials. One reason other New York 
officials were indifferent towards 
O‘Malley‘s mounting struggle with Mo-
ses was due to the fact that very few took 
his threat to relocate seriously. The belief 
that the Dodgers would never leave, com-
bined with the fact that O‘Malley had 
kept his discussions with LA secret, 
greatly weakened O‘Malley‘s negotiating 
power in NY. As Euchner (1993) states: 
 
City officials were so 
confident that the 
Dodgers would stay in 
Brooklyn that they were 
not aggressive in their 
negotiations… the 
city‘s disbelief of the 
Dodgers‘ threat to ‗exit‘ 
reduced the impact of 
the team‘s ‗voice‘ in 
lobbying the city (p.18). 
 
Therefore, when O‘Malley finally did 
decide to exercise his BATNA and move 
the Dodgers to Los Angeles after the 
1957 season, New York officials as well 
as Brooklyn fans were shocked. Los An-
geles delivered what Moses refused to: 
free land (at the Chavez Ravine) and the 
autonomy to design a stadium without 
government meddling. Ultimately, 
O‘Malley valued the move to a stadium 
of his own design in LA and control over 
all its revenue streams more than he did 
the aging Ebbets field or proposed Flush-
The Dodgers Move West 
Moses was assuming 
O‟Malley was depend-
ent on him to get a new 
stadium, thereby over-
estimating his own 
power in the negotia-
tions process. 
  Fall 2010 47   
ing Meadows plot in Queens. Among 
Brooklyn fans, O‘Malley became a vil-
lainous figure whose name was held in 
contempt with the likes of Hitler and Sta-
lin (Ardolino, 2008). The Dodgers would 
go on to bring numerous pennants home 
to Los Angeles, while Ebbets field was 
demolished and replaced with a low-
income housing apartment building.  
 
From Vero Beach to Glendale 
 
The Dodgers relocation to Los 
Angeles would carry implications for 
another aspect of the franchise, another 
city, another loyal fan base, and another 
round of negotiations. Vero Beach is a 
small town on the central east coast of 
Florida.  With a population of 3,600 after 
WWII, the town was originally known for 
its citrus products, its Naval Air Station 
built for the war, and holding the county 
seat of Indian River County.   Bud Hol-
man was a local businessman who had 
turned the air station into an airfield—two 
thousand acres, sixty miles of streets, four 
runways, and hundreds of buildings—
which was then leased back to him by the 
city (Johnson, 2008). 
The Brooklyn Dodgers had pre-
season training in twelve different towns 
and cities throughout the South and Car-
ibbean, but in 1947 General Manager 
Branch Rickey was looking to establish a 
―baseball college atmosphere‖ that would 
be the first of its kind to bring together all 
of his minor and major leaguers.  Bud 
Holman knew little about baseball, but he 
heard through mutual friends that the 
Dodgers were looking for a permanent 
training home. At Holman‘s invite, 
Branch Rickey toured the abandoned air 
station and saw potential in its open fields 
and barracks.  Driven by the strong per-
sonalities of Holman and Rickey, both 
sides ―quietly‖ reached an agreement that 
would not be announced to the press until 
eleven months later (Johnson, 2008).  The 
team pledged to upgrade the buildings, 
fields, and facilities necessary in ex-
change for a one dollar per year lease plus 
a donation of one exhibition game gate 
receipts to the city‘s airport fund 
(Johnson, 2008). 
This original agreement laid the 
foundations for future negotiations.  In 
1953, the Dodgers built Holman field 
(named in honor of Bud Holman) for 
$100,000 and agreed with the city to a 
twenty-year lease with a twenty-year op-
tion (Johnson, 2008). The team would 
still pay a dollar per year and would have 
to upgrade their own facilities in ex-
change for a minimum number of exhibi-
tion games and gate receipts from one. 
When the Dodgers‘ big-league team 
moved to LA in 1958, many questioned 
whether Florida was the logical spring-
training location for a West Coast fran-
chise. Uncertainty grew in 1960 when the 
FAA investigated the city‘s original lease 
to Holman and subsequent lease to the 
Dodgers.  This turned into a four-year 
legal and political dispute that was finally 
solved when the Dodgers bought all 110 
acres of Dodgertown from the city for 
$134,000 (Johnson, 2008). 
The O‘Malley family sold the 
team to FOX Corporation in 1997, and 
Arizona cities and Las Vegas immediate-
ly began to make offers to host spring 
training.  In 2000, the Vero Beach City 
Council and Indian River County Com-
mission kept the Dodgers in town by buy-
ing the land and facilities for $19 million 
and leasing it back to the team for twenty 
years at a dollar per year.  However, the 
FOX Corporation sold the team to Frank 
McCourt in 2003, and in 2007 he broke 
the contract to move the Dodgers to Glen-
dale, Arizona and a $76 million facility 
(Johnson, 2008). 
 
Team Perspective: The 20-Year Lease 
 
 Since the very beginning of 
Dodgertown, team executives have ques-
tioned the value of the facility.  Branch 
Rickey was the camp‘s main architect and 
proponent, but Walter O‘Malley—who 
originally had the same ownership per-
centage as Rickey—was in charge of fi-
nances and continuously asked if the ex-
penses were worth it.  Dodgertown chron-
icler Rody Johnson writes, ―Rickey was 
spending $250,000 a year on Dodgertown 
[upgrades, much more than any other 
team].  And because the Dodgers missed 
the World Series in 1950, O‘Malley felt it 
cost the club a million dollars‖ (Johnson, 
2008, p. 33). O‘Malley bought out Rick-
ey‘s ownership share in 1950, and the 
new General Manager, Buzzie Bavasi, 
―convinced O‘Malley that Dodgertown 
was worth it, that extensive instruction 
got players to the majors faster, and that 
they could be showcased at the camp and 
sold to other teams‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 
36). Buzzie Bavasi recalls that O‘Malley 
told him to ―sell enough ball players each 
year to pay for the operation of Dodger-
town‖ (Bavasi, 1987, p. 39). 
 During the FAA dispute in the 
early 1960s, rumors that the Dodgers 
lease was being cancelled led Dodger 
publicist Red Patterson to state that 
―already cities in Florida, California, Ne-
vada, and Arizona were offering training 
sites to the Dodgers‖ (Johnson, 2008). 
Johnson writes that during this time, 
O‘Malley told the city council that: 
  
The Dodgers spent $3 
million in developing 
Dodgertown and re-
ceived in return only 
$122,000 from exhibi-
tion games during their 
fourteen years in Vero.  
Other teams paid rent, 
but they didn‘t have to 
pay to build facilities 
(Johnson, 2008). 
 
As a point of comparison, Fort Lauder-
dale had recently built a $750,000 stadi-
um for the Yankees, Clearwater provided 
a $400,000 field for the Phillies, and Sar-
asota spent $200,000 to improve their 
park to get the White Sox (Johnson, 
2008). Despite this context, the deal that 
MLB 
Dodgers owner Walter O‘Malley had  a contentious relationship with New York city plan-
ner Robert Moses (left), but reached agreement with businessmen Bud Holman (right) to 
hold spring training in the ―friendly‖ city of Vero Beach, Florida. 
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resolved the dispute called for the Dodg-
ers to pay the city $134,000 for the land.  
Clearly, the Dodgers valued the Dodger-
town community they had created more 
than the money they could have received 
from potential alternatives.  
But with the big-league team on 
the west coast, a spring training home in 
Florida no longer made as much sense for 
the Dodgers.  In 1957, rumors first spread 
that ―Dodgertown would be a ghost town 
within a year and that California would 
be the training base for the entire Dodger 
organization.‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 63) 
Forty-two years later, Arizona officials 
asked LA fans if they ―would rather fly 
across the country to a fifty-year old fa-
cility or take a one-hour flight to a new 
one?‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 193)  The team 
had to compare all of the Dodgers fans 
who could attend spring training in Arizo-
na (but not Florida) against the old 
Brooklyn Dodgers fans in Florida (who 
were growing older).  
In 1998, right after FOX bought 
the team, the Fort McDowell Yavapai-
Apache Indian Reservation offered to 
build the Dodgers a $20 million spring 
training facility (Johnson, 2008).   De-
spite the change in ownership, many in 
the Dodgers organization did not want to 
leave Vero Beach; Dodger legend Tom-
my Lasorda met with Florida Governor 
Jeb Bush to ask for state money to remain 
in Vero Beach, and the Vero Beach Press 
Journal reported ―a feeling existed 
among many in the Dodger organization 
that they didn‘t want to leave 
Vero‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 192).  Fort 
McDowell‘s offer began to weaken as the 
estimated cost of the facility increased to 
$50 million and an Arizona law, which 
was expected to fund the construction, 
failed to pass (Johnson, 2008). Johnson 
analyzes how this deteriorating BATNA 
affected the Dodgers‘ negotiations with 
the city: ―As the Dodgers‘ negotiation 
leverage with Vero Beach began to weak-
en… one thing became certain; the Dodg-
ers had no choice but to train in Vero 
another year‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 193).   
 The next year, Las Vegas be-
came the home of the Dodgers‘ AAA 
team and provided the franchise with 
another spring training alternative.  A 
rumor circulated that the Nevada city 
would offer the Dodgers a $5 million 
bonus to relocate (Johnson, 2008). Dodg-
ers President Bob Graziano inspected 
potential sites and said, ―Our reaction is 
that it‘s real… But we are not intent on 
leaving Vero Beach. We just have to 
compare alternatives‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 
199). Clearly, the Dodger‘s attraction to 
Vero is only relative to the other options 
on the table.  Vero Beach responded with 
a $19 million buyout: $10 million for the 
property, $7 million for facility improve-
ments, and a $2 million capital reserve.  
This offer was slightly greater than the 
$18 million that Kissimmee, Florida and 
Clearwater, Florida spent for the Astros 
and Phillies, respectively, but less than 
the combined $48 million Surprise, Ari-
zona spent for the Royals and Rangers 
(Johnson, 2008).  
When Boston developer Frank 
McCourt bought the team in 2003, 
Dodgertown‘s days became numbered.  
The cities of Glendale and Goodyear, 
Arizona, made offers, and in November 
2007 the team signed an MOA to move 
spring training to Glendale for the 2009 
season.  The Dodgers would share a $76 
million facility with the White Sox, $50 
million of which would come from the 
Arizona Sports and Tourist Authority 
(Johnson, 2008). Later it became known 
that Glendale gave the Dodgers the option 
to buy 30 acres of downtown land as an 
investment, at current market value 
(Johnson, 2008). Frank McCourt had in 
fact initiated this discussion himself; he 
could do this because Glendale had al-
ready committed to having both teams.  
McCourt would later say, ―This is not an 
economic decision.  This is a fan conven-
ience decision,‖ yet in the end the Dodg-
ers moved because both of these interests 
were aligned (Johnson, 2008, p. 247). 
 
City Perspective: Vero Loses Its Grip 
 
Dodgertown originated from 
mutual convenience; the Dodgers found 
their perfect practice facility, while the 
town needed to find a use for the airfield 
and sought the big-league team‘s publici-
ty.  As the Dodgers‘ needs changed and 
they received more and more attractive 
offers from more fan-friendly cities, the 
city couldn‘t simply offer dollar-a-year 
leases anymore.  Now that local govern-
ment was pressured to produce a competi-
tive offer, how did the town, county, and 
state evaluate the economic and emotion-
al value of the Dodgers to all of its citi-
zens? 
 Since their arrival, the Dodgers 
were intertwined with the small town of 
Vero Beach.  The Press Journal said the 
five thousand fans who watched the first 
game in 1948 were the ―largest crowd 
ever to assemble for any event in this 
city,‖ and the day was ―probably the big-
gest day in the history of Vero 
Beach‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 18). Overall, 
the newspaper praised Dodgertown for 
bringing ―publicity worth thousands of 
dollars‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 22). As exam-
ples of the Dodgers‘ connection to the 
town, the Dodger‘s Dodgertown director 
relocated his family to Vero Beach be-
cause he ―liked the friendship of the local 
people,‖ shortstop Pee Wee Reese joined 
the local country club, and pitcher 
Baseball fans and media described Dodgertown as the best spring training facility in the 
majors for its access to the players (note the open-air dugouts). 
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Preacher Roe fished with local business-
men and even won the Indian River 
County fishing tournament. 
 One story from 1951 shows the 
direct economic impact of the team.  Un-
fortunately, the mayor of Vero had ex-
pressed to the Dodgers concern about 
―the growing number of blacks on the 
team‖ and ―worry about our young wom-
en.‖  In response, General Manager 
Buzzie Bavasi sent his traveling secretary 
to Miami to get $20,000 exchanged into 
two-dollar bills, which the O‘Malley and 
Bavasi families stamped Dodgers logos 
onto throughout the night.  That weekend, 
O‘Malley closed the Dodgertown cafete-
ria, gave the players the bills, and told 
them to eat out in the community.  As the 
story goes, the mayor called Bavasi Mon-
day morning and said, ―I get your 
point‖ (Johnson, 2008, pp. 37-8).  In this 
minor conflict between the city and team, 
the Dodger‘s economic value to this small 
Florida town could speak for itself. 
 Community leaders formed the 
―Keep Our Dodgers Com-
mittee‖ in 1998 in response 
to the Fort McDowell bid 
(Johnson, 2008). The group 
oversaw an economic esti-
mate that placed the value of 
the team to the community at 
$30 million, considering the 
weak local economy and the 
double-digit unemployment in the off-
season (Johnson, 2008). This value was 
$5 million greater than the estimated val-
ue of the Mets to nearby Port St. Lucie, 
and $10 million greater than a Press 
Journal assessment the same year.  The 
Press Journal broke down the estimate: 
$1.5 million Dodgers‘ payroll for 275 full
-time and 200 seasonal employees, 
$317,000 annual property tax, $300,000 
annual purchases from local businesses, 
$70,000 annual local charitable donations 
(including $20,000 to Dodgertown Ele-
mentary School), and all of the remaining 
tourism dollars from fans (Johnson, 
2008).  Bud Holman‘s son, Bump, said 
that by having the Dodgers, ―the time 
table for the development of the area has 
been advanced by at least 20 years,‖ com-
pared to neighboring towns (Johnson, 
2008, p. 160).  The committee estimated 
that during the 1994 players strike, when 
spring training was pushed back and 
shortened, ―local merchants, hotels, and 
restaurants suffered‖ an estimated $2 mil-
lion loss (Johnson, 2008). 
 The Committee also focused on 
the emotional connection of Dodgertown.  
Economic Development Director Milt 
Thomas remembered when his parents 
used to bowl with Dodgers outfielder 
Wally Moon, and said, ―The Dodgers are 
part of our culture.  It would be like tak-
ing the Metropolitan Museum out of New 
York… The Dodgers are as much a part 
of Vero Beach as the Ocean‖ (Johnson, 
2008, p. 188). One Press-Journal editorial 
compared the Dodgers-Vero relationship 
to a ―love affair,‖ and its breakup like 
―leaving your spouse after fifty 
years‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 177). 
 Despite these strong feelings, the 
town‘s sentiment was not unanimous.  
The intra-organizational bargaining pro-
cess of the city was one of the strongest 
factors in determining whether the Dodg-
ers would stay.  Businessman and long-
time activist Frank Zorc opposed the 
county‘s $19 million bid MOU, saying 
―the very idea of a community 
[providing] financial support for a private 
sports business is an abomina-
tion‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 201). Zorc him-
self ran for county commission, objecting 
to the bid process where local officials 
left no time for discussion or voter ap-
proval (Johnson, 2008). A mere ninety 
votes out of sixteen thousand cast separat-
ed Zorc from the incumbent, who sup-
ported the purchase of Dodgertown, by 
(Johnson, 2008). Many were surprised at 
the close result, as this county commis-
sion election was essentially the bid refer-
endum that had never taken place.  De-
spite the narrow margin and lack of align-
ment, the incumbent commissioner went 
ahead with the offer. 
 How was the $19 million bid 
value determined?  Indian River County 
Administrator Jim Chandler said that the 
Las Vegas bonus would have no impact 
on the county‘s position, and that the 
county had ―no intention of getting into a 
bidding war‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 199). Yet 
his offer was in the same range as other 
recent city and team agreements.  Experts 
point out the importance of using readily 
―available‖ information as anchors in 
negotiation, and the recent $18 and $24 
million (per team) agreements seemed to 
have resonated as comparables in the 
official‘s minds (Bazerman & Neale, 
1992).  $10.5 million came from a tourist 
and sales tax bond, $7.1 million came 
from federal legislation, and $1.4 million 
emptied out the City of Vero Beach re-
serve fund (Johnson, 2008).  It would 
have been difficult for the city to offer 
any more, but the total was very compara-
ble to other Dodgers‘ offers and other 
team agreements.  Despite all the eco-
nomic studies and emotional accounts, it 
appears as if the county‘s offer was simp-
ly the most they could afford to offer.   
 By the time the Dodgers did 
move, the economic and emotional con-
nection appeared to have faded.  Los An-
geles Daily News writer Tony Jackson 
wrote that only the Red Sox games sold 
out anymore and that, ―the bond between 
the Dodgers and the city clearly isn‘t 
what it used to be‖ (Johnson, 2008, p. 
242). The looming threats to vacate may 
have worn down some spirits, as well as 
changing demographics.  
Scripps Howard sports 
columnist Ray McNulty 
wrote that Vero Beach 
was ―no longer a mostly 
seasonal, otherwise-
obscure small town 
dominated by hard-core 
Dodger fans‖ (Johnson, 
2008, p. 242).  Having already offered as 
much as they reasonably could and in the 
midst of waning citizen activism, Vero 
Beach had no choice but to watch the 
Dodgers leave Dodgertown. 
 
Conclusion: Bottom of the Ninth 
 
The two rounds of negotiations 
encompassing the Dodgers‘ westward 
movement illustrate principles of negotia-
tions that are relevant for all sports fran-
chises.  
The negotiations between Walter 
O‘Malley and Robert Moses offer insight 
into the implications of emotion in nego-
tiation and its corresponding effect on the 
negotiating power structure and pro-
cess.  The negotiations surrounding the 
move from Brooklyn to Los Angeles best 
approximated a two-party negotiation 
between O‘Malley and Moses.  While 
other parties had a vested interest, the 
negotiations themselves revolved around 
these two primary actors.  Individual 
emotion played a large role in these nego-
tiations as both parties resented each oth-
Both Vero Beach and the many cities that de-
sired the Dodgers attempted to quantify the po-
tential impact of the team on their cities and 
offer economic incentives accordingly. 
MLB 
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er and each man had a vastly different 
assessment of their bargaining power. 
Further, O‘Malley‘s secrecy in his negoti-
ations with LA only bolstered New York 
officials‘ confidence that the Dodgers 
would remain in Brooklyn. This aspect of 
the negotiations further clouded the distri-
bution of power, as a BATNA only pro-
vides leverage to one party when the oth-
er is aware of the alternative (Lewicki et 
al, 2010). The economics of the 1950s 
may also have played a role in framing 
the negotiations toward a more personal, 
relationship-based model as observed in 
New York. 
 The story of the Vero Beach 
negotiations compares the changing dy-
namics between a sports team and its city 
by the end of the 20th century.  The origi-
nal Vero deal, just like the LA deal, 
showed how much the team valued land 
and freedom to develop it however they 
pleased.  Yet, the Dodgers ended up leav-
ing Vero primarily because of the money 
directly and indirectly offered to them.  
While the original Vero negotiation was 
also initially orchestrated by two domi-
nant personalities (Holman and Rickey), 
the later rounds involved many actors 
who all had different interests.  In this 
multi-party framework, the emotional and 
economic connection between the team 
and city became much more important 
than any one individual‘s opinions or 
beliefs.  This negotiation process was also 
much more drawn-out and visible; cites 
knew what offers were being traded 
around and Vero Beach recognized the 
possibility of the team‘s departure.  Given 
the openness of these negotiations, 
BATNAs played a significant role in es-
tablishing the value of the Dodger organi-
zation to both parties. Much more atten-
tion was paid to the economic value of 
having a spring training camp located in a 
city.  Both Vero Beach and the many cit-
ies that desired the Dodgers attempted to 
quantify the potential impact of the team 
on their cities and offer economic incen-
tives accordingly.  Though the Dodgers 
arrival in Vero Beach was linked to per-
sonal relationships and a qualitative as-
sessment of the area, their departure was 
marked by larger economic forces. 
 
The authors adapted this article from a 
paper they submitted for academic credit 
in ILRLR 6011: Negotiation — Theory & 
Practice in spring 2010. 
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The ILRSMC attends the 
Twenty-eight ILR Sports Management Club and Cornell students drove to Princeton University for 
the fifth annual Ivy Sports Symposium on Friday, November 19.  Hosted by the Ivy Sports Collaborative 
and the Princeton Sports Business Club, the symposium brought together 69 speakers from the sports in-
dustry in an intimate and educational setting.  Following are panel recaps, pictures, and commentary from 
the event. 
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The keynote roundtable featured 
some extremely experienced members of 
the sports industry who offered great in-
sight into a number of issues that are im-
portant in today‘s sports environment. To 
the delight of the Cornell ILRies in at-
tendance, Falk‘s first question was to ask 
Commissioner Bettman about the im-
pending collective bargaining issues in 
professional sports.  Bettman articulated 
his view that the best solution for a league 
must be long-term—he was wary of what 
he termed ―band-aids‖ that would leave 
larger issues unaddressed.  He also ex-
pressed a belief that the 2004-05 NHL 
lockout  fundamentally changed the dy-
namics of collective bargaining negotia-
tions, because it proved that a league 
could shut down and come back not only 
as a viable business, but better than it was 
in its pre-lockout position. Peter Moore 
offered a perspective somewhat different 
from the other panelists by noting the oft 
overlooked fact that other businesses 
within the umbrella category of the 
―sports industry‖ are affected by a labor 
stoppage besides the leagues themselves.  
He observed that EA has to develop 
games about a year in advance of the sea-
son, meaning that a labor stoppage could 
potentially mean a loss of tens of millions 
of dollars.   Because the NHL-NHLPA 
couldn‘t come to an agreement, EA 
Sports had to lay-off 200 employees from 
its NHL franchise that year.  They have 
committed to making Madden 12 regard-
less of a lockout, but obviously no foot-
ball would strongly affect their business.  
Moore‘s product also allowed him to 
speak from the fan‘s perspective, rhetori-
cally asking how fans would react to the 
upcoming collective bargaining negotia-
tions. Given the current economic cli-
mate, how would fans perceive multi-
millionaires fighting with billionaires 
over money?  
 The conversation then 
turned to revenue sharing, after David 
Falk pointed out that most athletes al-
ready have what amounts to revenue shar-
ing in the max salary cap system. Moore 
argued quite convincingly that the most 
important aspect of sports is the need to 
generate competition, and that, in the end, 
revenue-sharing offered a disincentive 
towards spending the money to field a 
competitive team. To Moore, the concept 
seemed entirely ―un-American‖. Howev-
er, Harvey Schiller countered that sports 
are unlike any other business and should 
therefore not be treated in the same way. 
With the discussion leaning 
heavily on the labor relations aspect of 
the sports industry, Falk asked the panel-
ists a wide-sweeping question around the 
issue: Did the NHL lockout work? 
Bettman chose to defer, as his opinion on 
the matter is clear. Moore used his experi-
ence with EA to make the claim that the 
NHL benefited greatly from having the 
most ―connected‖ fan base in sports. He 
claimed that product research on EA‘s 
NHL video game shows that gamers are 
more likely to use the management mode 
to run their favorite franchise. Because of 
this rabid, engaged fan base, he claimed 
that the NHL (and his NHL video game 
franchise) was ―much better off‖. Schiller 
also offered his thoughts, saying that the 
franchises themselves are more stream-
lined and therefore, better off.  See 
Mathew Mullery article on page 26 for a 
financial breakdown on this very ques-
tion. 
The conversation was then redi-
rected towards the NCAA, likely because 
it has been such a popular point of discus-
sion over the past year. Schiller declared 
that in ten years, there will be either a 
completely different NCAA or no NCAA, 
citing the changing economics as the rea-
son for the institution‘s ineffectiveness. 
Though he believed the system is broken, 
Keynote Roundtable 
David Falk, Founder & Chief Executive Officer, Falk Associates Manage-
ment Enterprises (Moderator) 
Gary Bettman, Commissioner, National Hockey League (Cornell ’74) 
Peter Moore, President, EA SPORTS 
Harvey Schiller, Vice Chairman & President, Odgers Berndtson 
“The purpose of collective bargaining is to make 
the game better.” 
 
-David Falk 
Falk, Bettman, Schiller and Moore spoke on a variety of current topics, including 
labor relations in professional sports. 
2010 Ivy Sports Symposium 
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Lunch Panel Presentations 
 Attendees were invited to two 
lunch presentations designed to give ad-
vice for students looking to work in the 
sports industry: 
 
Building Your Career: One Relation-
ship at a Time 
 
 Jason Belzer emphasized con-
structing a network through personal rela-
tionships. His point was that even the 
small things count, and that people appre-
ciate it when you help them.  When build-
ing a network, you are looking to advance 
yourself professionally, but your relation-
ships cannot be built if you expect some 
kind of help immediately. He advised to 
try to show how you can be useful, and 
hope that this will, in the long run, result 
in people wanting to return the favor. 
Extremely important in this was his rec-
ommendation to maintain contact with 
those in your network. Belzer also made 
the point that in order to be successful, 
you have to be aware of what is happen-
ing in your industry; for those interested 
in a career in sports, this means reading 
the Sports Business Journal regularly. 
Overall, Belzer‘s message was to build 
relationships by demonstrating your 
worth and maintain them, so that when 
you do need to ask for something, it 
won‘t be the first time you‘ve contacted 
them since you first met. 
 
 
How To Stand Out from the Crowd 
 
 Buffy Filippell‘s presentation 
had a different job-seeking focus from 
Jason Belzer‘s, but was no less valuable. 
Filippell encouraged attendees to know 
what they ultimately want to do, but to 
also be somewhat flexible. She illustrated 
that if you are too specific in your job 
search you ultimately limit yourself to the 
point that you can‘t find anything. She 
emphasized the importance of a solid 
résumé, an engaging cover letter, and a 
convincing 30-second ―elevator speech‖.  
All of these aspects of your job search 
should be tailored to the job you are look-
ing for; even if you don‘t have any direct 
experience in the industry, show how the 
skills you‘ve developed can translate and 
show your value by giving the tangible 
results you have produced.  Just as a track 
and field athlete would describe his or her 
performance with actual times, try to 
quantify your impact in previous jobs.  
More broadly, Filippell encouraged lis-
teners to be open to working in many 
different capacities. You should know 
where you are, where you want to be, and 
be on the lookout for creative ways to get 
yourself there. In sports, it is important 
that you be unusual and memorable if you 
want to stand out from the many people 
pursuing employment in the industry. 
 Afterwards, Buffy offered to 
critique resumes, which two Cornell stu-
dents, Mateo Hernandez-Ysasi (CALS 
‘14) and Jennifer Baker (MBA ‘12), en-
thusiastically participated in.  Mateo said 
Buffy‘s advice to look for broad career 
opportunities before narrowing down his 
focus after time and experience was most 
helpful.  Jennifer recounted how one‘s 
resume must clearly tell the employer 
why you want to work for them and what 
you offer. 
 
-Jake 
(Continued on page 54) 
Jason Belzer, President, Global Athlete Management Enterprises, Inc. 
Buffy Filippell, President, TeamWork Online, LLC 
Schiller admitted he was unsure of who 
can fix it and how. Moore, worried that 
money takes over and destroys intercolle-
giate rivalries, noting that many schools 
have changed conferences recently in an 
attempt to improve revenues. Bettman 
offered that for sports executives, college 
is a system to develop talent. All seemed 
to agree that the NCAA had some major 
issues on its hands that need to be re-
solved soon. 
Because the event took place 
with such proximity to the Cam Newton 
allegations, it was only natural that he, 
and the issue of college athletes being 
paid for their efforts, be discussed. Schil-
ler said that if they were to be paid it 
would have to be under an entirely new 
system, and noted that schools are already 
spending quite a bit on such costs as tui-
tion and facilities. All agreed that the 
Newton case, and others like it, are a re-
sult of societal issues and issues with the 
system as a whole.  
Overall, the Keynote Panel was 
a fantastic introduction to the day and set 
the stage for the rest of the symposium. It 
was an exciting year to attend due to all 
of the labor issues surfacing in the sports 
world. Though the panel was only able to 
touch on a handful of issues, it was com-
pletely riveting and surely entertained 
anyone who is interested in the issues 
currently being faced in the sports indus-
try. 
 
-Jake 
 
 
Who came? 
 
Over 200 students and 150 professionals 
participated with the 69 speakers in attend-
ance.  Our Cornell contingent was also 
made up of Sports Marketing Group mem-
bers, an organization we hope to have 
continued interactions with in the future.  A 
breakdown of attendance by Ivy school: 
Other organizations in attendance include: 
 
The New York Times, Activ8Social, Com-
cast, Harlem Globetrotters, USTA, Gold-
man Sachs, IMG, Turnkey Sports & Enter-
tainment, Madison Square Gardens, Popu-
lous, and StubHub. 
28 Cornell 
28 Penn 
22 Princeton 
19 Columbia 
13 Brown 
5 Dartmouth 
4 Harvard 
Every attendee received the above SWAG. 
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2010 Ivy Sports Symposium 
The Symposium‘s College Ath-
letics panel opened by allowing the audi-
ence to gain a little perspective on the 
diverse set of experiences present 
amongst the panelists, each of whom had 
played or coached at the NCAA Division 
I level. Each panelist was invited to share 
their point-of-view regarding the evolu-
tion of the student athlete; the pressures 
today as compared to what they faced 
when they were in school. Rick Boyages, 
suggested that the biggest difference he‘s 
noticed is the intense media coverage 
surrounding the student athletes.  The 
majority of the panel agreed, with Pat 
Cavanaugh adding, ―there‘s more trans-
parency now, which forces accountability 
on the players.‖ 
Discussion then moved to the 
issue of payment for student athletes, and 
safe ways to commercialize college ath-
letics.  On the issue of money, Michael 
Sheehey argued, ―money is money.‖ He 
claimed it was better for student athletes 
to get paid legally than for it to continue 
to go on under-the-table.  Former Men‘s 
Division I Basketball Head Coach Hugh 
Durham continued that thought, stating 
that athletes already get paid in the form 
of scholarships. WNBA star Candice 
Wiggins argued, ―education for athletics 
is a fair trade,‖ but wondered if the school 
had the right to take ownership of the 
athlete for their entire career. Should her 
likeness be allowed to be displayed on 
Stanford‘s campus? Mr. Sheehey won-
dered if the athletes really had any power 
at all in any of the issues being discussed. 
Although the discussion was 
engrossing, one couldn‘t help but take a 
step back from the conversation for a 
moment to realize the years of experience 
and exposure each panelist had. Each 
came from a different background: a 
men‘s basketball coach, a WNBA player, 
an associate commissioner, leaders in the 
business of sports, and even walk-on ath-
letes. The differing experiences and 
knowledge base made for a wide array of 
experiences to draw upon, and allowed 
the audience to get a feel for all angles of 
the collegiate athletics environment. Fur-
ther discussion included the scrutiny that 
college athletes face, the monetary issues 
that most colleges currently face, the 
large gap between the top and bottom 
schools, and a debate regarding College 
Football Bowl games. 
 
-Matt 
Marketing Agencies was one of 
the most interesting breakout sessions of 
the symposium. Many of the initial ques-
tions surrounded the role of marketing 
agencies in the wake of the economic 
collapse, culminating with questions 
about where these sports executives see 
growth in the business, and ultimately 
how one can break into the industry. 
 When the recession hit, every 
speaker echoed the same sentiment: the 
sports industry viewed the recession as an 
opportunity. Randy Bernstein stated that 
it forced marketing agencies to become 
more relevant and more accountable. Bri-
an Corcoran, who launched Shamrock 
Sports Group this year (during the reces-
sion), said that he saw the recession as an 
opportunity to make an impact for sports 
that need it, including bullriding, Nascar, 
and arena football. When pressed about 
launching Shamrock during this time, 
Corcoran reiterated that he viewed it as a 
Marketing Agencies 
Terry Lefton, Editor-at-Large, SportsBusi-
ness Journal and SportsBusiness Daily 
(Moderator) 
Randy Bernstein, President & Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer, Premier Partnerships 
Brian Corcoran, President, Shamrock 
Sports Group 
Christopher Lencheski, Chief Executive 
Officer, Phoenicia Sport & Entertainment 
Michael Levine, Co-Head, CAA Sports 
(Cornell ’93) 
Ben Sturner, Founder & Chief Executive 
Officer, Leverage Agency 
“All the panelists were eager to talk with the 
students.” 
 
-Robbie Cohen, Cornell ILR ’13  
Derek Eiler, Senior Vice President & Managing Director, The Collegiate Licensing 
Company (Moderator) 
Rick Boyages, Associate Commissioner, Men's Basketball Big Ten Conference 
Pat Cavanaugh, Founder & Chief Executive Officer, The Crons Brand 
Hugh Durham, Former Men's Basketball Head Coach, Florida State University and 
University of Georgia 
Michael Sheehey, Senior Vice President, Comcast Sports Group 
Candice Wiggins, WNBA Player Minnesota Lynx 
College Athletics 
Panelists represented diverse backgrounds and professional experiences. 
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great opportunity and the perfect time to 
do it. Chris Lencheski summed it up best, 
proclaiming to 
those attending 
that, ―While eve-
ryone else was 
looking to get out, 
the sports industry 
was looking at 
how they could 
adapt and suc-
ceed.‖ 
This eco-
nomic situation 
led to a time of very difficult budgets. In 
order to continue selling at a high end, the 
speakers focused on two primary areas: 
differentiation and the value of relation-
ships. Michael Levine, who worked with 
both the New Yankee Stadium deal and 
the Madison Square Garden renovation 
deal, stressed the importance of attempt-
ing to make the offer unique and creating 
value propositions for the buyer, differen-
tiating it from everything else that is out 
there. He also mentioned that if you are 
able to get multiple buyers, it allows you 
to drive the price. Randy Bernstein built 
off of this point, saying that once you get 
multiple buyers and sponsors, you can 
replicate it in other areas. He said that this 
is where you are able to build relation-
ships, which, as Ben Sturner pointed out, 
is ―what it‘s all about.‖ Sturner, who 
worked with both the NLL and the AVP, 
also reiterated the differentiation point, 
saying that you have to be creative to be 
successful. 
Despite the obvious hurdles pre-
sented by the recession, there is still room 
for growth in the industry. Chris Lench-
eski said that he feels like most people 
think the biggest growth opportunities lie 
in social media, but he feels like the ma-
jor growth going into the future lies in 
mobile information. He consistently 
stressed what he saw as the three most 
important areas, ―On the wall, in your lap, 
and on your phone,‖ with the biggest are-
as for growth being on handheld media 
and technology. Randy Bernstein added 
that he feels like the growth lies in people 
breaking into the industry being diversi-
fied and finding ways to make themselves 
valuable. As he stated, ―Sales will always 
be sales,‖ so it comes down to the people 
and how they can find value in a con-
stantly-changing industry. 
Finally, the question that most of 
the students in attendance were waiting 
for: how did you get your job?  Brian 
Corcoran started off by offering the seem-
ingly-paradoxical advice, ―Don‘t mention 
your passion for sports if you want a job 
in sports.‖ Instead, he stressed the im-
portance of talking about your passion for 
business and how you can make money 
for the company you are speaking with. 
He finished by telling the audience to be 
students of sports business, not necessari-
ly students of sports, and to use connec-
tions and plant seeds for opportunities. 
Ben Sturner focused on differentiating 
yourself and building on relationships. He 
suggested going on informational inter-
views, following up, and treating every 
job you get like it‘s the best thing ever. 
Chris Lencheski said that no matter what 
your job, work to be 
the best at it and 
make yourself indis-
pensable. He contin-
ued, saying that the 
first ninety days set 
the tone for your ca-
reer, and that you 
have to make the best 
use of every oppor-
tunity you get. Final-
ly, Randy Bernstein 
drove this point home, saying that you 
have to outwork everyone else – be the 
first one in and the last one out. 
The insights, opinions, and ad-
vice offered by each of these industry 
professionals was well-received and ap-
preciated by all in attendance, and is sure 
to be the focal point of much discussion 
going into the new year. 
 
-Edward 
 
 
“Tiger‟s biggest mistake was ever getting married.” 
 
-Phil de Picciotto, President of Athletes & Personalities,  
Octagon (Penn JD ‘81) 
 
Cornell Alumni 
 
The symposium was a great venue for 
connecting with Cornell alumni in the 
sports industry.  Gary Bettman (ILR ’74) 
and Michael Levine (A&S ’93) were enter-
taining and informative in their respective 
panels, and took the time to speak with 
our group members.  We also enjoyed 
talking with Mike Roberts (AEM ’98) and 
Steve Cobb (A&S ’05), both former varsity 
basketball players and entrepreneurs in 
the sports marketing and branding area.  
See back cover for a group picture with 
Levine (center) and Cobb (far left). 
The day was filled with excellent opportunities for professionals and students alike to network with others who are interested in and 
involved with the sports industry.  
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The final session of the day in-
cluded a panel on ―Global Soccer‖, meant 
to discuss the future of soccer in America, 
in terms of both the men‘s and women‘s 
games and analyzing the past.  
American soccer has developed 
at both the national team and the MLS, 
with the league‘s recent expansion of 
seven teams in the last six years. Dan 
Cherry, of the New York Cosmos, who 
could potentially join the MLS in the 
coming years, said that the MLS can con-
tinue to grow; however, this growth must 
be steady and stable. Steady and stable 
growth will keep the league from overex-
tending its resources as the demographic 
of the MLS fan changes.  The English 
Simons was bullish on ―Americanizing 
soccer‖. 
Wolff gave some input as to 
soccer on ESPN‘s foreign networks. The 
popular European leagues such as the 
English Premier League get the prime-
time broadcast spots, but Wolff credited 
the MLS and its long term strategy. Wolff 
agreed with Cherry in that if the MLS did 
not keep its growth level sustainable there 
would inevitably be a drop off. Wolff‘s 
final point on the MLS was that there are 
very few players (David Beckham, Thier-
ry Henry, Landon Donovan etc.) who 
have the superstar status that other profes-
sional athletes achieve and this has al-
lowed for the focus to be on the field.  
Having both the LA Galaxy and 
New York Red Bulls recently eliminated 
from the MLS Cup, Simmons then posed 
the question of whether the lack of stars 
in the tournament is bad for league devel-
opment. The general consensus from the 
panel was that having the league‘s stars 
involved in the playoffs could have been 
better for the league, but it is far from a 
worry and will allow for other players to 
be in the spotlight for the time being.  
Hopkins chose to instead look at 
the progression of the women‘s game in 
this country. In the early 1990s the team 
was dominant, but they got nothing in 
terms of equipment, accommodations etc.  
Now the level of talent is the same, but 
they receive the benefits that they de-
serve.  
Harvey continued with the wom-
en‘s soccer discussion explaining that the 
hardest part of her career was trying to 
start Women‘s Professional Soccer 
league. Harvey feels that the market is 
there, however WPS will not develop 
easily. The current six team league could 
fail for same reasons that WUSA failed; 
financial and management issues, or it 
could be a young MLB or NFL.  Harvey 
explained that a lot of the development is 
on the shoulders of the team owners. 
The panelists then discussed 
some of the differences between the MLS 
and the European soccer industry. For 
example, in Europe it is simply an open 
market and teams like Real Madrd and 
Barcelona must create their own capital to 
invest in players, who hopefully perform 
well and thus generate more interest and 
eventually pay dividends.  If  these play-
ers do not account for their transfer fee, 
their teams get into debt.  
The topic then swung to recent 
developments regarding consumers. 
Wolff discussed the ESPN goals app for 
smartphones, which allows the user to 
watch every goal from whatever league 
they purchase. Wolff explained the func-
tionality of this app saying that once you 
buy something, you want every aspect 
possible. Harvey added that the develop-
ment of technology can potentially bene-
fit the smaller leagues thanks to increased 
player exposure. She used the example of 
Ron Artest tweeting during halftime of a 
basketball game as something that can 
lead to increased fan interest. Cherry 
agreed that progressiveness can help gen-
erate interest, but also stressed the im-
portance of tradition and heritage in soc-
cer. Looking at the clubs overseas, the 
passion is incredible and shows that there 
can be growth in the states. 
Continuing looking at the fans, 
Cornell students engaged the panelists with questions throughout the symposium. 
Global Soccer 
Simon Cummins, Managing Director, International Sports Practice, Odgers 
Berndtson Executive Search (Moderator) 
Jim Brown, Principal, JBC International and Advisor, 2014 FIFA World Cup 
Dan Cherry III, Chief Marketing Officer, The New York Cosmos (Penn ’00) 
Mary Harvey, Former Chief Operating Officer, Women's Professional Soc-
cer and Former Director of Development, FIFA 
Gary Hopkins, President & Chief Executive Officer, G7 Sports 
Shawn Hunter, Former President & Chief Executive Officer, Club Deportivo 
Chivas USA 
Begoña Sanz, Deputy Sales & Marketing Managing Director, Real Madrid 
Club de Fútbol 
Russell Wolff, Executive Vice President & Managing Director, ESPN Inter-
national (Dartmouth ’89, Dartmouth MBA ’94) 
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the panelists addressed the overall watch-
ing experience in the US versus overseas. 
The feeling was that, though there will be 
a bit of ―Americanizing‖ the experience 
abroad, we will not be seeing anything 
drastic like the addition of media 
timeouts. The changes that will be made 
are more the modernizing of the stadi-
ums. One example was Arsenal‘s Emir-
ates Stadium, which has more jumbo-
trons, and a better sound system than its 
predecessor, Highbury Stadium.  
The panelists were then given 
the opportunity to present a final random 
but relevant thought. Wolff, looking to 
the fan and focused on the broadcast side 
said that the 2014 World Cup in Brazil is 
perfect for attracting fans on television 
because games will be on at watchable 
times whereas the past 4 world cups 
(France, Korea and Japan, Germany and 
South Africa) had games broadcast at 
very awkward hours in the US. Hunter 
stressed that it could be huge for US soc-
cer if the 2018 or 2022 World Cup were 
in the US, but it is in no way disastrous if 
that is not the case. Brown touched on 
technology in soccer, saying that FIFA 
spent loads of money on the refs for the 
2010 World Cup, but there were still er-
rors. He said simply that is the human 
element of refereeing in soccer, which 
has been present since the game‘s crea-
tion. 
Harvey, Brown and Hopkins 
pointed out the growth of the women‘s 
game. Harvey stated that currently 1 in 10 
soccer players worldwide are female, 
while this ratio for new soccer players is 
1 in 5.  Brown continued by explaining 
that for the 2003 and 2007 Women‘s 
World Cup there was no competition for 
hosting, but there have been multiple bids 
to host the 2011 cup. Hopkins explained 
that women‘s soccer in the US grew dras-
tically thanks to the 
performances of 
the likes of Mia 
Hamm and Brandi 
Chastain and that 
the men‘s game 
could see similar 
growth if the US 
were to host and do 
well in a World 
Cup.  
H o p k i n s 
added that legaliz-
ing gambling might 
add to interest as 
everyday people 
with no team alle-
giance could have a 
vested interest. 
Hopkins explained 
that in the UK you 
can bet on anything 
from the score to 
the color of the 
keeper‘s gloves. 
Sanz then coun-
tered by pointing 
out that Real Ma-
drid is sometimes 
forced to play with-
out their sponsor 
―Bwin‖ because of 
its association with 
gambling.  
This panel 
provided many 
different vantage 
points on the game 
of soccer from Real 
Madrid, maybe the 
most storied club in 
the world, to mem-
bers of FIFA, the 
game‘s governing body, and everywhere 
in between.  Although the U.S. did not 
win the world cups, the respective mem-
bers of the Global Soccer panel were still 
bullish on soccer in the US as the MLS 
grows and the national team keeps im-
proving.  
 
-Ramzi 
“The symposium reinforced the thought that I 
would want to someday enter the sports industry 
as a career.” 
 
-Edward Christian, Cornell ILR ’11  
The Ivy Sports Symposium is awarded to a different member 
club and university each year.  The University of Pennsylvania 
Undergraduate Sports Business Club will host the 2011 Sympo-
sium in Philadelphia next November.  The ILRSMC and Cornell 
plan to submit a bid to host in the near future.  Follow the event 
on twitter, facebook, and at sportssymposium.org for updates.  
We hope you will join us at future symposiums. 
 
The Ivy Sports Collaborative 
 
The ISC is an umbrella organization of 
the ILRSMC and other sports business 
clubs at all Ivy universities.  Dedicated 
towards educating students about the in-
dustry and facilitating career opportunities, 
the network offers a job board, newsletter, 
and advice and support for all member 
clubs.  Learn more and sign-up for free at 
ivysportsbusiness.com. 
The network also played an integral 
role in planning the symposium and pro-
moting it to member schools.  Undergradu-
ate executive board members from Brown, 
Cornell, Penn, and Princeton served on 
the planning committee by helping formu-
late panels, invite speakers, design the 
program, and all the responsibilities that 
go into making this event happen.  Special 
thanks goes to network alumni co-chair 
and symposium founder and executive 
director Chris Chaney (Princeton ’07) for 
his vision, leadership, and motivation in 
making the event as professional and re-
warding as possible. 
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Where did your interest in law come 
from? 
 
 I always had an idea that I might 
be interested in law school, but didn‘t 
decide until after my junior year at Cor-
nell.  I spent a semester at Cornell in 
Washington where I worked at the NLRB 
D.C. office, and then worked at the De-
partment of Labor for that summer.  At 
the NLRB, I had the opportunity to write 
opinions and do substantive work that I 
found interesting. That definitely solidi-
fied my decision to study law.  My super-
visor at the NLRB wrote my law school 
recommendation letter. 
 
Would you say you were interested in law 
before sports? 
 
 Absolutely.  I didn‘t even think 
about sports until I was at Proskauer.  I 
think this is the better way for students to 
make decisions: specialize in a particular 
field or area before you decide to focus 
on a particular industry.  I choose to pur-
sue a career in labor law which eventually 
provided me the opportunity to transition 
into sports law.  There is really no such 
thing as sports lawyers; rather there are 
corporate attorneys, labor attorneys, I.P 
attorneys, and antitrust attorneys who 
specialize in the sports industry. 
 
What aspects of ILR and your Cornell 
experience do you most remember? 
 
 Professor Nick Salvatore—I 
found labor history very interesting, even 
though the subject isn‘t directly relevant 
to the work I do now.  To this day, I re-
member reading about Eugene Debs and 
the Industrial Workers of the World.  
Classes in subjects that probably will not 
have any applicability to your career are 
valuable in giving you a broader perspec-
tive and I would urge students to learn 
about as many different areas as possible 
in college. I do wish that I had taken a 
second language such as Spanish at Cor-
nell, which is more important than stu-
dents may realize for many careers.  
Coming from ILR, I went into law school 
with a strong background in labor law, 
but I didn‘t truly begin to understand 
what lawyers actually do until I began 
work as an associate at Proskauer. 
 
Could you give a brief introduction to the 
function of the MLB Labor Relations De-
partment?   
 
 The department is comprised of 
both lawyers and non-lawyers.  The attor-
neys are responsible for negotiating the 
collective bargaining agreements with the 
MLB Players Association and World 
Umpires Association, handling grievanc-
es and disputes under the contracts, advis-
ing clubs on contract issue, administering 
the drug testing programs, and handling 
issues involving minor league and inter-
national players (e.g., Dominican Repub-
lic), among other things.  Non-lawyers 
have business, economics, or statistical 
backgrounds, and provide advice to Clubs 
on player compensation issues, oversee 
the salary arbitration and Rule IV draft 
support programs, and provide quantita-
tive analysis regarding the revenue shar-
ing system, the competitive balance tax, 
and general industry economics. 
 
What would a typical day or week in-the-
life look like for you? 
 
 There is no typical routine, as 
there are always dozens of tasks and pro-
jects going simultaneously.  A lot of my 
time is spent in meetings, on the phone, 
and traveling (including our time in Or-
lando for the winter meetings and owner 
meetings).  Either Rob Manfred, me, or 
someone from our group speaks to repre-
sentatives of the Players Association and 
WUA virtually every day. 
 Much of what we do is cyclical 
based on the baseball calendar.  Salary 
arbitration takes up most of late January 
and February, much of March is spent in 
Florida or Arizona for Spring Training 
meetings, the Rule IV draft and grievance 
arbitrations occur during the season, and 
the off-season is consumed by the major 
industry meetings and planning for the 
next season. 
 
How do you compare the value of a JD, 
MBA, or masters in sports management 
in this industry? 
 
 The sports industry is filled with 
both MBAs and attorneys, but the answer 
depends on your career interests.  There 
are very few entry-level opportunities for 
attorneys in the sports field, so most attor-
neys pursuing a career in sports law will 
begin at a law firm. As a result, attorneys 
tend to enter the sports industry at a more 
senior level.  I would never advise anyone 
to go to law school solely to pursue a 
career in sports.  You should only go to 
law school if you want to be a lawyer 
whether you work for sports clients or 
investment banks, etc.  An MBA is very 
useful for a person pursuing a business 
career in sports, and proficiency in statis-
tics, quantitative analysis, and financial 
analysis are very important.  A masters 
degree in sports management would not 
necessarily make you a more attractive 
candidate for the Labor Relations Depart-
ment, but it may for other jobs in sports.  
We care much less about sports-specific 
degrees than about a demonstrated record 
of achievement in school and at work. 
 
Working in the game, do you consider 
yourself a “fan” of baseball?  
 
 I am, and always have been, a 
baseball fan.  I was fanatical baseball fan 
as a boy, and either watched or listened to 
virtually every game of a team that shall 
Daniel Halem Interview 
 
 
 Daniel Halem ‟88 is Major League Baseball‟s Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Labor.  An ILR 
School alum, Halem graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1991 before serving as a partner in 
the Labor and Employment Law Department at the New York law firm Proskauer Rose LLC.  He was hired in Sep-
tember 2007 to replace Frank Coonelly, the current President of the Pittsburgh Pirates.   
 
 Daniel spoke with Gabe Gershenfeld ‟11 during the 2010 Baseball Winter Meetings and a subsequent 
phone call to discuss ILR, careers in the sports industry, and sports labor relations. 
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now remain nameless.  Now, I am honest-
ly not a fan of any one team so much as a 
fan of the game.  It can be hard to sepa-
rate being an employee of MLB and be-
ing a baseball fan when you are very 
close to the business side of the game.  I 
watch the emotional roller coaster that 
MLB general managers go through each 
season, and the pressure they face to put 
together a winning club.  Sports can be a 
very tough business.     
 
What are the characteristics of successful 
employees in the labor relations depart-
ment? 
 
 All employees are extremely 
dedicated (underline ―extremely‖).  They 
work all hours without complaint.  We 
are always on call – 7 days a week at all 
hours.  Whenever they are assigned a 
task, they don‘t ask about the deadline, 
but rather assume it had to be done an 
hour ago.  They are mature, understand 
confidentiality, and are very bright.  
There are millions of smart people in the 
world, but we look for individuals with 
good judgment and excellent interperson-
al skills, in addition to being brilliant.  I 
always say that you are only as good as 
the people who work for you. 
 
Baseball has seen work stoppages in 
1972, ‟76, ‟80, ‟81, ‟85, ‟90, and ‟94-„95, 
but has had 16 years (and counting) of 
labor peace.  What has made this possible 
and what will be the key to continued 
labor peace? 
 
 On MLB‘s end, credit goes to 
Commissioner Selig and Rob Manfred 
[MLB EVP of Labor Relations and HR, 
ILR ‗80] for establishing a more coopera-
tive and productive relationship with the 
Players Association.  They set the tone 
for the relationship.  A lot of hard work 
was put in by both sides to improve the 
relationship well before I arrived in 2007. 
 Developing a better labor-
management relationship is not easy, but 
requires much effort to build a level of 
trust on both sides.  Trust is not estab-
lished overnight, but develops over time, 
as the parties are able to work through 
difficult issue, after difficult issue.  Hope-
fully, the more constructive labor rela-
tions foundation that Commissioner Selig 
and Rob Manfred built with the Players 
Association with continue to grow over 
time. 
 From my perspective, having 
only arrived three years ago, we com-
municate well with the Players Associa-
tion.  In fact, we talk about issues virtual-
ly every day.  Of course, we have disa-
greements, and don‘t always see eye to 
eye on some things, but our discourse is 
always civil and constructive. 
 
These characteristics sound like universal 
labor relations principles. 
 
 Certainly.  All successful labor – 
management relationships share similar 
characteristics such as open communica-
tion, respect, trust, and a desire to work 
out differences without suffering a work 
stoppage. 
 
 
Your current CBA expires December 
2011.  What issues do you expect to be 
most contentious issue(s) going forward?  
What will be mutual gains opportunities 
for both parties? 
 
 Both sides have a joint interest 
in increasing baseball‘s revenues and 
expanding the fan base.  A bigger eco-
nomic pie is better for everybody.  
[MLBPA Chief] Michael Weiner has 
been meeting with players to identify the 
crucial issues on the players‘ side, just as 
we have been meeting with the owners 
and General Managers to establish our 
bargaining proposals.  At this point, it is 
too early to say exactly what the critical 
issues will be on both sides. 
 However, we expect that the 
economic issues that have been the sub-
ject of our prior negotiations, namely 
revenue sharing and the competitive bal-
ance tax, again will be discussed.  The 
system of amateur talent distribution 
through the Rule IV draft and internation-
al signings, and the post-season format, 
also likely will be topics of discussion. 
 
At Proskauer, you had the opportunity to 
also work with the NBA, WNBA, NHL, 
and New York Jets.  How do MLB labor 
relations compare?  Are there any factors 
that make baseball unique? 
 
 Labor relations are one of those 
―animals‖ where each relationship is truly 
unique and different.  Some of the differ-
ences are based on personalities, and 
some are based on the history of the rela-
tionship.  In addition, each of the major 
professional sports leagues have unique 
economic challenges and issues that af-
fect their relationship with the players. 
 Baseball has a mature relation-
ship with the Players Association that has 
developed over time, following decades 
of strained labor relations.  We work hard 
to maintain a productive labor-
management relationship which requires 
constant communication with the Players 
Association on issues, and a willingness 
on both sides to compromise.  Both the 
Commissioner‘s Office and the Players 
Association also try to avoid public rheto-
ric or criticism of each other, which can 
be destructive of a relationship.   
 
Do you think the NFL and NBA will play 
next year? 
 
 I hope they do.  I have no direct 
knowledge of their negotiations other 
than what I read in the media, but I hope 
they do not have work stoppages.  Re-
gardless of what is often reported in the 
media, leagues and players unions work 
very hard to avoid a work stoppage be-
cause the substantial economic damages 
that a work stoppage causes.  I think it is 
way too early to predict whether there 
will be a work stoppage in either the NFL 
or NBA.  There is still plenty of time for 
agreements to be reached, and I am sure 
that the negotiators on both sides will 
work extremely hard to the very end to 
reach an agreement.  
 
The year is 2020 and baseball labor rela-
tions are going fantastically well.  What 
will this look like?  What has to happen—
or continue to happen now—to make that 
possible? 
 
 The ideal labor-management 
relationship in sports is where the parties 
work together to increase the popularity 
of the game, and by extension, the total 
revenues of the industry.  When the eco-
nomic pie keeps growing, and there is a 
bigger pie to share, it is easier to find 
creative solutions to the distribution is-
sues we constantly face.  If in the next 10 
years, we can work cooperatively with 
the players to increase the appeal of base-
ball, develop more stars, maintain com-
petitive balance, and grow revenues in all 
markets, we should be in good shape.   
MLB 
  
 Back in the days when men were men, nobody worried about pitch counts. Ed Walsh threw 464 innings in 
1908. If you tried to take him out of a game after 100 pitches, he'd probably tell you he had at least another 200 
pitches in him. Despite the recent efforts of Nolan Ryan and the Texas Rangers to go back to the old days of not 
counting pitches, the rest of baseball still does so, so we might as well pay attention to it.  
 These days, a starting pitcher is usually taken out after around 100-110 pitches. Sometimes, this means 
taking out a pitcher throwing a shutout in the 6th inning because he had reached the 100 pitch limit. There are two 
ways for a team to get around this predicament: letting the pitcher throw more pitches (which could potentially 
increase the risk of injury), or increasing pitching efficiency (i.e., throwing fewer pitches per at bat). This article 
explores the latter. 
  It takes at least three pitches to strike someone out, but only one is required to get an out on a ball in play. 
Therefore, conventional wisdom says that a pitcher could decrease his pitch count by not attempting to strike out 
every batter. This is called pitching to contact. That seems good enough for most fans, but is it true?  
 A strikeout results in an out 100% of the time (ignoring the rare dropped third strike), but a ball in play 
results in an out only 71% of the time. That ―other 29%‖ results in more batters coming to the plate, which results 
in more pitches having to be thrown to those additional batters. On one hand, more strikeouts lead to more pitch-
es per at bat, but also lead to fewer batters coming to the plate. On the other, more balls in play (fewer strikeouts) 
leads to fewer pitches per at bat, but also leads to more batters coming to the plate. It is difficult for a pitcher to 
change his style, so he is essentially stuck with what his natural talents have given him. So holding all else con-
stant, which type of pitcher is more efficient with his pitch count?  
 According to Retrosheet game logs from 1993 to the present, the average strikeout requires 4.8 pitches, 
the average walk takes 5.5 pitches, and the average at-bat when the ball is put into play takes 3.3 pitches. Before 
you say ―but this pitcher is different,‖ these numbers have been tested against pitchers of all types--ground ball 
specialists, high-strikeout pitchers, high-walk pitchers (see footnotes). So these averages seem applicable to all 
pitchers, whether they follow the norm or are unusual cases like the high-strikeout, low-contact A.J. Burnett or the 
low-strikeout, high-contact Joel Piniero .We can use these pitch-count estimates to see how an increased strikeout 
rate affects a pitch count. 
 How about a real-life test of the estimator? Joba Chamberlain has received some criticism from main-
stream media-types about needing to be more efficient with his pitches, so he's as good an example as any. Joba 
faced 709 batters in 2009, striking out 133 and walking 76. Multiply Joba‘s 2009 pitching line by the average num-
ber of pitches per result, and you get 2,706 pitches thrown. How many did he actually thrown this year? 2,733. 
That difference of 27 pitches might seem like a lot to miss by, but it is only less than one pitch per start. 
 Joba‘s 2009 pitching line prorated to 9 innings, is fairly typical for a pitcher: 9 innings, 6 strikeouts, 4 
walks, and one home run. If 30% of balls in play fall in for hits, that also means that there are 10 hits allowed in 
those 9 innings. In that ―typical‖ game, a pitcher is expected to throw 153.1 pitches in 9 innings.  
 What about games that aren't normal, like one where the pitcher racks up a ton of strikeouts?  
 Here's an extreme example: Take the exact pitching line from above, but change strikeouts from 6 to 27. 
So the new pitching line is 9 IP, 27 strikeouts, 4 BB. Notice that the home run has now gone missing from the 
pitching line. In the first example, a home run occurred once every 36 balls in play. In this example where the 
pitcher either strikes out or walks each batter, there are no balls in play, and therefore no home runs. Using the 
formula above, the pitcher would be expected to throw 151.6 pitches. That‘s fewer pitches than the ―normal‖ pitch-
er would throw in a 9 inning game. 
 Let's look at the other extreme--a pitcher who doesn't strike out a single batter the entire game. Such a 
pitcher would face, on average, 44 batters per game, allowing 12.7 hits per game, 4 walks and about one home run. 
The number of hits allowed is simply an illustration which assumes that 30% of all balls in play land in for hits. 
This number is only necessary to determine the total number of batters a pitcher would face in a ―typical‖ game 
with no strikeouts. What matters here is that all non-strikeout and non-walk plate appearances end in 3.3 pitches, 
whether or not the result of the play is a hit. This pitcher‘s expected pitch count would be 154 pitches.  
 With this model, these two examples show that even at the extreme ends of the spectrum, the amount of 
batters you strike out, holding all else constant, makes virtually no difference in terms of pitch count efficiency--in 
fact, there‘s actually a slight benefit to striking out more batters. To the left, this same exercise is graphed out for 
every possible strikeout total, from zero to 27, holding all else constant: 
 The maximum value is 154, and the minimum value is 151.6. In practical terms, there is not much of a 
difference. So what did we learn from this exercise? The pitcher with no strikeouts would be expected to throw 154 
pitches, the ―normal‖ pitcher would be expected to throw just about 153 pitches, and the 27-strikeout pitcher would 
be expected to throw just under 152 pitches. Given a constant walk rate and balls in play out percentage, this model 
shows that, even in the most extreme cases, striking out lots of batters will not increase your pitch count. In fact, it 
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ILR Sports Manag m nt Club members with Michael Levin  ‘93 (center), Co-head of CAA Sports, at the 2010 Ivy Sports Symposium.  
Twenty-eight Cornell students participated in this one day event at Princeton University that attracted 69 speakers and panelists 
(including NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman ‗74) in an intimate setting.  Read Sports, Inc.‘s coverage of the event, starting on page 51. 
